JOHN BRIGGS
IN
MAHARASHTRA

A Thesis Submitted

to the

UNIVERSITY OF POONA

for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN HISTORY

BY

ARVIND DESHPANDE

Arvind Mahadeo Deshpande

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

Prof. A. R. KULKARNI

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

UNIVERSITY OF POONA

PUNE.

12.1.82

1982

C O N T E N T S

		Page
Acknowledgements		
Abbreviations		2
Chapter I :	Introduction	3
Chapter II :	Political Settlement of Khandesh...	38
Chapter III :	Settlement of the Bhils	120
Chapter IV :	Administrative Settlement of Khandesh	192
Chapter V :	Briggs and Problems of India	296
Epilogue		345
Appendices		356
Bibliography		374

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the life of a teacher, with his multifarous duties, research is inevitably a long and laborious process. He requires some one to guide him, and above all to bring him back to the path of work, when he tends to go astray in pursuit of his professional inclinations. I was singularly fortunate to have such a friend for my supervisor. It is well nigh impossible for me to put in words the deep sense of gratitude that I entertain for Dr. A.R.Kulkarni. Without his studied and analytical comments and without his encouragement when I despaired of research, this work would have been impossible. He made freely available to me the vast material he himself had collected from the India Office Library, London, during his two trips there as a fellow of the School of Oriental and African Studies. To borrow a phrase from Briggs : Nothing would give me more satisfaction than his approbation. My senior colleague, Dr. K.N.Chitnis was a constant source of encouragement and inspiration. His critical comments,and his analytical discussions helped me over many a rough patch. My young colleague Dr. Sushma Varma helped me enormously, particularly in the heuristics of this work. I sincerely thank both of them. Many other friends, young and old, helped me. Among them my special thanks to Mrs. Rajguru, Kum. Amita Rayrikar and Kum.Neelima Kulkarni for their willing help. The staff of the Jaykar Library, the Servants of India Society Library, Pune Archieves, Deccan College Library extended to me all the assistance and courtsey. I thank them all. Shri Sahasrabudhe has obliged me with his neat and speedy typing.

Poona,
Date :

(A. M. DESHPANDE)

ABBREVIATIONS

DCF	:	Deccan Commissioner's File
E.I.Papers	:	Selection of Papers From Records At the East India House Relating To The Revenue, Police, and Civil and Original Justice Under The Company's Government In India.
Ferishta	:	History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power In India by Ferishta Astarabadi translated by John Briggs.
HSI	:	Holkarshahicha Itihas.
Letters	:	Letters to Young Person In India.
PRC	:	Poona Residency Correspondence.
Report	:	Report on the Territories Conquered from the Peshwa by Elphinstone.
SPD	:	Selections from Peshwa Daftar.
JB	:	John Briggs.
Elp/ME	:	Mountstuart Elphinstone.
WC	:	William Chaplin

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION.

The conquest of the Maratha country was, perhaps the greatest military achievement of the British in India. [1] Hitherto, their conquests were preceded by diplomatic efforts and, were, in the final analysis, results of these efforts. Nowhere was conquest preceded by so violent a rupture as it happened in Maharashtra. The consequence, therefore, were bound to be of a larger and wider magnitude. It was only in Maharashtra that they had overthrown the ruling authority in a single though long-drawn campaign carried out over an extensive area. Sir John Malcolm claims that "..... we were compelled, by circumstances beyond our control, to pursue an onward course, and in spite of our wishes and resolutions we have been carried forward to supreme rule....."[2] Be as it may, the fact remains that it was in Maharashtra that the British were confronted, for the first time on so large a scale, with the problem of administering a conquered empire. In December 1817, the Government of India had decided to annex the Maratha territories administered by the Peshwa and that the Peshwa was to be deposed. For this purpose, the territories conquered from the Peshwa were formed into an independent charge under the authority of a Chief Commissioner. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who was named

to this office by the Governor-General in Council, was no stranger to Maharashtra. In 1801, he had been appointed as an Assistant to the Resident at Pune, later on, in 1803, he had served General Wellesley ' as a short of political assistant '[4] and finally in 1811, he was appointed as the Resident at Pune. He had been instrumental in bringing about the treaty of 1817, and on the whole, seems to have been the person most responsible for the downfall of the Maratha Empire.[5] His knowledge, not only of the Maratha polity, but also of the people and their customs, was undoubtedly very keen and profound, as can be seen from his various letters as well as from his Report that he wrote as the Resident.[6] On all hands it was agreed that he was the most suitable person to hold this charge.[7]

The task before Elphinstone was undoubtedly a gigantic one. In the final analysis it could be reduced to three main problems. Firstly, to establish the British authority over a people, who for the past century and a half had been politically independent, and for almost one century the most dominant power in India. Secondly, to win the confidence of the people and thirdly, to avoid any rupture of the peace. So great was Elphinstone's concern with the problem of administering the Maharathas, that he postponed the declaration of the British intention of assuming the government of the Peshwa's territory, decided upon in December, 1817, till February 20, 1818, when a large force

under Gen. Pritzler came to Pune and besieged Sinhagad. This he did because , 'in the native country of Marhattas, where I believe a national feeling still exists sufficient to prevent the people from assisting a foreign conqueror.'[8]

As for the introduction of British rule in Maharashtra, Elphinstone showed singular sagacity. He was a statesman, and he did 'hesitate to affect by forcible means, objects which are most safely and permanently secured by the slower process of moral persuation and political management.'[9] He knew that he had to win the confidence of the people, and to do that he must preserve the constitution of the country as intact as possible. 'It is, however, to be remembered that even just government will not be a blessing if at variance with the habits and character of the people.'[10] But Elphinstone did not believe that the Maratha government was unjust or intrinsically bad. ' It is of vast importance' he wrote to the Governor-General, ' to ascertain the causes that counter-acted the corruption and relaxation of the police and which kept this country in a state superior to our oldest possessions, amidst all the abuses and appressions of a Native Government'. [11] The change of government in itself was a great event. Elphinstone was aware of the fact that the conquest 'was so great and radical an innovation that there is scarcely any institution in the country into which it does not necessarily introduce great changes.[12]

These changes need not be all beneficial. In fact the introduction of the foreign government must bring in its wake ' evils from which this country has hither to been exempt.'[13]

The whole spirit of the native State was that the form of the government was highly personalized. People looked upto persons for protection rather than to a system.[14] It was precisely because of this that Elphinstone was skeptical whether the British would be able to maintain the form of the old government, though he certainly was keen on retaining the officials of the old government. Apart from its political consequences, it was not felt necessary to do away completely with the old system. Elphinstone saw and recognized merit in it. 'The present system is probably not bad in itself as the country has prospered under it'.[16]

Alternative to the preservation of the existing system was the introduction of the British system. Apart from the evils that he believed attended upon the introduction of a foreign rule, Elphinstone and other like minded administrators in India did not have a very high opinion of the administrative system then existing in British India. As Munro complained to Elphinstone, the ruling vices of the British administration were the British passion for 'regulations'[17] and English institutions for the natives. 'The natives of this country have enough of their own to

answer every useful object of internal administration'. [18] It was therefore not necessary to introduce British system wholesale in the Maratha country. But " so great an innovation " like the introduction of British power, was bound to be felt by the indigenous population. That they should feel it was inevitable. What was important was that they should not be alienated from it. It was therefore decided that the structure of the government at the level where the government comes in contact with the common people should be left as much unimpaired as possible. There were other considerations for this decision as well. The British government laboured ' under natural disadvantage ' [19] in that it had no honours like granting a privilege like " using a particular kind of umbrella or of riding in a palanquin " to satisfy the local gentry. [20] The best method to win over the local gentry, therefore, was to involve it in the process of administration. [21] But even so, " all places of trust and honour must be filled by Europeans". [22]

The administrative structure envisaged and implemented by the Commissioner " formed a chain from the Patil to the Collector....." [23] In this great chain the Collector was to be the king-pin. In his hands the governmental powers were to be unified. " Revenue, and judicial, and when practicable, military powers also, should be exercised by the same person "; and since it was necessary that the omnipotence of the British authority, symbolized by this one

person, should be felt every-where , " union, not division (of power) should be " the aim of British administration in India. [24] It was therefore necessary that ' the Collector should be judge and magistrate ....." [25] Settlement of so vast a territory was a stupendous task. The Collectors, who ultimately must do the actual work of settlement must be men of unusual character. The British authorities were eager to settle the country as fast as possible. It was therefore necessary to proceed with the task of settlement along with the prosecution of war. There was to be " no innovation, at least during the War....." [26] Munro, while replying to a letter of Elphinstone, expressed his apprehension at the possible appointment of Civilians to the post of Collector. " I think that, during the war, harm rather than good would arise from the appointment of Civil Collector ....." and he proceeded to advise Elphinstone that ' if you have any military officer conversant with revenue, it would be convenient to employ him for the present....."[27] Though himself a civilian, Elphinstone seems to have agreed with Munro, for out of five collectors that he appointed, only one was a civilian, Chaplin, and he too on the recommendations of and as successor to a great soldier, Thomas Munro.[28] Capt James Grant at Satara, Robertson at Pune, Pattinger at Ahmednagar and Briggs at Dhulia were the other appointments made by Elphinstone.

As Prof. Ballhatchet maintains, Elphinstone and Elphinstone and his junior Subordinates, " were the first builders of the new order in the territories conquered from the Peshwa".[29] The ' new order ' was in fact a dichotomy between the demands that were being made on the revenues of India by the Directors of the East India Company and the political vision acquired by their servants in India. The servants of the East India Company, those who left their impress upon the history of British India in the first quarter of the nineteenth century; men like Munro, Metcalf, Malcolm and Elphinstone, were inspired by a new ideal, the ideal of an empire as envisaged by Lord Wellesley, under whom all of them had served.[30] They looked ahead to an Indian Empire of Britain wherein the distinctive character of India would be retained. None of them were dreamers, and none of them believed that the British Empire in India was going to be a permanent one. As Elphinstone pointed out the belief that the British Empire in India " will not be long lived is reason and not prejudice".[31] The purpose of the work of these remanticist liberals who insisted upon a benevolent imperialism, was to postpone that day when the Empire would come to an end as far off as possible. And the end of the administration should be to enlighten the Indians in the art of government, and tie them close to the British government.[32] This could be done by involving more natives in the process of government. If

this was not done, it would degrade them, and then " it would certainly be more desirable that we should be expelled from the country altogether, than that the result of our system of government should be such a debasement of a whole people ....." [33] The aim of the government was paternalism, pure and simple.

On the other hand, the East India Company " treated its domain as an oriental despot his estate, to be exploited not improved ....." [34] The Company had lost her trading and commercial monopoly in India by the Charter Act of 1813, and the only monopoly left with her was that of political authority and the consequent authority of collecting revenue.

This conflict between a purely commercial outlook and a sense of enlightened mission, towards India was not a new one. In the eighties of the 18th century, the merchants of the East India Company were not very enthusiastic about accepting political responsibilities. Their attitude to the first Anglo-Maratha war was characterized by this lack of sense of mission. They wanted to keep to commerce and make as much profit as they could from their possessions in India. It was the remanticist liberal Burke, who revolted against this attitude of the East India Company. In his writings on India, and particularly in his speeches at the impeachment of Warren Hastings, [35] Burke drew a picture of India which was roughly as follows. India was a civilised polity

possessing laws, institutions and traditions worked out through centuries of effort, framed according to needs, and representative of the principles of human order, that is, the natural law. [36] Sir William Jones, the eminent orientalist agreed with Burke. [37] Burke believed that no people had a right to disrupt the natural order in any given society. [38] This was laissez faire in its sociological form. The antipathy of the free-traders towards the monopolists i.e. the East India Company in this case, led Burke to draw terrifying picture of the Indian administration.[39] Moved by genuine philanthrophy, Burke urged that India be governed according to Indian experience and traditions so that the fabric of Indian society shall remain in tact. However this concern for India in the late 18th century England, was more for the vindication of a point of view towards human government in general, than for the betterment of Indians in particular. The British thinking opinion was vastly ignorant of India. There was no derth of information about India with annonymous pamphlets, translations of Persian and Sanskrit works, travel accounts, memoirs of Company's servants etc. available in abundance. So great was the publicity received by items on India in the newspapers that it was accussed that a Governor knew that he was 'acting upon a public theatre, that his proceedings will be publicly (sic) recorded there and publicly judged of here'. [40] Burke went on to assert that it was 'the province and duty of

Parliament to superintend the affairs of this country' .[41] But most of the information received by the Englishmen was faulty and often the works were polemical and partisan in character.[42] Even the humanistic conservetism that developed in England meant promoting British institutions at the expense of Indian.[43] The excessive worship of reason and the belief that human ideas and institutions were justified only if they were based upon reason, led to an exaggerated view of the power of the legislators to shape the future of the world.[44] It was done with a belief that it will help India.

Most of these thinkers and advocates of better governance of India had never been to India. At the time of the renewal of the Company's charter in 1813, it was, for the first time as it were, realized that the problem of the government of India was not an abstraction but a pragmatic reality, and that it could be solved the best by the men on the spot in India, and that the direction to be given to their actions depended upon the ability of the directors in England to comprehend the needs of an alien society about which they had but refracted knowledge.[45] Hence, in the subsequent period, the Governor Generals, the Governors, the Collectors acquired a unique position in the British administration in India. Thus the foundations of a bureaucracy were laid. This realization made it possible for a Munro or Elphinstone to lay down a system within a broad framework of British ambitions in India. The discretionary powers granted

to the Collectors by Elphinstone were motivated by this same spirit and accentuated by lack of means of communication.

Whether it was enlightened paternalism of the Munro school or the fiscal interest of the Company in the collection of the revenue, the fact remained unaltered, that the administration must come close to the native population. The point at which the contact between the British imperialism and its Indian subjects would be focused was the person of the Collector. As Munro in his able minute of 31st December 1824 pointed out ' the good government of the country must rest very much on the talents of our local officers ....." [46] The office of the Collector was to be a trust and the duties of a Collector were " such as to make it imperative on him to know the real State of the country" . [47] This officer was not a distant civil servant, a bureaucrat at his desk, ' but a familiar lord, visiting and speaking' with the people ' of their quarrels and their crops, and looked up to as ma-bap.....' The office of the Collector was " to be the great executive office of local government, controlling in firm subordination, the whole inferior executive arm" .[48] The unobtrusive power of the Collectors to make or destroy, not only the happiness of the people, but also the system of the government, has been aptly described by Elphinstone in a letter to Stuart.

'..... every Collector does not consider the full effect of every measure he adopts to meet the calls that are constantly made on him. In fact he does not always (perceive) when he is innovating. One hundredth part of what he does can never be reported to me and what is reported must be instantly and hastily decided on. Thus rules are made ..... Many rules thus hastily made can never be retracted and we may find many years hence that we have inadvertently destroyed some institution or some feeling essential to the existence of the system we wish to preserve ". [49] If this was to be avoided, firm rules must be made which would make the Collector more of a bureaucrat than a public servant and his utility as a sounding post of the popular sentiment would be lost. [59] Alternately, he had to be conferred with extensive powers, disregarding the concentration of authority, so that he became a miniature government in himself. [51] It was the second alternative of making his Collectors real public servants and the powerful representatives of the British government, that Elphinstone adopted in Maharashtra. He, therefore, had to choose his men carefully and except in case of Capt. Gibbon whom he had asked to look after Ahmednagar charge, and who because of his obvious mismanagement had to be replaced by Henrey Pottinger, [52] he had no apparent cause to regret.

The Collectors appointed by Elphinstone were all young men. None, except Chaplin, had any revenue or administrative

experience. Chaplin had been the Collector of Bellary and was considered quite capable by Munro. Munro considered him ' the fittest person in the Madras Civil Service ' and ' a man of ability and temper '.[53] James Grant, (Grant Duff) had been a student of Marisehal college, Aberdeen in his early teens when he came out as a cadet in the Bombay army in 1805. He was born in 1789. Henry Pottinger, born in 1789, was educated at the Belfast Academy and had come to India in 1803 as a cadet in the Bombay native Army. He was a daring explorer,having explored Sind and Baluchistan. He had been a man of the world, but never had any revenue experience. In fact, 'he was better fitted to deal firmly with a crisis than to conduct ordinary administrative duties '.[55] Not much is known about H. D. Robertson except that he belonged to Bombay Army was made an Ensign in 1807 and a lieutenant in 1810. Briggs, born in 1785, came to India in 1801 as a cadet in the Madras army.[57] Most of the persons who later on constituted Elphinstone's official family had been young men in their teens when they came out to India. Except Chaplin, none of them had any preconceived notion about civil administration, and their Indian experience was confined to army about which they had good opinion.[58] Their lack of civil experience was considered by Elphinstone more than as an advantage than otherwise.[59] Except Chaplin again, all other Collectors had been associated with

Elphinstone when the latter was Resident at Pune. His wide knowledge and obvious sympathy for the natives and their institutions must have made deep impressions upon them. Chaplin shared the same sympathies, since his own patron Sir Thomas Munro had the same propensities as Elphinstone. Long before Elphinstone became the sole Commissioner for the Deccan, a view point, a policy to be followed towards the natives, had already emerged. [60] His young colleagues had grown into it and they became closely associated with the spirit of sympathy for native ideas and institutions. The dilemma before Elphinstone was : whether it was to be a government of laws or of men ? He had no patience with the Bengal or Bombay regulations, nor did he see it possible to fuse Bentham with the native 'Mamool' .[61] It had to be a government by men, and since it was to be so, he wanted his men to have the greatest understanding about the natives. These young men, who shared their Master's ideas, moreover, were bound to the system through the person of Elphinstone. The term 'family' , a typical benevolent patriarchal family, is perhaps the most fitting description of Elphinstone and his band of young colleagues.

On 3rd June 1818, Bajirao surrendered to Malcolm and the war came to an end in most of Maharashtra. But in the northern most district of Maharashtra , namely in Khandesh, desolatory war continued for a fairly long time. Khandesh, lying between the main seat of Maratha Confederacy at Pune and the principal confederates in the North India, occupied

an unique strategic importance. Bounded on the north as it was[62] by the Satpuda ranges, it also was subject to depredations by such tribes as Bhils and Kolis who infested these ranges. It was to Khandesh and through Khandesh that followers of Bajirao would flock and try to escape into the north. Undoubtedly Khandesh was an important charge, and Elphinstone recommended the name of Captain John Briggs of the Madras Army for this collectorate.[63] According to Elphinstone ' Briggs is (a) very clever, active and intelligent fellow ....."[64] Briggs continued to be in Khandesh till 1823, when he succeeded Captain James Grant as the Resident at Satara. He continued to be at Satara till 1827. In 1827 he went back to England and returned in 1831, when he was appointed the Senior Commissioner at Mysore. Within a year he resigned the post as he could not get along with the government of Madras. By Christmas of 1832, Briggs was appointed and had taken up his duties as the Resident at Nagpur. In 1835 he relinquished this post on grounds of ill-health and returned to England, never to come back to India.

II

The family of Briggs had had a long association with India. Within his life-time and recollection five generations of Briggs family had occupied places in the Indian army and civil service.[65] Briggs came from a Sturdy

Stock of Scotland. His grand father and grand uncle, Gilbert and Stephen Briggs respectively, had settled in Southampton. His grand uncle established himself there as a medical practitioner. Gilbert Briggs died as young man " leaving behind him three children, James Stephen and Elizabeth, scantily provided for" .[66] James, the eldest son of Gilbert, was brought up by his uncle to the medical profession. He joined the East India Company's services as a medical officer. James Briggs was twice married, first in 1784 to Martha, daughter of Mr. John Bryan Pybus of the Madras Civil Service. By his first wife, he had two sons, John and Stephen. John Briggs was born on 18th September 1785, and his younger brother was born in 1787. Stephen Briggs, John's younger brother entered the Navy in 1799, saw much service in the West Indies and died a post Captain. By his second wife, Miss Honor Dodson, James Briggs had two daughters and nine sons. The two daughters and one son died in the childhood. " His remaining eight sons all entered the public service in India, and five of them died in that country ".[67]

In his childhood, John and his brother Stephen, were kept in India in the custody of their uncle John Pybus. They were placed at the school kept by Dr. Winter. Shortly afterwards, John Briggs was sent to Eton. He was only nine years old when he was placed at Eton, where on examination he was placed in the forth form. The promise he had shown

was not maintained later, for when in 1799, when he was almost fourteen, he was removed from Eton, he was " in the upper remove of the fifth " form. " I am sorry to say " says Briggs,"that I benefitted little by my public school education ....." [68] In 1800 he obtained his appointment as cadet for the Madras establishment. He arrived in Madras on 10th July 1801.

The childhood of John Briggs was not a happy one. He confesses that " there was the ancient and proverbial want of sympathy and affection between us (i.e. John and his brother Stephen) and our step-mother ". [69] The two children spent their holidays with their mother's relations, where they had " examples of the strictest integrity and where any loose sentiment inadvertently expressed was sure to meet with instant reproof ....." [70] This almost orphan like childhood coupled with five years of public schooling, seem to have made Briggs an extremely tenacious character where and when his personal rights were concerned. This made him " a born radical " . [71] Throughout his life, he seems to have " throve on difficulties and disputations ", and he was never short of them. [72] Prof. Ballhatchet describes his portrait drawn when Briggs was 78 years old in the following words. " ..... a keen aggressive expression : the lips thin and firmly compressed together ..... "[73] Throughout his autobiographical notes reproduced by his biographer

Evans Bell, there is hardly any mention of his father; and whenever there is, it is cold and almost impersonal.

At Madras, John Briggs had to go through military training and also had to learn " the local language " ,[74] Hindustani. Briggs took both these trainings seriously. He paid a sergeant for extra drill at his quarters and " devoted as much time as (he) could spare to our Native instructor of languages ....." [75] Since he was born in India, he seems to have considered himself a part Indian and because of that, " fell into correct pronunciation " and was " favourably reported on " .[76] Having passed as an officer fit to join a Company, Briggs was posted to the 15th Native Infantry Regiment and joined it as Sixteenth Lieutnant. [77] Briggs seems to have had acquired somebad habits during his stay at Madras; because he says that " ..... before I was seventeen years old, I had been effectively <u>cured</u> of three fatal propensities, that of drinking and gambling besides that of smoking tobacco..."[78] His first station was in the territory then lately acquired from the Nizam. Before long he was ordered along with his company to take field against a minor but turbulent chief. This seems to have been a duty more in the nature of policing rather than campaigning. [79] After return from this duty, his company was detached to an outpost in a small Fort, whose commandent one Captain de Morgan, went on leave after the arrival of Lt. John Briggs

there. About this accidental command which devolved upon him, Briggs, in his autobiographical notes, writes with a touch of vanity. " I, at the age of sixteen and six months, was left as a Governor of an important post " . During the Second Anglo Maratha War, Briggs was made the adjutant of a training battalion. " I got great credit for it and I think I deserved it ". [81] This rather vainglorious self-esteem was not so much a part of his vanity, but indicative of a neglected childhood and the consequent urge to establish himself in the eyes of the world.

At the time of the Vellore mutiny of 1806, Briggs was in Hyderabad as the adjutant of the 1st Expeditionary (i.e. Subsidiary) Battalion. During the Vellore crisis, there seems to have had some minor trouble in the 1st Battalion, and as the adjutant of the Battalion, Briggs seems to have taken some very strong action. He blames his Commandant Major A.H. MacDowell, for not taking him seriously. "Maj.MacDowell never made any official report of this incident ....." [82] "Somehow or other his relations with me were never on a cordial footing after that day ...." [83] But a perusal of the incident in the words of Briggs himself fails to alarm us and we feel Major MacDowell's refusal to take Briggs seriously, justified. Briggs seems to have been a man of strong emotions, and it also seems that he was not a man to forgive. A serious rupture between Briggs and

MacDowell took place when both of them were in Khandesh. But it must be owned that if in this minor instance in 1806, Briggs was mistaken, in the major issues that were at stake in the controversy between these two men in 1818 over the principle of prize-money, MacDowell was in the wrong and the Collector of Khandesh received support of both the Commissioner and the Governor-General. [84]

That Briggs had taken his studies of Indian languages very seriously and had acquired proficiency therein is evident from the jobs on which he was employed during this period. In 1804, he was working as Persian and Hindustani Interpreter to the Army. In 1807 he accompanied Malcolm to Persia. He made a second trip to Persia in 1810 and returned in 1811. The embassy of Malcolm failed, but Briggs got invaluable experience, particularly in connection with his Persian studies. On his return he was appointed Persian Interpreter to the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force. It was during this year, on the 3rd of September 1811, that John Briggs married Miss Jane Dodson, the youngest sister of his step-mother. [85]

During the greater part of the year 1812 and 1813, Briggs remained at Jalana as the Persian Interpreter. He had undertaken, with the help of his munshi, translation of Ferishta's history.[86] At Jalana he went into it more seriously. But his duties as carriage and intelligence officer, led him into an entirely different field for the

time being. As carriage or transport officer, he "was brought in communication very frequently with that singular race..... of itinerant dealers ..... the Brinjarries (Banjaras)....." As there was no description of these people available, Briggs wrote an essay on them, which was published in the Bombay Literary Society's Transactions.[87]

John Briggs was appointed as the third Assistant to the Resident at Pune, Mountstuart Elphinstone, and Briggs joined him in early 1816. His other colleagues on the Residency staff were Francis Russel and Henry Pottinger.[88] At Pune also Briggs was given the function of an Intelligence officer, and his main job was to translate the various news-letters (अरबखार) that Elphinstone used to receive from different parts of India.[89] In his autobiographical notes, Briggs gives an interesting account of Elphinstone's modus operendi of getting intelligence. So accurate was the secret service that at Mahuli when Bajirao met Malcolm, he complained to the latter that the Resident " knew the very dishes that were served at his meals".[90] This account of Elphinstone's intelligence service is fully corroborated by the papers published in the selections from the Peshwa Daftar.[91]

In September Briggs left the Pune Residency to join Sir John Malcolm at the latter's invitation as Malcolm's Political Assistant. Malcolm himself was appointed by the

Governor-General as the Governor-General's political Agent with the Army of the Deccan under the command of Sir Thomas Hislop. [92] So, when the fateful battle of Khadaki was joined on the 5th November 1817, Briggs was not present at Pune. However, he had left his wife and children behind at Pune. His wife managed to escape capture by Peshwa's soldiers, thanks to the gallantry shown by the native troops accompanying her. This incident when reported to Briggs, left a deep impression on his mind. " Such acts of gallantry and fidelity on the part of our Native soldiers were not uncommon in those days, and were not, I fear, thought so much of, or so well requited, as they ought to have been ...."[93] His natural philonthrophy and his love for India seem to have been reinforced by incidents like these. But Brigg's house on the Sangam was burnt to ashes and along with it his whole library. Fortunately, the unfinished translation of Farishta was with a friend in Bombay, [94] and it survived the carnage to give Briggs his lasting fame.

In mid September Briggs joined Sir John Malcolm on the Narmada. Briggs was present at the battle of Mahadipur[95] that ended the war between the Holkars and the British. On the 6th January 1818, the Treaty of Mandsore was signed. Immediately thereafter, Sir John Malcolm was ordered with his Division, to go in pursuit of Bajirao. This led to the devolution of the office of Political Agent with the Army

of the Deccan on Briggs. He was present at the fall of Thalner and of Chandor in that capacity. In May, Captain Briggs was ordered " to take charge of the cessions and conquests " in Khandesh. [96]

Brigg's appointment was confirmed by Elphinstone and ratified by the Governor-General. [97] Ever since Briggs had left Pune to join Sir John Malcolm, he had still remained on the establishment of Elphinstone as one of his assistants.[98] In May 1818, the Army of the Deccan was broken, and Sir Thomas Hislop, on his way back to Madras, handed over the forts and territories ceded by Holkar and conquered from the Peshwa, into the care of Capt. Briggs. He was further ordered " to consider himself under the direct orders of the Hon'ble Mountstuart Elphinstone, sole Commissioner for the Government of our acquisitions in the Deccan ". [99]

Briggs left the charge of Khandesh in 1823 to succeed James Grant, the Political Agent at Satara. His stay at Satara, -- it lasted till 1827 -- was a quite one, particularly after a stormy charge like that of Khandesh. It was here, at Satara, that he did most of his literary work and completed the translation and critical collation of his magnum opus, Ferishta. [100] After a short visit to England in 1827-29, he returned to India and was ordered to the Senior Commissionership at Mysore by Lord Bentinck. He tried to follow in the footsteps of Elphinstone, and believed

that his position was identical to the Sole Commissioner in the Deccan. He also believed that he will get unlimited support from Madras government or from Calcutta against Madras government. In all these beliefs he was mistaken and the result was that he had to resign his office. He was thereafter appointed to Nagpur as Resident. " I am happy to have it in my power to show to the world that your honour and character stand unimpeached in my opinion by nominating you to the Residency of Nagpore....."[101] He arrived in Nagpur in late 1832 to find Nagpur " had not suffered from the transfer of the Government to the young Rajah ".[102] After the stormy stay at Mysore Briggs found Nagpur, calm and restful. However, his health had suffered great hardships. He had always suffered from severe headaches, and had to take large doses of medicine to keep it low. Sometimes, the attacks of headache would continue for three or four days together, rendering him miserable.[103] It was on the grounds of health that he lelinquished his post of Resident at Nagpur and went back to England in 1834-35. In 1838 Briggs was promoted to the rank of Major-General. Briggs did not return to India. His salary of £ 1,750 per annum, and the income that he derived from his Indian securities, made him fairly independent of official patronage. Besides since the day he returned to England, he may be said to have " gone into opposition " against the Government of India.[104] In England he associated himself with the Liberal

Party and joined the Anti-Corn Law League. In 1844, he tried a parliamentary seat, but lost. He opposed the annexation policy of Dalhousie as being immoral and potentially dangerous. He further warned that the loyalty of the Indian soldiers could be counted upon in ordinary - circumstances, but if their very social and cultural basis were threatened, they would desert. [105] He strongly opposed the deposition of the Raja of Satara and kept up a loosing battle in his behalf in the Court of Proprieters. He harnessed his pugnacious instincts to the promotion of philanthropic principles. [106] Briggs was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in recognition of his proficiency in Oriental Languages. [107] Already, i.e. in 1830, he was elected an Honorary Member of the Asiatic Society of Paris and of the Society of Universal Statistics.[108] In 1851 he was promoted Lieutenant-General and in 1861 a full General.[109] General John Briggs died at Bridge Lodge, Burgess Hill, on the 27th April 1875, just three months before the completion of his ninetieth year.

Sources for the Study :

The present study is based largely on the primary sources, both unpublished and published.

The Deccan Commissioner's Files preserved at the Pune Archives, Pune, throw a great deal of light on the career of Briggs as the Collector and Political Agent in

Khandesh. These Files are grouped in two sets, viz. Deccan Commissioner's Inward and Deccan Commissioner's Outward. The Inward Files contain the letters sent by the Political Agents and Collectors to the Commissioner. Those concerning Khandesh and Briggs begin with File No. 170 and run through about a dozen files, but not necessarily in consecutive numbers. The letters, obviously are not arranged subjectwise, but are arranged chronologically. However, the reading of these letters becomes unintelligible unless read along with the Deccan Commissioners Outward register, the files beginning with No. D. C. 401. These files contain replies to the letters in the Inward, or originate the replies that are to be found therein. Most of the revenue, judicial and political matters concerning the Collectorates are covered by these files.

The Satara Residency Files at the Pune Archives cover the Residency of Briggs at Satara. Along with these files containing the official correspondence of the British officials, the volumes of the Diaries maintained by Raja Pratapsing of Satara, are also available at the Pune Archives. They make a very useful supplement, and more often than not, a very useful corrective to the otherwise onesided official correspondence. The files of the Political and Foreign Departments of the Government of Bombay, preserved at the Bombay Archives, (formerly Record

Office) Bombay throw valuable light on the Nagpur residency of Briggs.

Besides these, the private correspondence of Mountstuart Elphinstone with his Collectors, preserved at the India Office Library, London, is also used herein. This correspondence has been partially transcribed and brought to India by Dr. A. R. Kulkarni, Professor of History, University of Poona. It is preserved at the Department of History, and it throws a great deal of new light on the persons and the period.

Along with these, the Jamavbandi papers of Khandesh and Satara, in Modi script, that are preserved at the Pune Archives give valuable details and statistical data.

Among the Published primary sources, the Poona Residency Correspondence, in thirteen volumes, may be considered as very useful for understanding the British attitude and policy towards the Marathas. Besides these, the Selections from the Peshwa Daftar edited by Prof. G. S. Sardesai, particularly volume No.41, throw a flood of light on the period under study. These selections are in Marathi. The Selections from the Records of the East India Company, (in 4 Vols.) are also of great help, particularly it makes the heurestical problem very easy.

The official reports written by men like Elphinstone (Report on the Territories conquered from the Peshwa) and

Chaplin (Report on the Deccan 1822) are important among the very useful published primary documents. Warden's Report on the Land Tenures in Bombay, 1816 is also an important and interesting document for comparison.

The published works of General John Briggs, which for the purpose of this study, must be considered as Primary Sources, do not present any difficult heuristical problem. His Land Tax is available in the library of the Bombay University. His other minor works like " Letters to Young Men " and his maiden paper on the Banjaras, are available, the first one in the Mandalik Collection of the Furgusson College, Pune , and the other in the Collected Transactions of the Bombay Literary Society, available at the Jayakar Library, Poona University, Pune. His Ferishta presents no problem whatsoever, as it is one work, in the words of Sir Elliot, which is available in almost " every town of India ". [110]

The biographical information is gleaned from Major Evans Bell's Memoir of General Briggs, London, 1885. Bell's book has the great virtue in that, he quotes at length - from the autobiographical notes of General Briggs.

1. Elphinstone to G. G., 18th June, 1818, Ibid, p.403. Also Elphinstone to Munro, 3rd May, 1818, Quoted by Ballhatchet, Kenneth, Social Policy and Social Change in Western India, (Oxford, 1957), p. 37.
2. Malcolm, Sir John, The Government of India,(London, 1833), p. 28.
3. J. Adam, Secretary to Government to Elphinstone, 15th Dec. 1817, PRC, Vol. xiii, pp. 270 to 273.
4. Ballhatchet, K., op. cit., p. 2
5. For the Early Career of Mountstuart Elphinstone, See Colebrooke, Sir T. E., Life of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone,(2 Vols.), (London, 1884).
6. See PRC , Vols. xiii and xiii
7. Munro to Malcolm, 10th June, 1818, Gleigg,, G. R., The Life of Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, (2 Vols.) (London, 1831), Vol.ii, p. 73.
8. Quoted by Ballhatchet, op. cit., p. 17.
9. Malcolm, Sir John, op. cit., p. 27.
10. Forrest, G. W., Selections from the Minutes and other Official Writing of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, (London, 1884), p. 57.
11. Report on the Territories conquered from the Peshwa, Ibid., p. 313.
12. Quoted by Ballhatchet, op.cit., p. 37.
13. Report, Forrest, op. cit., p. 315.

14. Malcolm, Sir John, op. cit., p. 28.

15. Report, Forrest, op. cit., p. 315.

16. Elphinstone to G. G., 18th June 1818, PRC , Vol. xiii, p. 410.

17. Gleig, Munro, Vol. ii, p. 172

18. Munro to Elphinstone, 12th May 1818, quoted by Stokes, Erik, The English Utilitarians and India, (Paperback Ed), (Oxford, 1959) (Reprint 1969, p. 19.

19. Report, Forrest, op. cit., p. 318.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 319.

22. Ibid., p. 318.

23. Ibid., p. 320.

24. Papers of Metcalf, quoted by Stokes, op. cit., p. 22.

25. Munro to Elphinstone, 8th March 1818, Gleig, op.cit., Vol. ii, p. 63.

26. Munro to Elphinstone, 25th January, 1818, Ibid., p. 52.

27. Ibid.

28. Munro to Ephinstone, 26th April, 1818, Ibid., pp. 71-72. Munro had suggested the name of Chaplin, and if he was not available that of Thackeray.

29. Ballhatchet, op. cit., p. 28

30. Stokes, op. cit., p. 9.

31. Quoted by Spear, P., The Oxford History of Modern India, (Oxford, 1965), p. 134. Also Gleig, Munro, op. cit., Vol. ii, p. 175.

32. Goeig Munro, Vol. ii, pp. 152 - 157. Minute on the State of the Country and the condition of the People, 31st Dec., 1824.

33. Ibid., p. 156.

34. Jenks, Mirgration of British Capital, p. 209.

35. The works of Edmund Burke, (London, 1894), Vols. iv and vii.

36. Bearce, G. D., British Attitude towards India, (Oxford, 1961), p. 16.

37. Mukherjee, S. N., Sir William Jones (Cambridge,1968).

38. Bearce, op. cit., p. 17.

39. Burke, Works, Vol. vii, p. 189.

40. Marchall, P. J., Problems of Empire, (London, 1966), p. 53.

41. Sutherland, Lucy S., (ed.), Correspondence of Burke, (4 Vols.), Vol. ii, (Cambridge, 1960) , Vol. ii, p. 385.

42. Marshall, P. J., op. cit., p. 53.

43. Bearce, op. cit., p. 28.

44. Mukherjee, op.cit., p. 5.

45. Marshall, op. cit., p. 51.

46. Gleig, op. cit., p. 158.

47. Ibid.

48. Stokes, op. cit., p. 21.

49. Elphinstone to J. Stuart, 17th Aug., 1819, quoted by Ballhatchet, op. cit., p. 37.

50. Munro's Minute , 31st Dec., 1824, Gleig, op. cit. pp. 158-159.

51. Metcalf, quoted by Stokes, p. 22.

52. Ballhatchet, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

53. Munro to Elphinstone, 23rd April, 1818, Gleig , op. cit. p. 69.

54. Dictionary of National Biography, (Oxford, 1937-38), Vol. vi, p. 130. Also see Kulkarni, A. R. James Cunninghame Grant Duff, (Marathi), (Pune, 1971) for a detailed life-sketch.

55. Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. vi, pp. 225 - 226.

56. Ballhatchet, op. cit., p. 7, Foot Note No.2.

57. Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. ii, p.1236.

58. Bell, Evans, Memoir of General John Briggs of the Madras Army, (London, 1885), p. 52. See also Gleig, Munro , op. cit., Munro's Minute of 31st Dec. 1824.

59. Elphinstone to Munro, 3rd May, 1818, quoted by Ballhatchet, p. 34.

60. See PRC, Vol. xii, particularly Elphinstone's Long Minute on the Southern Jahagirdars.

61. Elphinstone to Malcolm, 27th January 1819, Ballhatchet, p. 36.

62. Past tense is used here since there is no Khandesh District today.

63. Bell, E., op. cit., p. 59.

64. Elphinstone to Adam, 30th June, 1818, Ballhatchet, p. 39.

65. Bell, E., op. cit., p. 4, The Life Sketch of John Briggs is drawn chiefly from Bell's Memoir.

66. Ibid., p. 5.

67. Ibid., p. 8.

68. Ibid.,

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., p. 9.

71. Ballhatchet, p. 27.

72. Ibid., p. 26.

73. Ibid.

74. Bell, op. cit., p. 12.

75. Ibid. p. 13.

76. Ibid.,

77. Ibid., p. 14.

78. Ibid., p. 18. Italics mine.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., p. 20.
82. Ibid., p. 25.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid., p. 70.
85. Ibid. p. 39.
86. Elliot, Sir H. M., History of India, Vol. vi, (Kitab Mahal, Allahabad, Indian Reprint, 1972), pp.216-217.
87. Bell, op.cit., p. 40.
88. Ibid., 48.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid., p. 49.
91. See Vol. 41 of the Selections, particularly the letters written by one Balwantrao Bapuji.
92. Bell, op. cit., p. 50
93. Ibid., p. 52.
94. Ibid., p. 53.
95. Ibid., p. 54.
96. Ibid., p. 56.
97. Adams to Elphinstone, 26th Sept. 1818, PRC. Vol. xiii, p. 479.
98. Bell, op. cit., p. 59.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid., p. 97, It was at Satara that Briggs first thought of writing a book on the Land Tax of India.

101. W. Bentinck, G. G. to John Briggs, 13th Nov., 1832, Bell, p. 207.

102. Ibid., p. 221.

103. Briggs to Mountstuart Elphinstone, 19th July, 1818, also 7th Aug. 1818, 9th Sept. 1826, MSS EUR, F88, Box 6D, Vol. 1 and 3, India Office Library, London.

104. Bell, op. cit., p. 235.

105. Bell, op. cit., pp. 239-241.

106. Ballhatchet, p. 27.

107. Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. 2, p. 1236.

108. Briggs Memoir, Bell, p. 110.

109. Dictionary of National Biography.

110. Elliot, History of India, Vol. vi, pp. 216-217.

CHAPTER II

Political Settlement of Khandesh.

At the time of Peshwa Bajirao's attack on the Sangam Residency in Poona on November 5, 1817, John Briggs was not at Poona.[1] He had joined Elphinstone as latter's third Assistant early in 1816. The other two Assistants were Francis Whiteworth Russell, the third son of the Chief Justice at Calcutta, Sir Henry Russell, and Henry Pottinger, ' afterwards well known as Sir Henry '.[2] Brigg's chief job lay in translating the numerous intelligence reports received from the various native courts. He was given this job because of his ' acquaintenance with the languages'.[3] Long before Briggs came to Poona, he had acquired proficiency in Hindustani and Persian. During the period 1812 and 1813, Briggs had remained at Jalna, with the Hyderabad Expeditionary Force as Persian interpreter to the army. His Commandant employed him, it seems, even as an intelligence officer.[4] He was also in the field-carriage department and seems to have worked as a supply-officer also. In the latter capacity he 'was brought in communication very frequently with that singular race divided into many clans, of itinerant dealers in grain and salt, the Brinjarries,' Banjara or Wanjari in Marathi. He also, probably, acquired the necessary skill in elicitating real news from these people.[5] It was this skill and acquintance, that must have induced Elphinstone to employ Briggs as an intelligence officer, euphemistically

called the translator. Briggs, in his autobiographical notes, gives the details of the intelligence service organised by Elphinstone, not only at Poona but also at the various courts of India. Through their own postal service and observers, the English got all the information about every messenger that came to Poona or went out of Poona.[6] It is quite probable that Elphinstone took his young assistants into his confidence and discussed matters of State with them. Briggs seems to have been more in his confidence, or at least once there is a reference to Elphinstone and Briggs being engaged in a serious political policy conversation with Dr. Jeffreys.[7] Briggs had been at Poona for little over just a year, he had no previous acquaintance with Elphinstone, but in this short period he seems to have impressed Elphinstone with his skill who described him as a ' very clever, active and intelligent fellow and will certainly get on in diplomatic line ....'[8]. The useful training that he was receiving was soon to be continued in different surroundings under the watchful eye of his friend and patron, Sir John Malcolm.

Throughout the year, 1818, the atmosphere both at Poona and at Calcutta, was fraught with suspicion. The British government of Lord Hastings was planning a great campaign against the Pendharis, the free-booters, who had shown audacity to make inroads in the British held territories.

Since the Pendharis were spread all over Central India , the British were urging their allies, particularly the Marathas, to join this hunt of the Pendharis. Sir John Malcolm was appointed as the Governor-General's special political Agent with the army that was to suppress the Pendharis. His duties were primarily diplomatic, but he was also expected, when the actual war broke out, to perform military duties. As the Governor-General's agent he was to "serve as a link between the Governor General and the Residents at the courts of the allied princes. Moreover, he was expected to perform both political and military duties"[9]. The most important duty of the Political Agent was to visit the various courts in the Deccan and to ascertain their views about the forthcoming campaign. Sir John was assigned to the Army of the Deccan under Sir Thomas Hislop, and he was to advise and assist Sir Thomas in the execution of the war.[10] " As Governor General's agent, all political work connected with our operations is in my hands. " [11] Undoubtedly Sir John's position was an exalted one, and also extremely delicate. To assist him in his task, Sir Hohn selected his two principal aids from among a large number of likely candidates. Those two were Captains Josiah Steward and Captain Briggs. [12] Briggs was invited by Sir John Malcolm to join as one of his political assistants, an appointment fully approved and encouraged by Elphinstone himself. [13] The

Th 6155

offer was made, probably at Poona, when Sir John visited that place as Governor General's agent to persuade Baji Rao to join the English in their hunt of the Pendharis. Malcolm had reached Poona on 5th August 1817. The offer was gratefully accepted by Briggs. Malcolm left Poona on 12th August for Hyderabad. [14] Evidently Briggs could not accompany him at this short notice, especially since his family was staying with him at Poona. 'It was nout of question that my wife and family should accompany me at this time of the year'.[15] Briggs joined Malcolm in mid-September 'on Nerbudda ..... shortly after the united 1st and 3rd Divisions had received their orders to cross the river ' [16]. There is some miscalculation here on the part of Briggs. The united 1st and 3rd Divisions were not ordered till 10th November 1817 to cross the river, Sir Thomas Hislop having taken the command on the 10th instant. It was on the 15th that Sir John crossed the river in persuit of the Pendharis. On the other hand, Kaye says on the basis of the documents from Sir John Malcolm's personal records, that Briggs was present at the advance camp of Sir John when the latter moved out of Hyderabad early in September. [17] It is probable that Briggs met Malcolm on the Godavary than on the Narmada, on latter's way to Nagpur.

The purpose of Malcolm's march northwards was to join the Army of the Deccan formed for the ostensible purpose of

Pendhari War. But everyone believed that the war must evoke some response from the Marathas. It was with the intention of getting the Maratha cooperation that Malcolm's embassy was principally charged. But Malcolm's diplomatic mission with the Marathas was a failure.[18] Though the Marathas did not deny the English claims on them for help during the forthcoming Pendhari operations, their attitude had been equivocal.

By mid-October of 1817, the situation in Malawa had become extremely delicate. If it was not properly handled, it was capable of being very explosive to the great discomfort of the British forces advancing upon the Pendharis. The court of Gwalior was intensely unhappy about the treaty of Gwalior and was looking forward to some opportunity to either modify or completely disavow it. Information was received by the English that the forces of Shinde were in contact with various other chiefs of Malwa and Central India, as well as with the Sikhs in Punjab and the Gurkhas in Nepal.[19] In the wake of the general operations, the Pendharis of Central Indian peninsula were dispersing in all the directions, but mostly to the North, where it was believed that the Gwalior Court was willing to help them. The help in this instance would mean only one thing - taking field along with them against the British.[20] Amir Khan , one of the most important and powerful chiefs maintained an equivocal attitude and it was suspected by the British that he entertained a positive predilliction to join the Marathas. It was not till the news

of the Peshwa's disaster at Khadki that Ameer Khan threw in his lot with the British and ratified, on November 15, 1817, his treaty with them, by which he ceased all hostile intentions against the British and became the Nawab of Tonk.[21]

The position at the Holkar's court at Indore was far more dangerous. The powerful chief of Indore, Yeshwantrao Holkar had died on October 27, 1811, leaving behind him his widow Tulsabai and a minor son, Malharrao. He also left behind an army that was too powerful and restive to allow for a carefully planned diplomacy. Tulsabai, the Regent , was faced with an unruly army whose pay was in arrears. She was anxious to avoid any rupture with the army which she could not trust. In the years following the death of Yeshwantrao, she had managed to rule in the name of her son, by playing one group against the other. She also had become dependent upon Ameer Khan, one time trusted lieutnant of Yeshwantrao. In their anxiety to localize the war, the British had successfully detached Amir Khan from the Holkar court, and made him the Nawab of Tonk. Sir John Malcolm believed that the interests of Shinde, Holkar and Ameer Khan were so blended with the Pendharis that the British Government should move cautiously, must refrain from offensive operation and should be prepared to encounter them all .[22] He also suggested to the G.G. that the British Government

should make some moderate and reasonable demands on these princes. The Governor-General, on the opening of the hostilities with the Pendhari and more particularly after the battle of Khadki, was trying to negotiate with the Holkar court through the Resident at Delhi, Sir Charles Metcalf. But the ministers at Indore remained passive. When the news of the rupture between the British and the Peshwa reached Indore, there was a general rejoicing and declaration of loyalty and solidarity with the Peshwa. [23] Tulsibai and her ministers wanted peace with the English, if not an alliance. They expected that this would strengthen their position at the court. But other faction, more militant, led by military commanders like Roshun Beg, Ramdin, Gaffar Khan and others, wanted to throw in their lot with the Peshwa. While Metcalf was secretly negotiating with Tulsibai, Malcolm also was in contact with Indore. The arrival of the British Deccan Army near Ujjain created a sense of panic at the court. Tulsibai sent a vakil to Malcolm with overtures for a treaty. Malcolm suggested that the establishment of a Resident at the Holkar's court and the cession of Galna in Khandesh to the British as a depot were the prerequisites of a treaty.[24] In the meanwhile, the agents of the Peshwa were fairly active at the Indore court. Shripatrao, an agent from Poona had already prepared the pro-Peshwa attitude within the Holkar Army. In November, 1817, Bajirao sent two agents, namely Ganeshpant Pitke and Vithoji Kolte, to ask for specific help

from the Holkars.[25] Technically the Indore court was bound to render all the help to their liege lord would claim. As usual, the Indore court, in a bid to escape the horns of a dilemma, pleaded its inability to pay its soldiers for a prolonged campaign . Bajirao immediately dispatched a sum of two lakh rupees as a part payment for the troops.[26] Though the court faction at Indore overtly agreed to Bajirao's summons, they continued their parlys with the British. But the militant faction forced the hands of the Regent and her group. The agents of the Peshwa had agreed to pay to the troops another sum of Rs. six lakhs. [27] The English records seem to suggest that it was the promise of money to be paid by the Peshwa that prompted the Holkar troops to take a hard line against the British. But if we realize that the attitude of the army was always militant and further that long before Peshwas two agents arrived at Indore, there existed a strong war party, that the Holkar troops fought as mercenaries, holds little validity. The war party forced the Holkar court to prepare for southward march, with the ultimate objective of joining the Peshwa, now moving northwards. On November 24, 1817, the court moved towards the Narmada. It was accompanied by cavalry. The troops had enthusiastically welcomed the news of the war between the Peshwa and the British.[28]

Malcolm, who was in pursuit of Chitu, the Pendhari chief, had crossed the Narmada on November 15, 1817. Chitu had

flown towards the Holkar camp, thereby causing a great alarm among the British. Yet the attitude of the British government was to keep friendly relations with the Holkar court. On December 12, Malcolm joined Sir Thomas Hislop at Ujjain. The hopes of a peaceful settlement with the Indore Court were dashed to the ground, when on December 20, Tulsibai , the regent, along with her ministers, was beheaded by the military chiefs. All power now passed into the hands of the Pathan chiefs, who broke off the negotiations. Hislop immediately moved towards the Holkar army, and commanded Sir John Malcolm to join a battle with the enemy troops. Thus was joined the battle of Mahitpur on December 21, 1817, which was to have far reaching consequences on the fortunes of the Third Anglo-Maratha war, and also of Captain John Briggs then in the entourage of Sir John.

The Battle of Mahitpur was an undisputed victory for the British arms. " The battle was won by the valour of the sepoy, and not by the tactics of the Commander. " [29] In his report to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir John mentioned that Captain Briggs was " entitled to my best thanks. " [30]

The war between the Holkars and the British was concluded by the Treaty of Mandasore, January 6, 1818. By this treaty the Holkar gave up his claim on all the territory of the Satpuda range, besides agreeing to several other conditions. Khandesh, the area south of Satpuda, was

detached from the Holkar territories and handed over to the British. Malcolm moved into Malwa and thence in pursuit of Bajirao, on orders from the Governor General. He took his senior assistant in the Political Department, Capt. Josiah Stewart, with him, and left Capt John Briggs with the Commander-in-Chief, as Governor General's Agent.[31] Briggs was deputed by Sir John Malcolm to take charge of the territory ceded to the British Government by Malhar Rao Holkar ..... and to make arrangements for its provisional administration, the nomination has since been subsequently approved by ..... the Governor General'.[32] He was first placed under the orders of Sir Thomas Hislop, but later on was transferred under the civil authority of Mountstuart Elphinstone, now holding the office of the Sole Commissioner for the settlement of the territory conquered from the Peshwa. [33]

The area that was placed under the control of Briggs was fairly large one. It consisted of the present districts of Dhulia and Jalgaon and the three talukas of Malegaon, Nandgaon and Baglana of the Nasik district. [34] In 1822, Briggs estimated the area at 13,187 sq. miles with a population of 4,18,021. [35] The density of population was 31.25 per sq. mile. [36] Elphinstone believed that it was too big a charge for any one officer to look after and requested Briggs to hand over the parganas south of the Chandor hills to the Collector of Ahmednagar.[37] Briggs agreed

though rather reluctantly. At that time one Rungo Pundit, a person of his confidence, was deputed by Briggs with a body of 300 sibundee, to occupy the territory south of the Chandor hills upto the Godavari river. Rungo Pundit was asked to put himself in communication with Pottinger.[38] Elphinstone was requested to ask Pottinger to relieve Rungo Pundit as early as possible, since Briggs required the sibundees for restoring order elsewhere. [39] The parganas south of Chandor occupied by Briggs men were; Ellora, Ambad, Korabala, Dipoor, Sivoor Dhandulgaon, Patoda including the fort of Ankai, Kumbhari including Kopergaon, Nasik, Wani, Dindori, Sinner and Manik Punj. Of these, the first five paraganas had belonged to the Holkars, while the rest belonged to the Peshwa.[40]

Lying between 20°8' and 22° 7' north latitude and 73° 42' and 76° 28' east longitude , Khandesh formed "the most northern district" of the territories under the control of the sole Commissioner of Deccan. [41] Along the whole northern frontier the district was bounded by the Satpura ranges, in the north-eastern corner, the hill country, which belonged to the Holkars, formed its N E boundary. West and north-west, the Narmada remained the boundary of the district, while in the east and south-east, a row of pillars and some convenient streams separated it from the Central Provinces and the Berar. Its southern boundary was

marked by the Ajanta or the Chandor hill range. The region was full of wild jungle that abounded in wild life. Though there is no heavy rainfall, the district had plentiful of water supply. A number of small rivers come from the hilly region of the Satpuda. The major rivers are the Tapi, Girna, Bori, Panjara, Borai and the Narmada. The rivers, however, were hardly used as means of transportation and in the absence of good roads, Khandesh remained, by and large, cut away from the main current of Maratha political life. Its hills compounded the problem of control and even under the Peshwas, the wild hill tribes reigned almost unmolested. During the rains, which set in sometime in the middle of June and continue through the middle of October, the rivers are normally in spate and even in 1882, the railway bridge over the Tapi, was the only bridge in Khandesh. The rivers, then, were normally unfordable, and when forded, were generally crossed on cots floted on empty ggourds. Even within the district, life was dislocated and isolated. Large floods were not uncommon. In 1822, sixty five villages in the Tapi basin were entirely washed away while fifty were partly destroyed The loss of property was estimated at about Rs.2,50,000. To such natural calamities were added the wild animals and the epidemics. The chief wild animal found in Khandesh was the tiger. In 1822, tigers killed five hundred human beings and twenty thousand heads of cattle. In May, June and July of 1822, sixty tigers were killed by the army and

others. Under such conditions villages were deserted and life in some parts of the district was paralysed. The unsanitary conditions and the extremes of climates bred epidemics. Cholera morbus was a common and frequent visitation. From 1817 to 1820, every year Cholera attacked Khandesh. In 1817 and 1818, the epidemic struck both the army and the civilians. Briggs reported the death of 84 men out of a detachment of 500 in a few days. In 1819, Dhulia suffered from Cholera. It soon spread to other towns and ' populous towns were deserted and there were fears that the outbreak would cause a serious loss of revenue' . During the year ending July 1819, 11,521 deaths from Cholera were reported. In March 1820, there was an virulent outbreak of the epidemic in Ranjangaon claiming eightyseven lives in just one week.[42]

To the above natural handicaps, were added, in Khandesh, man made miseries. Once a populous and flourishing country, Khandesh in 1818, at the advent of the British was in total ruins. [43] Elphinstone in his famous Report on the territories conquered from the Peshwa, traces the ruinous condition of Khandesh to the invasion by Yashwantrao Holkar in 1802, and the subsequent disorder that prevailed in the area. He attributes the miseries of the land also to the Pendharis and the Arabs and other lawless bands.[44] In all there were 4032 villages in Khandesh. Of these, 540 were alienated

to various chiefs, including the Holkars. The British had 3492 villages under their direct control. Out of these 3492, 413 were uninhabited but partly tilled, 1146 were totally deserted, 97 villages were totally lost, even their sites were not remembered. Only 1836 villages were inhabited. [45] 'Some parts of the province are still in a high state of cultivation, and others, more recently abondoned, convey a high notion of their former richness and prosperity.' [46]

The treaty of Mandsor had ceded to the British, Holkarshahi territory in Khandesh, which, though considerable, did not embrace the whole of Khandesh. By the treaty, the Holkar government ceded to the company the parganas of Thalner, Sultanpur, Nandurbar, Raver, Adavad, Nyahlod, Utran, Galana, Chandwad, Ambad, Shevgaon, Kornale, Depoor, Verul, Sidurghodalgaon, mauze Adgaon, Wadzire, Kasaba Narsool. Kandapur, Kashti Chandanpuri, and Jambgaon, Antur, Dug and Gangrad. [47] Of these Thalner, Sultanpur, Nandurbar, Raver, Adavad, Nyahlod, Utran and Galana belonged to Khandesh while the rest belonged to Swaraj, that is the Maratha country. Bajirao had a total of 19 forts and garrison outposts in Khandesh. Of these, eleven were managed directly by the Peshwa while eight were left in the change of his sardars. Bajirao's forts were Mulher, Salher, Bhamer, Mora, Aurangabad, Hargad, Nhava alias Ratangad, Pisola, Kanera,

Deher (Dher), and Kukurmudhe. Daulatrao Shinde was in charge of the four forts of Ashar, Burhanpur, Bhugagad and Kalibhint, (काळीभिंत). These, however, did not form part of Khandesh proper. Holkars held the three forts of Galana, Laling and Shendave. The garrison at Halegaon, with the fort, was under the charge of Rangrao Narayanrao Rajebahadur, and in 1818 of his successor, Gopalrao. [48] In the province of Gangathadi included in Khandesh in 1818, the Peshwa had in all thirty five forts, of which six were held by his sardars. Hatgad was held by the Dhamdheres, Chandwad by Holkars, Songir, Ankai Thankai and Rajdher by the Vinchurkars.[49] It will, therefore, be seen that, though the Holkars had ceded their parts of Khandesh to the British, in January 1818, large tracts of Khandesh and the area in its immediate vicinity was still under Bajirao. After the battle of Ashti on February 19, 1818, the Peshwa moved towards the Berar, in juxtapost of Khandesh. After the battle of Shivni, fought on April 17, with scanty followers, Bajirao moved towards Khandesh. The danger, therefore, was far more real than imaginary.[50] To meet any such contingency, Elphinstone had propcsed that Gen. Smith should follow Bajirao, Gen. Doveton should effect the conquest of Khandesh and that Sir Thomas Hislop should form a light force that would pursue Bajirao, should be more northward. [51] Ram Deen, the principal military officer of the Holkar, after the

battle of Mehidpur, left Malwa and joined Bajirao at Nasik. [52] The Dengale was a powerful force in Khandesh. Their pro-Peshwa feelings were no secrets. A party of 400 infantry and 100 horse under Godajee Dengale attacked Betawad and took position in the fort of Torkheda, about 25 miles west of Thalner. [53] On 27th and 28th of February Bajirao moved towards Kopargaon. Sir Thomas Hislop planned to intercept him with the help of Gen. Doveton and Gen. Smith, 'if he (i.e. the Peshwa) tries to enter Khandesh'.[54] Surrounded by so imminant a danger, Briggs reported to the Commissioner his preference for the occupation of the provinces ceded by the Holkar and the commencement of operations in the area under Bajirao.[55]

In spite of the treaty of Mandsor, the occupation of the territory ceded by Holkar was not proving very easy, as was proved by the fort at Thalner. The pargana and the fort of Thalner were ceded by the Holkar to the British by the treaty of Mandsor and letters were sent to the Holkarshahi officials ordering them that their charges be handed over to the British officers with the requisite authority.[56] Copies of these letters of surrender were handed over to Briggs. But ' no person, however, on the part of Holkar ' had accompanied Briggs from Malwa, ' nor anyone ... deputed to meet' him in Khandesh, and Briggs felt that he was 'likely to meet with considerable difficulty in taking possession '. [57] This feeling was based upon the experience at Thalner.

' Rising abruptly from the waters of the Tapti river, where it is now crossed by the Bombay-Agra road, before that road passes the Sendhwa Ghat, was the fort of Thalner.....' It was surrounded on the other three sides by a hollow way, varying in width from a hundred to hundred and fifty yards. The outer walls had a height of sixty feet above the hollow. The interior had the same elevation. The main entrance to the fort was on the eastern side, through five successive gates, ' communicating by intricate traverse' . ' A winding ramp, with steps in some places, ascended through the gate to the rampart. The ground round the hollow way was intersected by ravines, round which clustered the houses forming the town of Thalner, about 350 yards from the fort '.[58]

After the treaty of Mandsor , the presence of the Army of the Deccan under Sir Thomas Hislop, was no longer considered necessary in Malwa, and accordingly, it was ordered southward, leaving a considerable force for the occupation and pacification under the command of Sir John Malcolm. [59] Sir Thomas with the headquarters and the First Division of the Deccan Army, began his march southward, and after descending the Simrol Pass, proceeded by way of the Sendhwa Ghat towards the valley of the Tapi. [60] John Briggs was with the Head quarters of the Deccan Army, accompanying Sir Thomas as his political assistant. [61]

On February 27, 1818, the First Division approached Thalner, having descended the Sendhwa Ghat earlier. The territory belonged to the Holkar government, for which ' sod-chitti ' i. e. release order was given to Briggs, and orders for surrender issued to Ramdas Agarwale, the Holkarshahi officer of this paragana by the Indore government. [62] The British forces, therefore presumed that they were marching through friendly county. The baggage of the force preceded the army, when suddenly, it was fixed upon by matchlocks from the walls of the fort, thereby obliging it to fall back upon the main army. This surprised and schoked Sir Thomas Hislop, and probably led to his violent reaction later against the killedar, Tulsiram Mama. A messenger with a summons was sent to the killedar asking him to surrender the fort as per the wishes of his master, Malharrao Holkar. The summons was not answered by the killedar. Sir Thomas thereupon resolved to attack the fort, and accordingly, the British guns opened fire on the north-west angle from the cover of the town. The gunfire produced no effective impression upon the garrison in the fort. The fort garrison comprised mostly of the Arabs. The outer gates of the fort were not in very good condition, and perceiving it, it was decided to bombard them. It had its effect, and the garrison sent out emissaries to demand the terms of capitulations. On being told that nothing but

unconditional surrender would be acceptable, the garrison continued to hold out. Late in the evening, British storming party, under the cover of artillary fire, entered the maingate, and passing through the remaining three gates, came to the fifth, where the killedar opened the wicket gate and discussed the terms of surrender. Suddenly the garrison opened fire on the British, and many officers of the storming party were killed. The British then opened heavy fire and the courtyard beyond the fifth gate was cleared of the enemy and captured. The main body of attackers joined the storming party, and in the ensuing battle, almost the entire garrison was put to sword. The killedar, Tulsiram Mama was summarily tried and hanged from a tree the same evening.[63] The hanging of Tulsiram Killedar was expected to be examplary and Briggs hoped that this 'will prevent the necessity of our again having recourse to similar measures in the rest of the districts ceded by Holkar'. [64] The same evening, i. e. on 27th February, Briggs issued a Proclamation to the public and warned the servants of the Holkar government now in Khandesh, that they should hand over their charges to the British authority lest they should suffer a fate similar to that of Tulsiram Mama, who ' placed himself and the garrison in the condition of rebels and subjected himself and his troops to the punishment of death' . [65] Briggs reassured the people that the British government did not want to molest the ' servants of its ally, Mulhar Rao Holkar.'

The threat was held out only in case of non-compliance with the wishes of the Holkar and British governments. [66]

Both the fate of the Killedar of Thalner and Briggs's proclamation seem to have had the desirable effect. On March 7, 1818, Briggs was able to inform Secretary Adams that Betawad, which was attacked and occupied by Gadajee Dengale's forces, chiefly Arabs, was evacuted by them and handed over to the British. Amalner, yet another important place, was also surrendered by Arabs to the English. [67] Holkar's commandant at Chandvad (i. e. Chandor) gave up the fort without a struggle. At Galna, the commandant and the garrison evacuated the fort even before the arrival of the British forces. The fort then was occupied by the British with Native Infantry. [68] Yet the country was far from settled. Briggs, however, was confident that it could be brought under order. To do so, he suggested that ' a force of three to four battalions with an efficient Engineer department and a park of seige artillary would be necessary.' [69] Such a force was to be used against the rebels holding out against the British government. Briggs did not recommend it as a measure for the final and permanent settlement of the country. He was convinced that ' the permanent settlement of Candeish will be a long and tedious operation to effect by regular troops and one that will incur considerable expense on the one hand, and a great delay in realising the revenue or restoring order on the other' . [79] Yet he was

extremely happy to inform the Commissioner on 10th March 1818, ' that His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop intends to place the whole of the Garrisons in Candeish under the orders of Lieut. Col. MacDowell.....' [71] The Commissioner, who had already suggested such a move to Sir Thomas , agreed totally and informed the Governor General that Col. McDowell was left with part of General Doveton's force to settle Khandesh. ' I have left it to Captain Briggs to employ the Detachment in that manner or confine its operations to settling the country between the range of Chandore and the Godavary, according to his idea of the force required for the former purpose. I have earnestly requested him not to lose a moment in beginning on the line he determines in the manner most likely to have immediate effect. ' [72] Along with the regular army, Captain Briggs wanted to create a local militia holding village lands. They would not be called upon to work outside the district ' nor indeed beyond their village ' and would help the Amildars in their task of revenue collection and the protection of their villages. The measure, though temporary, was immediately executed. [73]

Two major reasons can be counted for the phenomenal unrest in Khandesh. The defeat of the Holkars and the subsequent peace by the British with them, and secondly, the presence of Bajirao and his forces in the vicinity of the province. As a result of the defeat of the army of Indor

at Mahitpur, a number of recalcitrant military chiefs then in the service of Holkar went off to join Bajirao. From Malwa to the south, they had to march through Khandesh which after the treaty of Mandsor, in their opinion, was enemy territory. A large number of Arabs, either in the services of Pendhari chiefs, or employed as mercinaries by the legitimate rulers, finding themselves unemployed, had raised the standard of rebellion. Presence of the Peshwa in the immediate vicinity of Khandesh added to this turmoil. As Elphinstone reported to the Governor General on March 20, 1818, in spite of the Peshwa's misfortune, it was ' remarkable that no chief of note has left the Peshwa since his defeat by General Smith. ' [74] Some, like Dengle and Vinchurkar, were chiefs with considerable power and prestige in Khandesh and adjoining regions. The native local and social leadership was still with these chiefs, and contrary to what Briggs calls a matter of'force of custom and habit,' the regard and respect that the people had for the Pwshwa and the chiefs, seems to have been genuine. [75]

' Bara Bhaee and Ram Deen's (people) are many of them, inhabitants of Candeish, and some of the villages are full of them. They live quietly as long as troops are near, but flourish away by plundering the moment they (troops) are called away. ' To control this situation, Briggs instructed his Mamlatdars to find out from the Patil how many riding

horses were there in each village. [76] He had ' reason to believe ' particularly after the surrender of the Peshwa that ' Candeish ..... swarms with disbanded and discomfited soldiers ..... '[77] This was typical not of Khandesh alone but of the larger part of the Maratha country. ' Accounts from all parts of the country speak of crowds of horsemen who are dispersing to their villages, worn out with hunger and fatigue' .[78] This, both Elphinstone and Briggs realized was not necessarily a sign of the return of tranquility. As Elphinstone informed the Governor General, ' .....we shall be obliged for a long time to be on guard against more extended disturbances .... arising from the number of unemployed persons of the military profession, from the unsettled disposition produced by war and by the discontents naturally excited by the introduction of a foreign Government' .[78] In this particular respect, ' the State of Candeish ' was ' in some measure favourable to the Paishwa ' .[80] ' If the Paishwa should go to Hindoostan, any assistance he meets there, would no doubt revive the activity of his partisans in the Deckan. His vicinity would have the same effect if he could still keep the field or remain in any of the strong countries under the Sautpoora mountains .....' [81] With this contingency in mind, General Doveton was asked to march north-east of Khandesh , and Gen. Smith was asked to move northwards. In Malwa, Gen. Malcolm was stationed with his army. On all sides, Bajirao

was hemmed in, and finding resistance hopeless, the Peshwa surrendered to Sir John Malcolm on June 3, 1818. Prior to that the Vimchurkar, one of the powerful lords in Khandesh, had submitted to Malcolm on May 31, 1818. ' ..... The Vinchoorkar, who was to attend Bajee Rao at tomorrow's (i. e. June', 1818) meeting, should, if that prince declined the terms offered, separate himself from his camp and join me; and this was agreed to without any stipulation whatever on my part .....' [82]

In the meanwhile, Briggs was given the option of commencing immediately the settlement of Khandesh or of reduction of the country on each side of the Godavary. [83] Captain Briggs wisely preferred the latter....[84] Rango Pant a native agent of Briggs, with a body of 300 Hindustani Horse Sibundee, occupied all the country south of the Chandore range upto the Godavary.[85] The smallness of force at the disposal of the Political Agent was considered a serious constraint even by the Commissioner. Lt. Col. MacDowell was left with a force of 1100 rank and file. [86] In early April, the fort of Ankai fell into the British hands. However, Lt. Col. MacDowell could not spare any part of his already small detachment to form a garrison of the fort. Briggs felt that the fort must be garrisoned. ' ..... its situation and character demanded in any mind a necessity for its being held for the present by English troops. ' He therefore called on the officer Commanding at Chandore to spare a part of his small garrison under his other European officer to take

possession of the fort of Ankai. [88] The two weak companies, about 350 to 400 men, originally sent to Chandore, thus now were distributed in the forts of Chandore, Lasalgaon and Ankai. [89] It was this paucity of forces at the disposal of the Political Agent, that compelled Sir Thomas Hislop to place the whole of the Garrisons in Khandesh under the command of Lt. Col. MacDowell. This,helped Briggs, would enable Col. MacDowell to form a Detachment of four or five companies. This Detachment ' with 500 Hindoostany Horse under Cornet Kaye ' should march through Thalner, Songir and Galna towards Chandore or Malegaon as an exhibition of British armed strength. This, hoped Briggs, would give confidence to the inhabitants. This in turn ' will admit of our mamlatdars taking advantage of that feeling already so prevalent among the landholders of placing themselves at once under our protection .....' [90] Even with the whole Detachment under MacDowell, a forcible military settlement of the country was totally out of question. The Commissioner admitted this fact. [91] Under these circumstances, Briggs felt that the British ' must proportion (their) exertions so as to place much to the score of public opinion.' [92]

The Compaigns of Col. MacDowell:

After the fall of Ankai-Tankai, the detachment under Lt. Col. MacDowell marched to Chandor and encamped there on the 10th March. The British commandant hoped that the stern example of Thalner, and the unopposed occupation of Ankai

and Chandor, would induce the commandant of the fort at Rajder to capitulate without resistance. In this supposition, Lt. Col. MacDowell was proved wrong. On the 11th the Detachment moved against Rajder, which was considered impregnable. The place is formed by nature, being merely a high precipitous mountain. The fort has abundant natural water, and in March 1818, it was well stocked with one year's provision. The British commandant sent out a summons, which was contemptiously rejected. It was, therefore, decided to cow the garrison into submission. From the more advanced hills, the garrison opened fire upon the British. The British gained the possession of these forward posts by the evening of the 11th. On the morning of the 12th the British detachment bombared the fort heavily with shells, and the fort garrison was confined to the fort walls. Realising that further resistance was useless, the garrison asked for the terms of capitulations, which, incidentally, included a demand for the payment of the arrears of salary. The British guaranteed nothing more than their private property and freedom to go anywhere they felt like going. The garrison party then withdrew to the fort for consultation, when, suddenly the magzines of the fort blew up, and a huge and uncontrollable fire broke out. Under the cover of night, the larger number of garrison escaped. The British occupied the fort next morning. The fall of Rajder signalised the fall of Indrai, just a few miles away. [93] Informing the Commissioner of the fall of

these forts, Briggs proposed that these forts be destroyed, ' there being no men to spare to form the garrisons ' and further since they were of ' no value from local position'[94] However, the forts were not destroyed, since there was a considerable quantity of grain stored in them. [95] In the meanwhile, ' in the valley of Khandesh, ... through means of civil officers, and the employment of some irregular troops, every advantage was taken of the terror inspired by the rapidity of the military operations, to reduce to subjection those places where less coercive means were sufficient.' [96] Songir pass was occupied by Briggs's troops, i. e. Sibandis. Briggs considered this particular move as very important since that ' cut of(f) the communication of the freebooters with each other from East or West Candeish..... ' Meer Fazal Ali, his another trusted Indian agent, was ordered to continue operations against the Peshwa's districts in Khandesh. Briggs hoped that with the arrival of reinforcement from Sindwa in the form of Kaye's horse, the operations would pick up momentum. [97]

Siege and fall of TRIMBAK:

Col. MacDowell's detachment, after halting at Rajder till the 15th April, moved on tc Nasik. It encamped there on 19th. A few miles to the west of Nasik is the fort of Trimbak. This was, then, in the hands of Bajirao's men. Briggs took upon himself the responsibility of attacking this fort, inspite of the fact that it did not fall within his

management, because 'it appeared inadvisible to leave Trimbuc in the hands of enemy ' and both he and Lt. Col. MacDowell 'concurred in opinion that the loss of time in Candeish at present was not of such importance as to counter-balance the chance of our late acquisitions being recovered by the enemy in the event of all the troops being suddenly withdrawn .....' [98] Elphinstone not only approved this move, but also congratulated Briggs on his strategy. ' Your preferring the reduction of Gungterry to the settlement of the province immediately placed under your management was well judged and showed an enlarged view of the public interests .....' [99]

With a view to beseiging the fort of Trimbak, Lt. Col. MacDowell sent forward the engineers to recognoitre the area. The main body took up its position in front of the fort. In the evening a party of 50 Europeans and 50 Natives, with two six-pounders occupied a position opposite the gate-way on the south side, and during the night all the heavy guns and mortars were placed in battery to bear on the gate in the North-west side. On the morning of 24th these guns opened fire. Under the cover of the guns British troops moved up the ascent half way to the fort, and during the night constructed a battery. Under the close range fire of the heavy guns, the fort surrendered on the morning of 25th. the British took 25 guns.[100] Inside the fort , Briggs found prisoners, among them, Malharrao Appa, the nephew of Sadashiv Pant Bhau, and Aba Kundle, ' the late Killedar of

Sholapur, imprisoned by Bajirao. ' Briggs released them and provided them with means for journey to Poona.[101] After the fall of Trimbak, seventeen other forts capitulated without offering resistance.[102] On the whole, Captain Briggs was happy about the success of arms in the areas under his command. Briggs proposed to send the detachment back to Khandesh, and leave a force of 300 sebandis under Rungo Pant north of Godavary. [103] This Rungo Pant was a trusted confident of Briggs. Though neither Blacker nor Benton , even mention his name, Briggs had a great appreciation of his work. For the conquest of the whole of Khandesh, from Chandor Hills to the Pera river, within twenty days, Briggs gives credit to Rungo Pant. Briggs had called him from Poona, after the battle of Mahitpur. [104] Briggs asked him to reduce the area between the Chandor ranges and Godavary, a job he did extremely well. He occupied the forts of Ramsej, Deher, Bahula the districts of Nasik, Vani, Dindori, Sinnar. [105] If Briggs had great praise for Rango Pant , Blacker has the audacity of ignoring him, when many of the seventeen forts that fell after the fall of Trimbak were conquered by the Pant. Again Blacker is wrong in claiming that the forts of Ramsej, Bahula, and Kumbhari fell after the fall of Trimbak. In his letter to Pottinger dated 9th April, 1818, that is 15 days prior to the fall of Trimbak, Briggs includes Kumbhari in the list of forts occupied by Rungo Pant.[106] The four more forts from Blacker's list of seventeen forts, namely, Kawnai, Hatgad, Gadgada and

Tringalwadi were captured by Rungo Pant. [107]

Sardesai claims that this Rungo Pant, who was also known as Rungo Bapuji, was the same Rungo Bapuji who sent to England to defend the plead for Raja Pratap Singh of Satara.[108] Rungo Bapuji's biographer, K. S. Thakare also seems to have accepted this identity. [109] Sardesai has not produced any evidence to establish the identity except the similarity of names. It, however, seems that this identity is mistaken. Rungo Pant who served under Briggs was recommended by the latter for the award of jahagir worth Rs.2000/- per annum, in recognition of the meritorious services performed. In his letter of recommendation Briggs refers to him as ' a respectable Brahmin of Poona ' [110] whereas Rungo Bapuji the Vakeel of Raja of Satara was a Prabhu, surnamed Gupte. Briggs's Rungo Pant, before taking up services under the British, had been in the service of one Trimbakrao Yeshwant, mamlatdar of Kasar Lavan (?). Afterwards he was employed in the daftar of Ramchandra Naik Wansola, the Nizam's mamlatdar at Paithan.[111] He was a native of ' Chinchoor ' (Chinchwad ?) near Poona, and therefore, ' would prefer a village in that vicinity whose Tankhah does not exceed 2000 Rupees ' [112] From the Collector's correspondence it appears that Rungo Pant serving the British was an entirely different person from Rungo Bapuji Gupte.[113] Before leaving Trimbak, Briggs made arrangements for the safety of the whole area. In the light of the increased disorder just to the

north of Nasik, he decided to leave besides Rungo Pant , a small detachment of Sibandi under Lt. James Briggs, his younger brother.[114] The appointment was approved by the Commissioner on 5th May, 1818. [115] The designation of this new officer was Officer in charge of General Superintendance of Police in Gungathadi. Lt. Briggs was to visit all forts and provide them with provision for a month. He was authorized to keep a force upto 4 battalions of Sibundees consisting of 400 men each. He was to garrison all the forts in the region between the Chandor range and the Godavary north bank, i.e. the whole of Gangathady. The considerable force that would be left with him after garrisoning the forts was to be used for the purpose of maintaining good order in the region. Besides the sibundee, 300 Hindustani horse belonging to Captain Rind's Rissala were left with Lt. Briggs. He was to observe strict discipline and was to submit to civil jurisdiction all cases of crimes that did not affect the tranquility of the country. Rungo Pant was appointed to the civil duties of the whole of the country subject to Capt. Briggs's jurisdiction. Lt. Briggs was to support Rungo Pant. [116]

Even as the country belonging to the Peshwa was being subjugated by the British arms, the region of Khandesh was far from tranquil. In fact in early May, that was the only district still in turmoil. Poona, Ahmednagar and Satara were perfectly tranquil. [117] The single unsetting factor in Khandesh

was the presence of Arab mercenaries. The greater part of Khandesh in fact, was ruled over by the Arabs, who have a predominating influence over the councils and actions of the leading men of the District .....' and though the people of Khandesh were, by and large, ' decidedly ' well disposed towards the British authority, only the ' foreign marcenaries ' were holding out against. [118] They were 'the ready instruments of rebellion against their legitimate government and of oppression and usurpation (in) the neighbouring districts. ' [119] In the same report, Briggs speaks of the individual valour of the Arabs, their lack of discipline, their high pays, their insistance upon keeping their arms, and laments the British system of allowing them to do so. They ' have no interest in the soil or the country.' [120] Most of the Arabs were employed by the Peshwa and many of the local chiefs as mercenaries. After the failure of the Maratha arms was demonstrated by the battles of Mehitpur, Ashti and other places, it was but natural that these marcenaries should become restive for their pay, - the principal aim for which they had come to India. Many of them had joined the Pendharis. In the settled conditions of political life , they were rapacious, when the conditions become bad, their greed and rapacity knew no bounds. The Arabs were carefully fostered by the local chiefs. [121]

Numerous 'bands of marauders, chiefly Arabs' were collecting in Khandesh, ravaging the country.[122] Their aim

was it seems, to follow the pattern of the Bheels, that is of retiring into mountain fastness of northern parts of the district. [123] They were so recalcitrant that in many cases they did not allow the Killedars, under whose command they were supposed to be, to accept overtures from the British.

Songir :

After an agreement between the Peshwa's agent at Songir and an amil of Capt. Briggs, Lt. Rule commanding at Galna, moved a small body of troops and took possession of the town and fort of Songir, on 13th April. Lt. Rule drove out a body of Arabs who tried to oppose him. [124] In the fort were eleven guns and in the town five more, with many miscellaneous small arms and plenty of ammunition which Lt. Rule moved to the fort. Lt. Rule left a small garrison consisting of 1 havaldar, 10 regulars and 20 Sibandee. [125] On the 17th the petah of Songir was attacked by a body of two thousand Arabs, who carried the petah by assault. The Sibandees who were guarding the petah, were all killed. An attack on the fort with the help of scaling ladders, however, was beaten back by the Mamlatdar and his sepoys. The Arabs ran away after plundering the town. [126] Reinforcement was promptly sent. The gallant effort of the native officers, considered ' meritorious ' by Elphinstone and for which he urged Briggs to give the officers liberal prizes money being of ' secondary importance', [127] however, this did not end the misfortunes

of Songir. The Arabs were still in the vicinity of the place in strong number, and Briggs was apprehensive about their designs. [128] It was this apprehension which prompted Briggs to order Major Ives to march to Galna and hem in the Arabs in the neighbourhood who now amounted to ' 1500 to 2000 infantry besides cavalry ' [129] Capt. Rind's detachment was to work with him. Briggs recommended that Cornet Kaye's Horse accompanied by a battalion of Capt. Hare's Brigade should come through the Sindwa pass by the route of Barhanpur. This would intimidate the enemy. So strong was the pressure of the Arabs, that Briggs was afraid that without the active help of Kaye's forces and further reinforcement, it would be impossible to occupy eastern Khandesh . There was every possibility of loosing even those areas now in possession of the British.[130] Elphinstone agreed and approved Briggs's plan and promised to send all the help that he could get.[131] Major Ives moved on to Betawad and drove the Arabs from there.[132] From there he attacked Songir to relieve the garrison, but was repelled by the Arabs. Though Elphinstone was happy about the conquest of Betawad [133], Briggs reprimanded Ives for his failure at Songir, and requested him not to undertake such exploits unless he was reasonably sure of success. [134] The Arabs, in the meanwhile evacuated Torakhede on 2nd May, and on 9th May 1818, Major Ives reported the rumour that they are moving towards Taloda. ' The Arabs in Candeish and other armed followers are increasing very fast, but their last

recourse is, I believe Talodah, where their families have retreated.... If they are allowed to remain until after the monsoon, they will be very troublesome to the inhabitants'.[135]

Briggs believed, and rightly so, that Songir was strategically very important. He told Major Ives that it was more important even than the Sindhwa, since Songir 'connects our line of communication from Talneir to Galna and ensures an unbroken link of posts from Sindwa to Trimbuck '. An object of such importance was not to be overlooked at a moment ' when everything must depend on our ready and constant communication with each other ' [136] . He recommended that Major Ives should endeavour to increase the garrison at Songir raising it upto 400 infantry and about 4 to 5 hundred cavalry, with two field pieces.[137]

After the affair at Songir, Briggs was convinced that the problem of the Arabs could not be solved on any ad hoc basis. ' The more I hear of the condition of Candeish, the more I am convinced that by the removal of the foreign soldiers alone the settlement and easy occupation of the country will immediately follow'. [138] He was sensible of the limited means at the disposal of the British, but he was sure that a great deal could be achieved ' by assuming a confident tone and by allowing the impression of our character to work the rest.' From his various intelligence sources, he had gathered the impression that the Arabs were ' much alarmed at the idea of having to cope with the British troops ' and

that 'the whole population of Candeish was ' ready to join (the British) in their destruction'. [139] The Arabs had established themselves in large number in the area surrounding Torkheda. They were apparently in the possession of most of Bajirao's districts in Khandesh. Their aim seemed to plunder the nearby towns. ' The inhabitants look to the British for protection ', but Briggs lamented his inability at the moment to provide any ' due to the scarcity of means '.[140] To control, and eventually to eradicate the menace of Arabs, Briggs evolved a double action plea. The Arabs were to be hemmed in on all sides using Major Ives detachment and the Russell Brigade, operating in an inner circle . On the outer fring of the circle, he proposed the establishment of 'frontier posts on the bank of the Godavary and the Chandor range at places like Trimbuc , Ramseij, Lasalgaum, and Yevala. ' This could be extended, if necessary, to Jalana, Aurangabad, Lasoor and even Bijapur. ' This will not only protect Gungaturry but will also limit the theater of operation for Baji Rao'.[141] He instructed Major Jardine, the officer Commanding Detachment Bombay Army, that he should occupy Nandurbar and then march on to the fort of Kukurmundha. Major Jardine's eventual objective was to be the two Arab infested areas, namely Kopril and Taloda. He was not to risk 'the slightest chance of failing.' [142] Thus, in the course of time Jardine was to join Major Ives and Russell's Brigade in tightening the noose round the Arabs.

At the same time, the second part of the plan was to be operative. The Arabs were to be offered amnesty on condition that they would leave India and go back to Arabia.[143] They were to be allowed to carry their private property and the expense of their transportation was to be borne by the British government. The alternative to the acceptance of their offer was to be the risk of being considered free-booters and face the consequences. With an active pursuit of the hemming in operation, the offer of amnesty was not likely to be considered as weakness. A proclamation to this effect was to be made as early as possible.[144] The idea was was enthusiastically approved by Elphinstone who wrote ' I entirely approve of your intended proclamation, and beg it may be published without delay'.[145] Briggs informed Lt. Col. MacDowell that ' Altho' the Arabs for the most part may be classed with that description of free-booters who ravage the country and are entitled to no quarter as long as they are not the servants of any avowed government, yet the peculiar circumstances of their case have induced the British Government to offer them the alternative of being sent back with their property to their own country'.[146]

The Arab depredations, in the meanwhile continued unabated. They demanded money from the people of Dussara and Bhamer. They had to be chased by a body of 50 Sibandis.[147] Next day they plundered a village near Bhamer.[148] To compound

the issues, Bajirao, Ramdin and Dengale were reported to be moving towards Sultanpur.[149] Lt. Hodges, operating in the earlier regions reported an encounter with 300 Arabs and some Hindustani soldiers in that area. [150] At the advent of Hodges troops they fled away and Hodges was able to communicate the occupation of the whole of the paragana of Nasirabad, and the occupation of all the villages and gadhis like Kurgaon, Jalgaon etc. [151] In the meanwhile Maj. Ives and Capt. Rind had been successful in expelling the Arabs from Sindkheda, Torkheda and Betawad. [152] Capt. Munns, on 15th May 1818, attacked Bhirdai, [153] which had been raided by the Arabs , and defeated the mauraders. [154] Arabs were seen marching towards the Satpuda hills, where the armies of Peshwa were reported encamped. It was believed that the Arabs were going to join the Peshwa. Some Arab bands were moving in the direction of Amalner. [155]

With all these movements and depredations of the Arabs however one thing was becoming clear, and that was, that the field of their activities was being narrowed. From his agents and amildars , Briggs learned that ' excepting Bijawul and Amalnure and Maligoun there are no Arabs to the Eastward of our line of posts through Soungheir and that they are confined to a very narrow space'.[156] He, therefore, decided to advance direct towards the chief resort of the Arabs and reduce them at once. [157] He recommended to Lt. Col. MacDowell that they should march without delay on Malegaon, ' where Gopal Row

Raj Bahadur, the officer in charge would be well disposed to help them ' against the Arabs. [158] On 16th May, Briggs and the army arrived before Malegaon. Realising that Malegaon will have to be beseiged, he ordered one regiment of Russel brigade to proceed to Malegaon via Parola,[159] and called Hodges from east Khandesh. ' This object (i.e. Malegaon) is now of more importance than ever, the garrison appears resolved to stand out, and the very small number of troops to carry on the seige renders the presence of your Detachment here of the utmost consequence'. He was to 'lost no time' in arriving at Malegaon.[160] Briggs also called the irregular Horse under Lt. James Briggs from Gangathady [161].

MALEGAON: Seige and Surrender :

The fort of Malegaon is quadrangular in form, situated in a bend of the river Mosam, which cover one face and half of the two adjoining. On the other side the town, approaching the river at its extremities, almost encompasses the remainder of the fort. The fort consisted of two linesx of works, the interior work, built of stone masonary, was surrounded by a faussebraye seven feet high and a ditch 25 feet deep and 16 feet wide. The outer line, flanked by towers, was built of mud and stone, and approached within a few yards of the town on one side and of the river on the other. The inner fort was 60 feet high with a rampart 16 feet side, approached only through narrow covered staircases. Within were number of bomb-proofs.[162]

The fort of Malegaon was in the possession of the Raje Bahadur family, descending from the famous Naro Shankar Raje Bahadur. [163] The Arab settlement in Malegaon dates back to the days of Naro Shankar. He had invited several hundred Arabs to come and settle in the area, and had given them lands. The descendants of these Arabs who settled at Malegaon were called the Mawallid (Indian born). A few of them continued the profession of arms, but many entered into trade or the money lending business. In Malegaon there were about 200 Mawallid families who lived in the town of Malegaon outside the fort. In May 1818, the fort was in the possession of the Arabs, mostly born in Arabia, i.e. foreigners. Gopal Rao Raje Bahddar, the de jure master of the fort had hardly any authority over them. In fact, he was virtually a prisoner in the hands of Arabs.

Gopal Rao's troubles began when one Martand Page came to Malegaon and tried to instigate the Arabs to go on a looting expedition. Gopalrao promptly arrested Martand and put him in irons in the fort. Since then the Arabs had been pressing Gopalrao to release him, a thing Gopalrao persistantly refused to do. In the first place Gopalrao was forced to maintain the Arabs to secure his own position against the Governor appointed by Bapu Gokhale. He had agreed to pay Rs.10,000/- and to keep 100 Arabs in his service. However, when time came for payment, Gopalrao had no money to pay.[164] On the 15th May Gopal Rao came to see Col. MacDowell and Briggs.

He maintained that the Arabs demanded the release of Martand Page and a sum of Rs.4500/-. He was prepared to pay the amount provided the Arabs agreed to leave the place. Evidently Gopalrao was reluctant to attack his own town. Briggs agreed to pay the sum to the Arabs, provided they consented to return to their own country. On advancing on the city of Malegaon on 16th, Briggs and MacDowell found the fort fully garrisoned and in preparedness for war. Briggs sent his head Brahmin to the fort with a message that two English companies be allowed to be lodged in the fort. The head Brahmin, however, reported that Gopalrao, who had returned the previous day, was more or less a state prisoner in the hands of the rebels. Thereupon, Briggs and MacDowell sent in the proclamation approved by Elphinstone to the Arabs, asking them to quit. The proclamation guaranteed to the Arabs their life and property if they agreed to lay down their arms and consented to be transported to Arabia at British cost. In reply to this, the Arabs demanded elaborate security and guarantee agreement. They also did not agree to be transported back to Arabia. On receiving their reply, both the Commander of the British Detachment and the Political Agent decided not to parley any further and the army moved to seige. [165] On the night of 18th, the Arabs made a desperate sally in which the chief engineer of the seige, Lt. Davis was killed and Maj. Andrews severally wounded. The garrison received a reinforcement of 50 Arabs, and it was rumoured that many Arabs were

moving eastward to break through the seige and reinforce the garrison. [166] Realizing that the garrison was fully determined to hold the fort, Briggs became skeptical about the success of the seige before the mansoon set in. He despaired of getting any battering train from the neighbourhood in the immediate future. [167] MacDowell requested for ammunition, and recorded his determination ' to remain before it (i. e. the fort) until it is taken or surrenders...' [168] On 22nd the British troops launched an attack on Malegaon, but were beaten back. [169] Briggs reported the continuation of the seige and heavy losses of the British. [170] A breach was carried through the inner wall of the fort, and on the 27th a storming party was sent in. The garrison from the fort repulsed the party and Lt. Nattes of the Engineers was killed. [171] By 31st May, ' about 5,800 rounds of 18 and 12 pounders shot have been expended before this place, ' and an equal amount would be necessary if the fort wall was to be breached elsewhere. [172] The resistance of the garrison was unexpected. It is graphically described in one sentence in contemporary Marathi documents ; ' Malegaon is still fighting. ' [173] By 4th June, after moving the camp earlier on the 1st, the town was occupied, and steady fire opened on the eastern side. [174]

The long seige and the determination of the British as well as their seemingly inexhustible power, started having its effects on the garrison. Worst still, the Proclamation

itself was having its effect on the Arabs outside Malegaon, thereby diminishing the possibility of outside help. Jamadar Ahmed with 25 of his men from Parola accepted the conditions of the Proclamation on 2nd June 1818, while 3 Jamadars and 200 Arabs followers from Nandurbar followed the suit on 7th June. Passports were issued to them for Surat for their eventual transportation to Arabia.[175]

By 2nd June, the garrison had lost the town, and on 4th reinforcement from Ahmednagar under Major Watson had strengthened the besigers. On 5th June, the British fire exploded two magazines in the fort, and a large breach was made in the eastern wall. From this position, the British guns kept up a continuous fire. Finally on the 13th June the garrison asked for terms. [176]

The battle of Malegaon was perhaps the longest single battle of the Third Anglo-Maratha war. The seige had begun on 17th May 1818 and lasted for almost a whole month. About 450 Arabs opposed 2,600 British troops with 36 guns, mortors and howitzers. The British fired about 8,000 projectiles and used 35,500 pounds (16117 Kgs) of gunpowder. The Arabs lost 35 killed and 60 wounded, while the British casualties were 233 killed and wounded.[177]

Captain Briggs was perhaps the most unhappy man over the terms of capitulations. ' The garrison of Malegawn were in the situation that we shall find many others in Candeish, who depending on their strong fortresses, are determined to

hold out till the last, for terms ' The only terms he was prepared to grant were ' compelling them to work on roads or to endure rigid confinement for an indefinite period to spare their lives '. [178] As the terms of surrender were against the proclamation, Briggs refused to take charge of the prisoners'. [179] He gave MacDowell credit for being moved by the bravery of the enemy, but felt that it was a misplaced gallantry since the Arabs at Malegaon were not the soldiers of an organised government, but ' a licentious band of free-booters.' [180] It is rather difficult to understand Briggs's anger and annoyance. Probably he felt slighted for not being consulted for by MacDowell, probably his pent up anti-pathy towards the Lt. Col. found the better of him. In any case, his tirade was misplaced. Strictly speaking, he was right, since the only terms that could have been thought of were those of the Proclamation. And those terms when offered were rejected by the Arabs, thereby forfeiting their lives. But the whole idea behind the Proclamation, which was his own creation, was to avoid useless bloodshed. And that was what precisely the Colonel had brought about. The most interesting part of the whole situation was that, MacDowell had granted them no additional terms besides those mentioned in the Proclamation. He had achieved the goal for which he was fighting. Briggs's contention that an example should have been made out of the garrison is drastically contradic-tory to the spirit of the Proclamation. He refused to take charge of the prisoners. Lt. Col. MacDowell, reiterating his

point , requested Briggs to cooperate by taking charge of the Arabs and enable him ' to keep my convention with these men, who have had nothing to eat since yesterday morning.' [181] The only convention that he had with the Arabs was that their lives would be spared. The Arabs were lodged in a street in the centre of the Peta of Malegaon guarded by two Native officer's parties. [182] Elphinstone, with a cooler temper and a wider view, accepted the terms offered to the Arabs by Col. MacDowell. Briggs agreed to settle the accounts of the Arabs in consultation with Gopalrao Raja Bahaddur and the Arab Jamadar. [183] Briggs paid a total sum of Rs.26,456.8.0 as the arrears of their pay till the first day of the seige. All Arabs were moved from Malegaon to Songir for an eventual transfer to Surat. [184] Similar terms were offered to the Arabs at Taloda, Kopreil. At Kopreil Rs. 5177/- were paid.[185] The Mawallids were allowed to stay in India.[186] While some of the foreigners, like Salmeen Bin Omar Jamadar and his 39 followers, were allowed to settle in India since ' many have families here', on executing a bond that they would give up the profession of arms and become husbandmen. [187] ' The whole of the country is ..... already in our hands.....' [188] The Arabs were ' withdrawing fast ' and Briggs was watching them closely.' [189] They were now all on the other side of the Tapi, and Briggs was ' going to Songir to watch their quiet retreat and prevent their re-entry to add to their sports by more depredations,' since they had no reason to complain,

' loaded with wealth ' as they were.[190] Giving a vivid picture of the devastation caused by the Arabs, Briggs adds, ' They have been the scourage of Candeish and nothing, but a circular (?) demonstration will probably give you an idea of the extent of waste it exhibits. From having a country yielding in the proportion of 32 to 27 (Berar ?) in the olden times, you pass from one village to another through perfect jungle of several years' growth '.[191] By the beginning of the month of December, however, the scourage was removed , the Arabs were deported to the coast for eventual deportation to their own country and Khandesh was limping back to normalcy.[192] However, the journey of Arabs to the coast was not free of moments of tension. Some of the Arabs did manage to escape while being transported to Surat. John Elphinstone, the Chief of Surat , informed Briggs that of the 22 Arabs that were sent to him only 7 had arrived, while 5 ran away at Songir and 10 at Nandurbar. The party was ' not kept under any restraint for the sake of appearing just and kind.' [193] Briggs believed that the policy of the British government was not of putting under restraint those Arabs who had ' voluntarily ' given up depredations, ' but only such as are taken prisoners'. The purpose of this seemingly philanthropic attitude, however, was not kindness, but the uninviting possibility of having to ' run the risk of compelling us to attack them '.[194] 15 Arabs and one Jamadar escaped and on July 12, Briggs informed the

Commissioner of the escape of further 24 Arabs and one Jamadar. Briggs instructed Capt. Munn to keep a strict guard on the Arabs and asked him not to allow them freedom of movement.[195] To Lt. Panget, who commanded the escort to 180 Arabs on their way to Surat, Briggs's instructions were ' to confine those Arabs who might try to escape and who are unreliable. '[196] All these measures had the desired effects, and though the transportees might have grumbled sometimes.[197] On the whole the operations seems to have been performed quite smoothly.[198] Some Arabs, under the leadership of their Jamadar Ali continued to resist the English from their stronghold at Amalner. Amalner was the headquarter of the junior branch of Raja Bahadur's family. It was headed by Madav Rao Raja Bahadur. Ally and his Arabs were originally in the service of Madhavrao. However, when Madhavrao wanted to surrender the place to the British, the Arabs refused to comply.[199] Not only did they refuse to comply, but took Madhavrao almost as a prisoner. The Raja , however, managed to get away and join Briggs.[200] Briggs wrote a strong letter to Ali Jamadar, declaring the Arabs at Amalner as rebels. But there was no response from them .[201] The rains being over, Elphinstone urged Briggs to undertake active operations against the Arab rebels of Amalner.[202] The Arabs had seized the whole of Zamindars and patils of the villages in the paragana of Amalner to extort money from them, and Briggs believed that ' it is probable they will retain them till the last in their hands in hopes

that we shall compromise matters with them for the sake of the Zamindars.' [203] The Arabs had levied an extra-contribution on the area to the tune of Rs.25,000. Briggs decided to try for the last time peaceful methods. He would send a party of 200 sibundis to Amalner and see if the Arabs allow them to take possession of the fort peacefully. If they resisted, as they actually did, he would hand over the matter to the army.[204] Briggs told Ali Jamadar that the fort must be surrendered. The just claims of the Arabs about their pay and other things would be met with ' but any bond taken from the Rajah while a prisoner in Arab hands, would not be admitted. ' This was Briggs's ultimatum to the Arabs, there being no possibility of any ' further discussion on the subject.' [204 A] But the operations had to be postponed due to the terrible state of the British army, thanks to the epidemic of Cholera. [205] The cholera morbus attacked Khandesh with a violence almost unprecedented. His civilian officers were also taken ill. ' The Punchayets have come to stand still. ' And there was hardly any medical help. Col. MacDowell's medical officer was himself down with fever. Briggs urged the Commissioner to send medical help.[206] Major Jardine wrote to Briggs that his troops were hardly in a position to move, leave aside take field. [207] There were 84 deaths in a battalion of 500 men. [208] Major MacBean reported the detachment's ill health.[209] However, a strong force under Huskinson marched out from Malegaon towards Amalner. This force

consisted of 1000 European and 800 Indian infantry and 250 horse. The Arab garrison refused to accept defeat, but when blocked on all sides, they surrendered unconditionally. The event took place on November 30th, 1818. [210] With the fall of Amalner, the last resistance of the Arabs was broken down.

The Arabs alone, however, were not the ' scourage ' of Khandesh. There were the Bheels and the discomfited soldiers who bothered the country. [211] The discomfited soldiers belonged to two types, namely, the Maratha soldiers and the Hindustani cavalrymen in the services of Bajirao or his adherents. The protracted war and the gradual defeat of Peshwa induced many of his followers to give up his cause. As early as December 1817, Elphinstone reported to the Governor General that the harassment caused by the British forces to the armies of the Peshwa and Gokhale had disheartened the Marathas and ' the best proof' of this was ' afforded by the reduction of their forces. '[212] Discouraged by the constant flight of the Peshwa and disturbed by the increasing hold of the British on their homeland the soldiers thought increasingly in terms of giving up the cause of the Peshwa and returning home. The support of the petty and big Sardars to the Peshwa was also luckwarm. Those who were with the Peshwa were seeking for some opportunity to leave him and return to their homes. [213] Elphinstone was confident that the Peshwa ' must lose a great part of his army by desertion '[214]. A news letter of April 24,

1818 reports ' that great bodies of Bajee Row's horse would he happy to leave him under the present circumstances ...'[215] and that ' ..... a great number (of Peshwa's troops) talked of returning home. '[216] General Smith , who pursued Bajirao relentlessly felt ' very confident 'that ' the bulk of the enemy's army is broken up .....' [217] and reported that ' numerous small parties of the enemy's horse ' had returned home. [218] One Umaji Shankar reported on May 3, 1818, that the army of Bajirao was broken up, and the soldiers were going home. [219] Another person, Rango Vasudev reported to Elphinstone that a large body of the Peshwa's army is returning home cautiously. [220] ' Accounts from all parts of the country speak of crowds of horsemen who are dispersing to their villages worn out with hunger and fatigue '.[221] The pathetic condition of the returning horsemen has been graphically depicted by Elphinstone to the Governor General. ' Nothing can exceed their fatigue and their sufferings..... The horses are so worn out that they can scarcely move, and the men are in rags and bear evident marks of famine on their countenances. So totally dispirited are they that there is no account of their attempting to plunder even for subsistance, but many of them are being dismounted and disarmed by the common villages'.[222] Both Elphinstone and Briggs had a great compassion for these Maratha soldiers. In fact, Briggs believed that there was nothing like a Maratha soldier, the Maratha warrior being a mere peasent in arms at the times of war.

' I think you will find throughout your rule that there is hardly such an animal as a Maratha who relies solely on his horse and sword for subsistence ..... The Marathas has always a recourse in his plough.....'[223] Elphinstone seems to have endorsed this view. ' The want of employment and of plunder will drive back to their old profession all who were not originally soldiers.....'[224] Yet Elphinstone like the good statesman that he was, refused to take risks. Many armed persons still retained propensity for rebellion, and such persons were a great source, if not of danger, at least of trouble. ' The principal object of attention will then be to crush all petty insurrections and assemblages of banditti.'[225] In June 1818, Khandesh was ' the only part of the country that is still unsettled, '[226] because besides the Arabs and the Bhils there were number of Hindoostani soldiers and Gosawis and others who had taken up their abode in the jungle fastness of Khandesh. [227] Elphinstone believed that it was necessary that the 'lawless habits they have acquired during a long period of tumult and disorder ' be broken. [228] Briggs was convinced that ' the first thing to be thought of ' was ' the tranquillity of the country from the outrages of bunds...'[229] Though the monsoon was just round the centre and the season ' just now unfavourable ' for operations against the banditti Briggs decided to use this period ' for obtaining information of their (bandit's) haunts, their power and their intentions ' [230] He instructed his officers to collect informations about such persons and make a detailed report about them.[231]

He was going to ' take good care ' that they would be 'closely watched (and) it shall be done in such a manner as not to let it be supposed for a moment (that) they are to be molested while quiet. ' [232] However, when an untruly body of 500 armed men threatened the peace round Parola, in spite of the unfavourable season, Briggs ordered Captain Hare and Meer Fazal to attack them. [233] Ram Deen, having collected about 1500 men, went on a rampage, plundering several villages near Trimbak. Briggs asked Major Watson, who was in the vicinity, to attack him. [234] Trimbak itself was attacked by a rebel force under the leadership of a Pretender who called himself Holkar, on June 21, 1818. The garrison in the fort under the command of one Lachman Singh fought very well and repulsed the attack. The rebels retreated when the amil of the area came up with a reinforcement of some 70 or 80 sibundee to the assistance of the garrison. [235]

One of the principal reasons for the periodic unrest in Khandesh was the presence of a strong pro-Peshwa faction in the person of Trimbakji Dengale. It must also be remembered that Vithal Narsing Vinchurkar, a Sardar of Peshwa, was one of the few Maratha grandees who continued to be loyal to the Peshwa almost to the bitter end. The Vinchurkars had their inams and watans in Khandesh. By the middle of June, 1818, however, the Vinchurkar resistance was over and Vithal Narsing Vinchurkar was reinstated in his lands. [236]

Of the major adherents of the late Peshwa, only Trimbakji remained at large and unsubdued.

ARREST OF TRIMBAKJI DENGALE:

On June 28, 1818, Jayaji, the Patil of the village of Ahirgaon came to Malegaon with the information that Trimbakji Dengale was hiding in that village. Briggs immediately ordered Captain Swanston, who was at Malegaon, to take a body of 800 auxiliary horse with him and to surround the village and apprehend Trimbakji. Swanston surprised Trimbakji and arrested him. There was hardly any fight. Trimbakji was brought under heavy escort to Chandor. [237] Briggs himself repaired to Chandor to supervise the security measures and safe transport of the prisoner to Poona. [238] Trimbakji's private property consisting of gold mohars and rupees contained in several leather bags was seized by the troops. Briggs directed its immediate distribution among the troops ' since the reward for Trimbakji's capture was no longer valid. ' The gold ornaments of Trimbakji's wives, Radha Bai and Rakhma Bai, were retained by Capt. Swanston, who arrested them, ' to restore them back to them '. [239] Briggs was very happy about the arrest of Trimbakji and reported gleefully that 'we have gained our object ...' [240] He recommended that the Patil of Ahirgaon be rewarded by granting him in perpetuity the village of Ahirgaon whose annual revenue to the government was Rs.1500/-. [241] Grimly Briggs visualized a public hanging of Trimbakji at Punderpoor on the spot where the Shastrey

was murdered.' This morbid vision was probably produced by Briggs's desire to make an example of Trimbakji. ' This (i.e. the public execution of Trimbakji) would probably produce the greatest possible effect that could be attained from the possession of Trimbakjee's person.' [242] However, better counsels prevailed and it was decided that Trimbakji would not be hanged after all. On learning this Briggs was relieved and confessed his relief unashamedly. [243] Trimbakji was transferred to Thana and thence to Chunar by special orders of the Governor-General.[244] He was destined to die a prisoner, on October 16, 1829.

The arrest of Trimbakji removed a major source of irritation from Khandesh. Minor irritants continued for a long time to come, but they were more in the nature of law and order problems rather than the problems of settlement. As for the disbanded soldiers, Elphinstone believed that they ' will not stir again till after the rains', and he 'wished' ' that during that interval they should remain unemployed and suffer hardship. This will drive the foreigners to their homes and the villagers to their ploughs.' [245] The 'villages in the Marhatta country and in Candeish swarm with horsemen.. and many in Candeish at least found constant employment in the distraction of the country ' [246] The Peshwa's infantry was much more numerous than his cavalry. It was hoped that most of them would return to the plough, and of those who remained unemployed, a large number could be easily absorbed

in the revenue department, or in the police as Shibandis.[247] In the context of the acute shortage of men during the hayday of the war, Briggs had to relay heavily on the Shibandi troops raised from the local population as well as disbanded troops of Holkar and the deserters from the Peshwa army.[248] In May, 1818, the Shibandi force in the area of Gangathadi was organized on more orderly lines. About 1600 persons were incorporated in this force which was divided into four battalions.[249] Giving it a more mature thought, Briggs decided to reorganize the whole Shibandi force on rational lines throughout Khandesh. On May 16, 1818, he submitted a plan to Elphinstone. The entire Shibandi force was to be divided into a number of Rissallas. The number of Rissallas was not fixed, since the changing situation did not warrant a fixed number. Each Rissalla was to consist of 480 men, and was to be commanded by a Rissaldar. ' He is the ordinary channel for raising men and superintending the interior management. The Rissalla was further divided into eight Biradaries, consisting of 60 men each. Each Biradary was further divided into four Duffadadarries of fifteen men each. Each Biradarry was to be commanded by a Subhedar or a Jamadar, the former office being ' more a distinction in point of pay than of duty. ' Each Biradarry was to have one Karkun, who was to act as an accountant, and a civil officer who took 'command

of the forts '. The schedule of men and officers with their proposed salaries as given by Briggs is as follows:

Pay schedule of one Rissalla of Shibandi.[250]

Category	No	Pay @ per month	Total amount
Rissaldar	1	75/-	75/-
Subhedars	4	30/-	120/-
Jamadars	4	15/-	60/-
Daffadars	32	10/-	320/-
Sepoys	480	8/-	3840/-
Karkuns	8	20/-	160/-
Bhistis	8	8/-	64/-
		Expenditure on pay, net total -	4639/-

Every sepoy was to be armed with a matchlock besides a sword or any other weapon he chose. The officers were at liberty to use what weapon they chose. The European Commanding Officer could discharge a sepoy or a duffadar, but in case of a native officer being involved, the case was to be decided by the Political Agent.[251]

The policy of associating a large number of ex-servicemen in the Shibandi or in the revenue offices, was carried to a serious extent by Briggs. He was to receive a mild reproof from William Chaplin later on for his extended establishment.[252]

But then, in October 1819, Khandesh had the least number of unemployed infantrymen amongst all the Districts of the Deccan. [253]

As for the cavalry men out of service due to disbandment of Holkar's, Peshwas and other chiefs armies, Elphinstone had decided to take an entirely different attitude. At the beginning of the war, the British were forced to raise additional troops, particularly horse, and as the entire Maratha country was at war with them, they raised these troops in other parts of India. It was not very easy to discharge them and accept the former troops of their enemies in the service.[254] Elphinstone had asked Col. Skinner in North India to raise cavalr for him and to send it south. But in May 1818, he confessed to Skinner that he was ' overwhelmed with the whole horse of the country whom I must either provide for or let them turn Pindarries and every additional man is a source of perplexity to me ' [255] In all, about 7000 cavalry was thus raised, ' of which only 500 are strictly of the description required ' [256] The whole of the horse employed within the Peshwas's country during the war was approximately from 25 to 30 thousand. 'The greater portion of these may be allowed to find a provision for them; but a part must be taken into pay directly or in--directly by Government. ' [257] They could be absorbed in the Auxilary Horse, but for the present they must be kept unemployed. Elphinstone proposed that the number of the Auxilary Horse be reduced gradually by weeding out those who

had bad horses, or who were bad men and by reducing the pay. He hoped that the foreigners, i. e. those who did not belong to Maharashtra would go away, thereby creating vacancies which could be filled in by the disbanded cavalry of the Marathas.[258] Briggs was not very happy about the decision, though he saw its rationale. He believed that the Auxilary Horse inKhandesh, recruited from amongst the adherents of the late Holkar's rule or of the Peshwa's army, had performed a very useful and gallant service. He pleaded that no man should be discharged because his horse has died or is unfit without being paid a compensation of either Rs. 100 or Rs.50.[259] Since besides the Auxilary Horse, and also within it, Briggs had a large number of Hindustani Horse, he enthusiastically supported the idea of reduction of pay. He proposed a reduction of the salary of a private horseman to Rs.30/- on which ' No Hindoostanies who look to making little fortunes and returning home would remain ..... and their defection is precisely what is wanted'. However, he proposed a compensation to those Hindustani horsemen to desiring to go back home to the extent of 1½ month's salary. This reduction of pay was only in case of private horsemen, and not the officers who would have ' no cause to complain.' [260] With all these measures however, there remained a large number of unemployed horsemen in Khandesh. In October 1819 , there were 4000 horsemen out of employment in Khandesh. [261] This probably was because of the continuing campaigns in Khandesh against the Arabs, the

Bhils and others, gave a hope of employment to the unemployed horsemen elsewhere who probably flocked there. Secondly it was probably due to the presence of a large body Mawallid Arabs, who being the natives of Khandesh could not go elsewhere and would not be employed by the British government because ' their high pay and their habits of insubordination render it impossible to entertain them.' [262] Thirdly it is likely that the Hindustani horse discharged from the services stayed in Khandesh on their way north, or many others crossed over from the Shinde or Holkar territories into Khandesh.[263] Whatever be their number, however, they did not disturb the peace of Khandesh, and were soon lost in the population. The gradually increasing prosperity of the district gave them enough incentive to give up their martial profession. Some of them might have joined Suryajirao Nimbalkar's small rebellion at Yawal in 1820, but it was a minor affair and did not in any way tax the energies of the Khandesh authorities. [264] In any case, Captain Briggs was able to report to Elphinstone on December 14, 1818 that ' Candeish has been cleared of Savegible marauders ....' [265]

BRIGGS AND THE BRITISH ARMY:

During the military settlement of Khandesh, Briggs very often had very distressing experiences with the British army. The problem that distressed many English officers was the problem of forage and the purchase of fodder. The British army during the war would not pay for the fodder, in fact would take it from the villagers by force. Gen. Lionel Smith was so

distressed by this practice, that he wrote a letter speficially on this subject to Commissioner Elphinstone. [266] In this long and painful letter Gen. Smith observed that ' It is little singular that we have gone to wars against Pindarries for plundering and allow a practice in our own armies which... is nearly as baneful to the peaceful inhabitants of a country as many mischief of these professional freebooters. The only difference perhaps is fewer cases of murder and rape by our followers than Pindarries may occasion.' [267] The situation in Khandesh confirmed Gen. Smith's observation. On April 8, 1878, Col. MacDowell wrote to Briggs that ' with regard to forage I consider that we are in an enemy country.' Having entered a small village that offered no resistance, MacDowell ordered the place to be immediately occupied by Lt. Rule. ' His first duty, of course, will be to take charge of whatever may appear to be prize property and send in an account of it.' [268] Briggs strongly remonstrated to Lt. Col. MacDowell against the British Army's practice of free forage and free requisition of fodder. Bringing to the notice of the Commandant the economic and military disadvantages of the practice, he laid stress upon the fact that 'it alienates the inhabitants from the new government' [269] . He insisted that 'price must be paid for goods purchased '.[270] Col. MacDowell agreed with Briggs and promulgated orders 'that any fodder or animal purchased without the registration by the office and payment of due price would be considered as plunder' and the accused punished as per the rules. [271]

Forage and free fodder were not the only problems that the army raised. Its behaviour was disgraceful while attacking a town. At the battle of Kopergaon also, the British army behaved in a manner that was disgusting. They burned the houses of the civilians and looted property.[272] At Trimbak, the British army behaved with ' licentiousness ' that distressed Briggs. ' Very great irregularities were committed as the force came to its ground'. Plunder and arson were practiced on a large scale. It was only when Col. MacDowell proceeded to the spot that this was stopped. 'Many of the plunderers were seized and beaten at the time, others were confined and the whole of the plunder that could be collected was laid up in heaps under sentinels that the inhabitants of the place might come and claim their own goods...' The sacred temple at Trimbak was polluted women 'were striped and lying naked in the streets.' The fact was that the ' detachment at the end of the campaign is perfectly wild and there is no discipline at all in it, among the Europeans particularly.' Briggs was ' sorry to say that many of the officers are as notorious for their depredations as the men, and none seem(s) to think it essential to maintain discipline by checking.....'[273] Under these circumstances and ' in consideration of the sanctity of the place ' Briggs ' considered ' it his ' duty to stay a Day behind the Detachment at Trimbak. He collected the ' unfortunate people of the town together.' He made some lame excuses like the

logistical position of the town, and ' lamented the fate of the inhabitants and the pollution of their sanctuaries.' He gave five hundred rupees for distribution to Brahmins and five hundred more ' to maintain the customary ceremonies at the temple.' [274] The Commissioner approved Briggs's act.[275]

' Two very great objects of attainment ' in the eyes of the British officers were prize money and spies. Briggs was confident that ' all those things must ... find their level and will in time subside.' In the meantime, however, they were ' sources of vexation ' and made ' very bad impressions of our character, when character is everything...'[276]

With the attitudes to the civilian property and discipline held by the British officers and Briggs thus opposed, a conflict between the two was almost inevitable. Occasions for such showdowns were not wanting. The first occasion for the conflict arose in late April, when Rango Pant occupied a large territory belonging to Bajirao. The Pant occupied , as a civilian assistant to Briggs, the town of Songhir, and found some property therein. It included one elephant, nine horses, and a some military store. Earlier the Pant had captured ' two elephants and a considerable quantity of public property.' [277] Now the army claimed that property to itself as prize. Major Andrews, the President of the Prize Committee, wrote to Col. MacDowell to this effect, and the letter was forwarded by the Colonel to Briggs. Briggs believed that the

army had no claim on this property. [278] However, he prepared a detailed list of the property. In case of the Elephants, he would await the decision of the Commissioner, but in case of other animals, he proposed to sell them and keep the proceeds in deposit till the decision of the government was known. [279] Elphinstone agreed with Briggs and approved his measures. ' I am of the opinion that towns and places of Baji Row occupied without resistance by the civil authority are not liable to examination by the army. And that property taken possession of by the Civil Officers with the aid of Sebundees is not to be considered prize to the army ..... ' He, however, forwarded the correspondence to the Supreme Government for their decision. [280] The Governor General endorsed the views held by Briggs and Elphinstone and declared that ' property taken in an open town without resistance, by civil authority, and by irregular troops, such as Sebundy, is not to be considered as prize to the Army.'[281]

The army, nonetheless, continued to look for prizes in all directions. On April 29, 1818, Col. MacDowell wrote to Briggs informing him he had ' received information last night that a number of Bajee Rao's Sheep ' were in a jungle within twelve miles of the army camp, and that he had sent a guard under a Native Officer with orders to bring them in '. Briggs had to explain to Col. MacDowell that not only was there very great doubt about the ownership of the Sheep, but that there

TH C155

was no doubt in his mind that sheep grazing twelve miles away from the line of march could not become prize property, to whomsoever it might belong. He claimed that any kind of property of Bajirao was State property and not prize. [282]

On May 1, 1818, Briggs received a private letter from Elphinstone informing him of some valuable property belonging to Bajirao being hidden in the city of Nasik. The letter informed him that the property was in the possession of one Ramchandrapant Tamhankar. [283] Briggs alerted the army Commander, Col. MacDowell, stationed seven miles away from Nasik. The Commandant, however, refused to move, claiming lateness of hour as an excuse. [284] Briggs thereupon moved alone, and before the guards could move in from the camp in the morning of 2nd, was able to apprehend Ramchandra Pant Tamhankar. Briggs 'charged him with having in his possession a treasure belonging to Bajee Row. This, he did not deny.'[285] A huge treasure was recovered from his house. It consisted of an image in pure gold of Sheshashahi Vishnu weighing about 4-5 Kgs. (350 tolas), Kamarbands, bangles, glasses, bowls , necklaces, one stool (Chaurang) etc. all of solid gold. The total gold seized was about 43.8 Kgs (3,756[t]). The total silver that was seized weighed about 116.63 (10003 tolas 3 masas and 6 Ratis). Besides these, there were many boxes and bags that were not opened.[286] They contained jewels and gold mohars. The total value of the treasure was enormous. The Prize Committee of the army ' having received positive information of

property to a very considerable amount being now under the custody of Captain Briggs, lately discovered in the town of Nassuck belonging to Bajee Row and his adherents ' demanded that they be ' acquainted with the nature of property ' and ' humbly ' begged ' leave to lay their claims ' thereto. The Committee requested the Colonel to submit the copies of their communication to Hon'ble Mountstuart Elphinstone and also to Brig. Gen. Doveton for their consideration, ' should any objections be made to the delivery of the property to the Prize Committee '. [287] Briggs refused to hand over the property to the army, made detailed lists of various articles and forwarded the entire correspondence to Elphinstone.[288] Briggs was distressed and annoyed at the insinuations made in the correspondence and believed that the style of the letter was ' couched in terms by no means suit the station which the most noble the Governor General has assigned to one in Candeish.' [289] Almost a year later, the Government gave its decision in favour of the Army. This was, however, no reflection on Briggs or his stand . The Governor General wrote to Elphinstone on June 20, 1819 as follows: ' His Excellency cannot omit remarking in this place that he has perceived with mich regret the tone of the observations made relative to the conduct of Captain Briggs by Brigedier General Doveton, Colonel MacDowell and the Prize Committee in Khandesh. The difference of opinion does not seem to His Excellency to have been maintained, on the part of the latter-named officers, with that degree of courtesy and attention towards the other party that might have been

looked for in a fair discussion of the question... the Governor General considers the whole of his (Briggs's) procedure to have been unexceptionable and deems his exertions in securing the treasure to have been highly commendable.' [290]

After the capture of Trimbakji Dengale, a large booty fell in the hands of Captain Swanston. The value of the gold and silver and jewels was about 65,000 rupees. Briggs distributed this property among the 800 rank and file under Capt.Swanston.[291] The army once again laid its claim to the Prize, a claim that Briggs stoutly rejected. ' The seizure of Trimbakji Dengale, a proscribed criminal, after the war with Baji Rao had ceased, appears to me purely an act of civil magistracy, and I am at a loss to conjucture upon what grounds the Prize Committee can found its claim to the private property of such a person.....' [292] Both Elphinstone and the Governor General concurred with Briggs. 'Captain Briggs's view of the case, I am directed to inform you, seems to the Governor General in Council to be perfectly correct, the property in question not appearing to be on any ground claimable as prize to the army .....' [293]

The moral of the army in Khandesh was very bad. ..' The present condition of the Madras army (in Khandesh) is worst to death... This I say it who should not say it ... there is plenty of talk ... but no interior discipline and economy'. [294] To regulate the relations between the troops and the inhabitants Briggs raised an establishment of ' road guards '. The principal duty of the road guards was to assist the troops in procuring

food and fodder and to see that the villagers were not molested or taken advantage of. He laid down fare tables and requested the Commandant not to allow any troops to violate the rules and oppress the people through Begari.[295]

Briggs took his responsibilities seriously and considered himself the Civil authority in Khandesh.[296] Col. MacDowell was his senior in the Madras Native Infantry by some twenty years. They did not get on well with each other, even when Briggs was a mere Ensign. As Briggs claims, MacDowell had tried to get him removed to other Battalion, ' but very much to his annoyance, instead of my being removed, he was.' [297] They had not met since 1808, till the war with the Peshwa opened up. ' Our old regimental position soon became known in the camp, and some of his staff were not slow in keeping the Commandants' mind in a state of irritation. ' [298] Briggs gives full credit to Col. MacDowell for his courtsey, and military efficiency, and believed that ' but for the dispute as to prize property, we should have ended the campaign on good terms.' [299] With his insistance upon his civil authority, his anti-forage stand and opposition to prize money, it is no wonder that ' Briggs came to be regarded as a traitor in the camp.' [300]

NOTES

Chapter II.

1. Briggs, Autobiographical notes, quoted by Bell, E. op cit p.50.
2. Ibid p. 48
3. Ibid
4. Bell, E. op. cit. p.40.
5. Ibid
6. Ibid, p. 49.
7. S.P.D. Vol.41, Letter no.162, p.152. This letter says, गुरुवारी तिफनावर डाक्टर जाफरीस यानी मार कारभारी याचे बोलण्याचा काळा होता. त्यात बालफजीस्टीन व ब्रीक हे इमग्रताचे चित्त पुरवून बोलत होते. दुसरे (पाटंज)र वगैरे साहा पलटणचे पाहुण्या-सुध्दा आले होते. ते निराळे बोलाचे खलीत होते. हे निर्वाग सदरिल लिहा त्यांणी जेवण खोळंबून हाच मार केला.
   'This document is a confidential report made to Bajirao II by his agent.
8. Elphinstone to Adam, 30.6.1818, quoted by Ballhatchet, op. cit. p. 39.
9. Lord Hastings to Malcolm, May 10, 1817, quoted by Chakravorty, U. N., Anglo - Maratha Relations and Malcolm. (New Delhi, 1979) p. 97.
10. Hastings to Directors, June 9, 1817, Ibid.
11. Malcolm to a friend, 9th July, 1817, Kaye J. W. Sir John Malcolm, (London, 1856) p. 159.
12. Kaye, op. cit. p. 174.

13. Briggs Autobiographical notes, Bell, Evans, op. cit. p. 50.
14. Elphinstone to Governor - General, August 10, 1817, P R C 13, p. 214.
15. Briggs Autogiographical notes, Bell, E. op. cit. p. 50.
16. Ibid, p. 54
17. Kaye, op. cit. p. 174.
18. Chakravorty, op. cit. p. 98.
19. Blacker, op. cit. pp. 96-97.
20. Ibid, also Duff, Vol. III (1912) pp. 457 and 468.
21. Blacker, op. cit. p. 47.
22. Chakravorty, p. 98.
23. Thakur, HSI Vol. 2, p. 161.
24. Chakravorty, op. cit. p.131.
25. Duff, op. cit. p. 460.
26. P R C, Vol. 13, p. 466, secret memorandum by Anandrcw Yashwant, to Malcolm.
27. Foreign Dept., (Miscellaneous) Vol. 5, No. 124.
28. H S I, Vol. II, pp. 159-60, Also, Sardesai, G. S., S. P. D., Vol. 41, p. 135, Bajirao to Chhatrapati, 2.12.1817.
29. Ibid, p.132.
30. Kaye, op. cit. p. 215.
31. Bell, op. cit. p. 56.
32. J B to M E, 1.3.1818, D C 170.
33. J, Adams to M E , 15.12.1817, P R C Vol.13, pp.270-273

34. M. S. Gazetteer, Dhulia District, Govt. of Mah. 1974, p. 2.

35. J B to W C, January, 1822, E I papers, Vol.4, p. 636.

36. Ibid.

37. M E to J B, 30.3.1818, D C F 402.

38. J B to Pottinger, 9.4.1818, D C F 170, p. 59.

39. J B to M E, 10.4.1818, D C F, 170, p. 67.

40. J B to Pottinger, 9.4.1818, D C F 170, p. 59. Even with these deductions of areas, Khandesh still continued to be a heavy charge. It was not x till 1868 that the three talukas of Malegaon, Nandgaon and Baglan were separated from Khandesh and added to the District of Nasik, (Gazetteer of B'bay Presidency, 1882, Khandesh, p. 1) Later still the District of Khandesh was divided into two separate Collecorates, namely, East Khandesh and West Khandesh, at the present called as Jalgaon and Dhulia Districts respectively. (M.S. Gazetteer, p. 2).

41. Elphinstone, ' Report on the ---, Delhi, First Reprint, 1973, p. 3.

42. All this information is drawn chiefly from the Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency, Vol. 12, Bombay, 1880. All the facts are corroborated by the documents, hence the account is accepted.

43. East India Papers, Vol.4, p. 686.

44. Elphinstone, Report ---. op. cit., p. 4.

45. J B's report, East India Papers, Vol. 4, p. 686.
46. Elphinstone, Report ---, op. cit., p. 4.
47. Thakur V. V., H S I, Vol. 2, Indor , 1946, p. 174
48. S P D Vol. 31, p. 148.
49. Ibid, p. 147.
50. Chakravorty, op. cit. p. 112.
51. Elp. to G. G. 7.3.1818, PRC Vol.13, p. 316.
52. Elp. to G. G. 20.3.1818, PRC Vol.13, p. 320.
53. Briggs to Sir John Malcolm, 28.2.1818, DCF 170.
54. Briggs to Adams, 7.3.1818, DCF 170.
55. Briggs to Elp. 19.3.1818, DCF 170.
56. Thakur, HSI, Vol. 2, p. 177
57. Briggs to Elp., 1.3.1818, DCF 170.
58. Burton, R. G. , The Maratha and Pindari War, (Delhi, first Indian reprint, 1975.) p. 67.
59. Ibid, p. 64.
60. Ibid, p. 67.
61. Briggs to Sir John Malcolm, 28.2.1818, DCF 170
62. Thakur, op. cit. p. 177
63. Briggs to Sir John Malcolm 28.2.1818, DCF 170; also Burton op. cit. pp. 67-68.
64. Briggs to Malcolm, Ibid.
65. Briggs's Proclamation, 27/28.2.1818, DCF 170.
66. Ibid.
67. Briggs to Adams 7.3.1818, DCF 170.

68. Blacker, op. cit. p. 258.
69. Briggs to Elp. 1.3.1818, DCF 170.
70. Ibid
71. Briggs to Elp. 10.3.1818, DCF 170.
72. Elp. to G. G. 31.3.1818, PRC Vol. 13, p. 326.
73. Briggs to Elp. 7.3.1818, DCF 170
74. Elp. to G. G. 20.3.1818, PRC Vol. 13, p. 322
75. Briggs to Elp.19.3.1818, DCF 170.
76. Briggs to Elp., 9.6.1818 MSS EVR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I.
77. Briggs to Elp. 11.6.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I.
78. Elp. to G.G. 9.5.1818, PRC Vol. 13, p. 353.
79. Ibid p. 355
80. Elp. to G. G. 24.5.1818, PRC Vol.13, p. 389.
81. Elp. to G. G. 9.5.1818, PRC Vol. 13, p. 355
82. Malcolm to Adams 31.5.1818, PRC Vol.13, p. 368.
83. Elp. to G.G. 9.5.1818, PRC Vol.13, p. 349.
84. Ibid
85. Briggs to Pottinger 9.4.1818, DCF 170
86. Elp. to G.G., 9.5.1818, PRC Vol.13, p.349.
87. Briggs to Elp. 10.4.1818, DCF 170.
88. Ibid
89. Ibid
90. Ibid
91. Elp. to G. G. 9.5.1818, Vol.13, loc. cit.

92. Briggs to Elp. 10.4.1818, DCF 170

93. Burton op.cit. p. 88; Blacker op.cit. pp. 345-346.

94. Briggs to Elp. 13.4.1818, DCF 170.

95. Briggs to Elp. 15.4.1818, DCF 170

96. Blacker loc. cit.

97. Briggs to Elp. 15.4.1818, DCF 170.

98. Briggs to Elp. 23.4.1818, DCF 170.

99. Elp. to Briggs, 5.5.1818, DCF 402. Gangthady is the area south of present Khandesh, the fertile valley of Godavary that joins Khandesh to the rest of Maharashtra.

100. Burton op. cit. p. 89.

101. Briggs to Elp. 26.4.1818, DCF 170.

102. Blacker op.cit. pp.345-346.

103. Briggs to Elp. 26.4.1818, DCF 170.

104. Rungo Bapuji to Chaplin, SPD Vol.41, p.246.

105. Briggs to Elp. 15.4.1818, enclosure, DCF 170

106. Briggs to Pottinger 9.4.1818, and to Elp. 15.4.1818, DCF 170.

107. SPD Vol. 41, letter No.259, p.246.

108. SPD Vol. 41, p.248, foot note.

109. See Thakare K.S., Rungo Bapuji (Marathi)

110. JB to ME, 7.12.1818, DCF 173.

111. JB to ME, 9.7.1819, DCF 176.

112. JB to ME, 7.5.1819, DCF 176.

113. I have been informed by Shri Y. N. Kelkar that the surname of Rungo Pant of Briggs was Khole. However, I have not been able to ascertain it.

114. JB to ME, 26.4.1818, DCF 170.

115. ME to JB, DCF 402.

116. JB to Lt. Briggs, 13-5-1818, DCF 170

117. ME to G. G., 9.5.1818, PRC Vol. 41, p. 355.

118. JB to ME, 1.3.1818, DCF 170

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.

121. SPD, Vol. 41, p. 31, Lakshmanrao Govind's report from Khandesh 1802.

122. JB to ME, 10.4.1818, DCF 170

123. Major Ives to JB, 3.6.1818, DCF 170.

124. ME to G. G., 9.5.1818, PRC VOL 41, p. 350.

125. Blacker, op. cit., p. 346.

126. JB to ME, 20.4.1818, DCF 170

127. ME to JB, 29.4.1818, DCF 402.

128. JB to ME, 1.5.1818, DCF 170

129. JB to ME, 26.4.1818, DCF 170.

130. JB to ME Ibid.

131. ME to JB, 5.5.1818, DCF 402

132. Ives to JB, 7.5.1818, DCF 170

133. ME to JB, 12.5.1818, DCF 402

134. JB to Eves, 4.5.1818, DCF 170

135. Ives to JB, 9.5.1818, DCF 170

136. JB to Ives, 4.5.1818, DCF 170

137. Ibid

138. JB to ME, 20.4.1818, DCF 170.

139. Ibid.

140. JB to ME, 1.5.1818, DCF 170.

141. Ibid.

142. JB to Jardine, 12.5.1818, DCF 170.

143. ME to JB, 11.3.1818, DCF 402.

144. JB to ME, 20.4.1818, DCF 170

145. ME to JB, 29.4.1818, DCF 402

146. JB to Lt. Col. MacDowell, 11.5.1818, DCF 170.

147. News, 11.5.1818, DCF 170, p.325

148. Ibid, 12.5.1818.

149. Ibid.

150. Lt. Hodges to JB, 13.5.1818, DCF 170.

151. Ibid.

152. JB to ME, 13.5.1818, DCF 170.

153. It is 12 Kms. west of Dhulia.

154. DCF 170, p. 349.

155. News, 16.5.1818, DCF 170, p. 353.

156. JB to ME,13.5.1818, DCF 170.

157. Ibid.

158. JB to Lt. Col. MacDowell, 11.5.1818, DCF 170.

159. JB to ME, 16.5.1818, DCF 170.

160. JB to Lt. Nodges, 20.5.1818, DCF 170

161. JB to ME, 20.5.1818, DCF 170.

162. Burton, op.cit. p. 90

163. SPD, Vol. 31, p. 148.

164. JB to ME, 20.5.1818, DCF 170

165. Ibid, A rather long, detailed and graphis letter.

166. Ibid.

167. JB to MacDowell, 21.5.1818, DCF 170

168. MacDowell to JB, 21.5.1818, DCF 170

169. JB to ME, 29.5.1818, DCF 170.

170. Ibid

171. Burton, op. cit. p. 90

172. MacDowell to JB, 31.5.1818, DCF 170

173. SPD , Vol. 41, p. 209, मालेगाव सांधाप लडत आहे.
9.6.1818, the same phrase is used agaon on 12.6.1818.

174. Burtom, op.cit. p. 91.

175. JB to ME, 2.6.1818, and 7.6.1818, DCF 171.

176. JB to ME, 15.6.1818, DCF 171.

177. Burton, op. cit. p. 91

178. JB to ME, 15.6.1818, DCF 171

179. JB to Col. MacDowell, 14.6.1818, DCF 171

180. JB to ME, 15.6.1818, DCF 171.

181. MacDowell to JB, 15.6.1818, DCF 171.

182. MacDowell to JB, 14.6.1818, DCF 171.

183. JB to MacDowell, 25.6.1818, DCF 171.

184. JB to ME, 1.7.1818, DCF 171.

185. Jardine to JB, 4.7.1818, DCF 171.

186. JB to ME, 15.6.1818, DCF 171.

187. Enclosure to JB to ME, 2.7.1818, DCF 171, p.283.

188. JB to ME, 1.7.1818, DCF 171.

189. JB to ME, 1.7.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 DVol. I .

190. Ibid

191. Ibid.

192. JB to ME, 12.9.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D, Vol. I

193. John Elphinstone to JB, 29.6.1818, DCF 171.

194. JB to J. Elphinstone, 7.7.1818, DCF 171

195. JB to Munn, 8.7.1818, DCF 171.

196. JB to ME, 12.7.1818, DCF 171.

197. Balljotchet, op. cit. p. 82.

198. Ibid

199. Blacker, op. cit. pp 399-401.

200. JB to ME, 24.10.1818, DCF 173.

201. JB to Col. MacDowell, 24.10.1818, DCF 173.

202. ME to JB, Oct. 1818, DCF 403.

203. JB to ME, 24.10.1818, DCF 173.

204. JB to Col. MacDowell, 24.10.1818, DCF 173.

204.A. JB to Ali Jamadar, n.d., DCF 173.

205. JB to ME, 1.11.1818, DCF 173.

206. JB to ME, Ibid.

207. Jardine to JB, 2.11.1818, DCF 173.

208. JB to ME, 7.11.1818, DCF 173.

209. MacBean to JB, 6.11.1818, DCF 173.

210. Blacker, op. cit.

211. JB to ME, 11.6.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D, Vol. I, The Bheels, forming a part of a different kind of settlement, are discussed separately in the next chapter.

212. ME to G. G., 21.12.1817, PRC Vol.13, p. 276.

213. ME to G.G., 7.3.1818, PRC Vol.13, p. 317.

214. ME to G.G., 5.3.1818, PRC Vol.13, p.314.

215. PRC Vol.13, p.336.

216. News, 23.4.1818, PRC Vol.13, p.340.

217. Smith to ME, 2.5.1818, PRC Vol.13, p. 342.

218. Ibid

219. तेथून फौज पुनटोन लोक आपापलाले घरास जावयास लागले ... काही सिलेदार व विंचुरकराची फौज साडदहा हजार असे पुनटोन आपलाले घरास गेले ...
SPD, Vol.41, pp. 184-185.

220. बाजीराव साहेब याचे लस्करावर फ सरकारचा छापा पडोन पळाली ते आपलाले घरी जीव सरकून येत आहे....
6.5.1818, SPD, Vol.41, p. 189, Many such reports are published in SPD Vol.41.

221. ME to G. G., 9.5.1818, PRC Vol.13, pp. 353,

222. ME to G. G., 24.5.1818, PRC Vol.13, p. 384.

223. JB to ME , 1.7.1818 , MSS EUR F 88, BOX 6 D, Vol. I.

224. ME to G. G., 18.6.1818, Political and Secret, Vol. 307 & 308.

225. ME to G. G., 5.3.1818, PRC Vol.13, p. 316.

226. ME to G. G., 18.6.1818, PRC 13, p. 395.

227. JB to ME, 9.5.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D, Vol. I

228. ME to G. G., 18.6.1818, PRC 13, p. 396.

229. JB to ME, 11.5.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I

230. JB to ME, Ibid.

231. JB to ME, 9.5.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I.

232. JB to ME, 11.5.1818, MSS EUR F 88, BOX 6 D Vol. I

233. JB to ME, 8.6.1818, DCF 171.

234. JB to ME, 23.6.1818, DCF 171.

235. JB to ME, 26.6.1818, DCF 171.

236. JB to ME, 27.6.1818, DCF 171.

237. JB to ME, 30.6.1818, DCF 171.

238. JB to ME, 29.6.1818, MSS EUR F 88, Box 6 D Vol. I

239. JB to ME, 30.6.1818, DCF 171.

240. JB to ME, 29.6.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I

241. JB to ME, 30.6.1818, DCF 171.

242. JBto ME, 29.6.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I

243. JB to ME, 5.7.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I

244. G. G. Governor of Bombay, 31.10.1818, PRC Vol.13,p.484

245. ME to Munro, 19.5.1818 , Ballhatchet, op.cit., p.79.

246. ME to G. G. 18.6.1818, PRC Vol. 13, p. 403.

247. Ibid, p. 404

248. JB to ME, 1.3.1818, DCF 170

249. JB to ME, 13.5.1818, DCF 170.

250. JB to ME, 16.5.1818, DCF 170.

251. Ibid.

252. Chaplin to JB, 20.11.1819, DCF 406.

253/ E. I. Papers, Vol. 4, p. 205, Ahmednagar, Poona and Satara had 5,000, 2000 and 3500 unemployed foot soldiers respectively against 1800 of Khandesh .

254. ME to G. G., 18.6.1818, PRC 13, p. 403.

255. ME to Skinner, 16.5.1818, Ballhatchet, op. cit. p. 79.

256. ME to G.G., 18.6.1818, PRC Vol.13, p.404

257. Ibid

258. Ibid. Also his circular dated letter to Collectors, DCF 402.

259. JB to ME, 24.5.1818, DCF 170.

260. JB to ME, 1.7.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I.

261. E. I. Papers, Vol.4, p. 205.

262. M. E. to G. G., 18.5.1818, PRC Vol.13, p. 404.

263. Cf. / See JB's letter to ME incorporating the the contents of Sir John Malcolm's letter to him, JB to ME, 12.9.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I.

264. Mag. State Gazatteer, Jalgon Distriect, p. 103.

265. JB to ME, 14.12.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I.

266. Smith to ME, 7.5.1818, PRC Vol.13, pp. 342-345.

267. Ibid

268. MacDowell to Briggs, 8.4.1818, and 9.4.1818, in Bell, op. cit. p. 66 ff.

269. JB to Col. MacDowell, 19.4.1818, DCF 170.

270. Ibid

271. Col. MacDowell's Order, 19.4.1818, DCF 170.

272. SPD, Vol. 41, let No.170, p.158.

273. JB to ME, 25.4.1818, Ballhatchetm op. cit. p.28.

274. JB to ME, 30.4.1818, DCF 170.

275. ME to JB, 4.5.1818, Ballhatchet, op.cit, p.28.

276. JB to ME, 11.6.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol. I

277. JB to ME, 16.4.1818, DCF 170

278. JB to Lt. Col. MacDowell, 21.4.1818, DCF 170.

279. JB to ME, 21.4.1818, DCF 170.

280. ME to JB, 28.4.1818, DCF 402.

281. Bell, op. cit. p. 68;

282. Bell, op. cit. p. 67 .

283. JB to ME, 5.5.1818, DCF 170.

284. Bell, op. cit. p. 68.

285. JB to ME, 5.5.1818, DCF 170.

286. Ibid

287. Maj. Andrews to Lt. Col. MacDowell, 6.5.1818, DCF 170.

288. JB to MacDowell, 7.5.1818, DCF 170.

289. JB to ME, 7.5.1818, DCF 170.

290. G. G. to M. E., 20.6.1819, op. cit. p. 70.

291. JB to ME, 30.6.1818, DCF 171.

292. JB to MacDowell, cited in Bell , cp cit. p. 73

293. G. G. to ME, 13.12.1818, cited in Bell, op. cit. p.73.

294. JB to ME, 1.7.1818, MSS EUR F 88, BOX 6 D Vol. I.

295. JB to MacDowell, 21.7.1818, DCF 171.

296. JB to ME, 26.5.1818, DCF 170.

297. Briggs, Autobiographical notes, Bell, op.cit. p.61.

298. Ibid, p.62.

299. Ibid

300. Bell, op. cit. p. 67.

CHAPTER III

SETTLEMENT OF THE BHILLS

The most vaxatious problem that Briggs faced in Khandesh was the problem of the Bhils. It was a problem which, to the end of his tenure as the Political Agent in Khandesh, Briggs could not solve to his own satisfaction. The problem of the Bhils could not be solved on par with the problem of the Arabs or that of the disbanded soldiery of the late Peshwa. It involved a large section of the indegenous population with certain definite rights which had both social and economic implications. Almost ten years after his departure from the Khandesh , in 1833, there were an estimated 55,000 Bhils in Khandesh.[1] During the war with the Peshwa, the Bhils had taken no sides, and had continued almost unabated their ravages in and around Khandesh. 'The Bheels of the Satpoora Hills plunder almost without molestation the boundaries of the Cassarbarry and Ajanta range.....[2] . These ravages, Briggs believed, he had inherited from the previous Government. Rebellions by the Bhils was a normal phenomenon under the Maratha Government. Writing from Kukurmundha one Balaji Mahadeo Sahasrabuddhe speaks of the great menace of the Bhils. The villagers abandoned their homes and the villages were destroyed.[3] Another letter tells us of the uprising of Deoji Naik Bhil.[4] The Bhils in the region of Kaldari created a great deal of disturbance in North-Western Khandesh in early 1811 and a campaign had to be opened against them. The

depredations by the Bhils seem to have been a regular feature of Khandesh. In Khandesh Jamav papers in the Pune Archives, one comes across repeated references to their daring raids. According to Briggs the major cause of these repeated ravages by the Bhils was that ' their claims were unattended to by the late (i. e. Peshwas's) Government .....[6] . But the Marathi documents do not fully support this contention. From Taloda Narhar Bapuji Deshpande and Janardan Raghunath Sukhatme write to Poona about the depredations of Dewaji Naik Bhil in the Baglana pargana, and suggest that these depredations were due to the famine. Balaji Sahasrabuddhe claims that the Bhils unite for depredations due to hunger.[7] It seems that the whole issue of the Bhils had turned into a vicious circle. Due to the unsettled political conditions since 1802-03, the villages in Khandesh were depopulated. The process was aggravated by the Third Anglo-Maratha war and the predatory activities of the Arabs. This made life impossible for the Bhils and prompted them to undertake depredations of their own.[8] Ahilyabai Holkar had made agreements with the Bhil chiefs for the protection of the ghats and passes and generally of the country.[9] In all these agreements the Bhils were granted certain rights or Huks which the Bhils claimed to have been theirs since times immemorable. By endorsing them through various yads and sanads the Governments prior to that of the East India Company seem to have accepted them.

By implications they also accepted them ancient lineage of the Bhils.

The question 'Who are the Bhils? ' has been found difficult by anthropoligists to answer. That they do not belong to the Indo-Aryan ethnic group is a fact on which all scholars agree. And a majority of anthropologists also agree that they differ from the pre-Dravidian groups in India. 'The more we analyse the data the more it transpires that the Bhils are racially more distant from the so called pre-Dravidian groups while they approach nearer to the higher castes!'[10] According to Enthoven, 'the typical Khandesh Bhil, the wild woodman of the Satpuras is dark, well made, active and hardy with high cheek bones, wide nostrils and in some cases coarse, almost African features. These are no doubt stunted and degraded by want and ill health .....'[11] Commissioner Elphinstone found them 'small and black' and always carrying bows and arrows.[12] Graham describes a Bhil as a 'diminutive figure ..... the hardy denizen of the hill.....'[13] .

The origin of Bhils is shrouded in obscurity. The Historically minded Briggs confessed that 'their origin is .. too obscure and too remote to furnish data for history'.[14] However throughout the recorded history, the Bhils always occupied an inferior social position within the Hindu Fold being considered one of the seven lowest castes. [15] Though their religion was less sophisticated than the traditional popular Hinduism, the Bhils worshipped all the gods and

godlings of the Hindu pantheon. The hill-tops were of special reverence to them as being the abodes of spirits both benevolent and malevolent.[16] This almost primitive religious belief accompanied by a host of sacrificial rituals could have, perhaps distinguished them from other Hindu groups in an urban setting, but in the rural backward setting of Khandesh in the early nineteenth century, it was difficult to separate them from other inhabitants. 'It is difficult to say from whence the Bheels are sprung, there seems to be no good foundation for the general opinion that they are the aborigins of the soil/and that they were driven into the Hill on the Hindoo invasion, their language differs little from that of the surrounding country and their manners from what I have seen not at all.'[17] This observation of Briggs is corroborated by Graham,[18] Enthoven[19] and modern anthropologists like Karve, Naik or Doshi. Elphinstone However, did not agree with Briggs. In his report he states 'The Beels differ from the other inhabitants in the language, manners and appearance .....'[20] Yet in the social matters, the indigenous inhabitants could and did make the distinction. ' ..... (It) is obvious that where a Brahmin on one hand, or a Beel on the other, was to be tried, it would be too much to expect unprejudiced decision .....'[21] In the social scale, therefore, the Bhil began with a handicap.[22]

In the general structure of the social organisation , however, a Bhill was not a parasite. 'Throughout Candeish and Gungturry the minor duties of the police were conducted

by the Bheels .....'[23] When the Bhils came by this duty is difficult to say, but Graham suggests that it was under Aurangzeb that the Mughals recognised the 'usurped authority' of the Bhils 'on the condition of the protection of the passes and fortresses.'[24] This conjucture, however, does not seem very plausible since Graham also claims that one of the conditions on which the claims of the Bhils were accepted by the Mughal Emperor was their embracing Islam.[25] The Muslim Bhils do not form the majority of the chiefs or the village watchman class, and are confined mostly to the Tadwi clan residing in the north-east of Khandesh.[26] The Bhil tradition takes this responsibility of the Bhils to the remote past. In any case, if the Bhils were to come by this duty of protecting the village from thieves and robbers only after the campaigns of Aurangzeb in the second half of the seventeeth century, it is well neigh impossible that the village Bhil watchman, the Jaglya, would have been included among the traditional village servants, the Balutedar. That he was so included is evident from Briggs letter to the Deccan Commissioner answering the queries that the latter had made.[27] Briggs tells us that the village watchmen, or Jaglyas in Khandesh held large grants of rent free lands for the services they rendered to the society. The total land so held by the Bhils amounted to 32,520 bighas.[28] It seems impossible that an agrarian and traditional society would have alienated such a large track of land to functionaries, whose functions were of so recent an origin as the campaigns

of Aurangzeb. Their acceptance and assimilation in the complex structure of traditional Indian society is a positive proof of their police duties originating in a more remote past. Briggs himself held this view and expressed it in his magnum opus 'Land Tax in India'.[29]

The term Bhil is a generic term denoting roughly almost all the forest dwellers. The Khandesh Bhils are subdivided into many clans and tribes. Enthoven has classified them into three major groups. viz. plain Bhils, hill and forest tribes, and mixed tribes. 'The plain Bhils, the largest and most civilized class found in almost all the villages of central and South Khandesh, are known simply as Bhils in contradistinction to the hill and forest tribes.'[30] The hill and forest tribes consist of twelve main tribes. These are: 1) Barda 2) Dangchi 3) Dhanka 4) Dhorepi 5) Gavit 6) Khatil 7) Mathvadi 8) Mavchi 9) Nahal 10) Oavra 11) Varli 12) Vasava. All except the Dangchi inhabited the Satpuda, and are referred to by Briggs generally as Satpuda Bhils in his reports. All these tribes, ethnically are pure Bhils. The Bhilals, the Nirdhi and the Tadvis are mixed tribes, the Bhilals are half Bhil, half Rajput or kunbi; the Nirdhis and Tadvis are half Bhil, half Muslims.[31] ' The common Khandesh Bheels who are scattered in such numbers throughout the province, reject however, all distinguishing name of clan or caste, and glory in the simple appellation of Bheel'[32]. The distinction between the Hill and Plain Bhils was more superficial than real, as Briggs found.

' The Hill Bheel and the Bheel of the Plain are entirely similar to each other, and they become residents of the Hills or plains, according to circumstances.[33]

Most of the plain Bhils were incorporated in the local police.[34] The trouble, when it came, always came from the Hill Bhils. The Bhils occupied the eastern part of the Khandesh hill range and extended as far south as Poona. ' They even spread over the plains to the east, especially on the North of the Codavary, and are found as far off as the neighbourhood of the Wurda .....'[35] However, the particular province of Khandesh proper was well suited for the habitation of this forest tribe. ' This province is nearly surrounded by broad chains of mountains, whose sides are clothed in noxious vegitation, where for many months of the year, none but the hardy denizen of the hill can exist, and where secure in the unwholesome fastnesses of these more elevated regions the cateran could undisturbedly collect his wild force, and burst from the bosom of the mist upon the unsuspecting prey on the plain.'[36] Almost on all sides, Khandesh is surrounded by hill ranges. Satpuda, which forms the northern boundary of the province, is a series of tabular trap hills, separated from each other by ravines deep and wide. The whole area is covered by 'splendid forests'. To the West, ' the great Sukhein Range rises steep any stony.' In the south the continuous ranges of Chandor, Satmalla and Ajanta form the southern most boundary of the province. To the east, ' the low sterile hillocks'

separates Khandesh from the rich province of Berar.[37] According to Briggs, the inhabitants of these hills and forests were called Mangs, Ramonsees Bheels or Colees in different parts. Those bordering on Gungturry are called Colees, and those in the Baglana and Satpoora Hills, Bheels; and a tract of country lying East of Surat and Baroch and extend ing thro' Hills and forests as far as Nemueir and Candeish is styled Bheelwarra.'[38]

The life style of the Bhils was very simple almost primitive. ' Their habits and ideas ..... are totally opposed to agricultural labour; the motives which lead to the gradual accumulation of property are faint and insufficient; and honest mechanical craft is despised with the most thorough contempt' [39] Graham goes on to tell us that the Bhil tribes of Matvadi, Barada and Dhorepi were generally despised by other Bhils because they made their living through honest labour.[40] This, of course, was true only of those Bhils who were removed farther away from cultivating civilization. Briggs informs us that the Bhils were granted large tracts of land which they cultivated But those of the Bhils who lived outside the villages or civilized areas lived a primitive life. ' In this country (Bhilwarra) they cultivate the valleys by the simple method of sowing grain on spots where wood or grass has been burnt, but without ploughing and the grain thus raised, the flowers of the Maua (Moha) , which is in great abundance and various roots and shrubs afford them a scanty substance.'[42]

This smallness of their wants coupled with their capacity to undergo privations of which Graham speaks with admiration,[43] made it difficult to control them. The peculiar character of the people and their total disregard for personal comforts and safety was one important factor that complicated the solution of the Bhil problem. 'Reckless of life, active and intelligent', the race of the Bhils was 'peculiarly adapted for the foray and the night attack'[44] and '.... deeming their own lives of small value, they felt little scruple in trifling with those of others.....[45]

Most of the Bhils were organised in Bands which were tribe and area oriented. They had their own Rajas or petty Princes among themselves. 'The imbecillity of the neighbouring states, and the enterprise of their leaders' were the circumstances that tended to alter their conditions frequently.[46] Most of the mountain chiefs had claims on the country surrounding their hutty, either to protect it from robberies, or to guard passes which ran through their area. In most of the cases the claims were backed up by grants from former rulers, as at the least by local tradition. They claimed their rights from Ahilyabai Holkar, as in case of Goomani Naik Bhil of Satpuda[47] or from Tukoji Holkar as in the case of Deoji Naik Bhil of Thalner pargana.[48] There were a few spurious cases, no doubt, where plain Bhils tried to usurp the privileges of the hill chiefs. But such cases were few and far between.[49] Almost every Bhil chief called Naik, by his followers, had a claim of pecuniary

character. ' Among all my Bheel (naiqs) each fellow has the privilege of taxing a particular ghaut, some exact the privilege of 200 Rs. annually from the Surcar while others have a fourth of the Govt. customs; these are their Hucks , wuttney privileges of their birth and they relinquish them with extraordinary reluctance.' [50] The Bhils in the plains were originally the village watchmen; ' they were the organs of intelligence of the police ..... Over each District or part of District was a Bheel Naiq who had superior control over all the village Bheels, (and) was responsible for the immediate restitution of stolen property or of tracing the thieves..../' [51] There were a certain number of Bhils in each village who had lands or a portion of the crops granted to them for their maintenance. Their duty was ' to conduct strangers beyond their limits and wake them over in in safety to be next village Bheel '. It was also the duty of the Village Bhil to guard the village gate, and also the cultivated fields. With their intimate knowledge of the area and the inhabitants, they were expected to know, and in most cases they actually knew, the hideouts and modus operendi of the thieves. [52] ' He is enabled to do this by his early habits of inquisiteveness and observation, as well as by the nature of his allowance, which being partly a small share of the grain and similar property belonging to each house, he is kept always on the watch to ascertain his fees, and always in motion to collect them..... ' [53]. When the tables were turned, this very knowledge could be

and would be turned to advantage of the Bhil robber.[54]

It is, therefore, evident that all the Bhils, whether Hill ones or plain ones, had certain perquisites. In most of the cases the perquisites were in the form of Watans usually called the Salami Watan.[55] However, during the troubled times that followed the second Anglo-Maratha war, the control of the Central government of the Peshwa over this remote and difficult part became increasingly shadowy. The Holkar government which controlled a large tract of this territory after 1803 failed to give effective direction to the administration.[56] The increasing disorder accompanied by by the pecuniary demands of the governments and other agencies compounded the distress of the population. The Second Anglo Maratha conflict was followed by a severe famine.[57] As a result of the war and the famine, ' which extended from the Satpoora Hills down to Hyderabad,' Khandest lost the greater part of its population.[58] In the year 1810, Holkar's officers from Sultanpur reported that out of the 280 villages of the pargana, 11 villages were lost , 42 were accounted under different revenue headings like Dumala or Jagir, 21 were lost to predatory rebels, Of the remaining 206 villages, 169 were in great arrears or lying fallow. Only 37 villages were under cultivation.[59] This unsettled condition was caused and further aggravated by the Pendharis. In the opinion of Briggs, 'the ravages committed by the Bheels and the Arabs, were not even equal perhaps to those inflicted by the Pindaries.'[60] The Pindharis ravaged the country at their leisure, being not

controlled by any superior military authority. ' Their usual approach was through the Ghauts near Asseer and the Mahomedan Bheels of that tract were their guides and abettors.'[61] Giving a graphic account of the catastrophe that befell Khandesh in the form of the Pendharis, Briggs writes to Elphinstone, ' Desolation is everywhere apparent in Candeish. Immense tracts are covered with jungle , in some parts of which their still remain forts entire, and mosques appearing through the woods, the monuments of better times...'[62].

The depopulation and devastation of the country had natural economic consequences. The revenue income of the government decreased at a time when the financial necessities had increased. The government of Peshwa resorted to the expedient of farming the revenue which ensured a fixed income to the Government. The revenue farmer '..... became for the time being the sovereign of the district, and it may easily be imagined ..... that the holder (of the contract) extracted from the ryot the uttermost of his ability to pay.' In the times of peace and plenty, the maintenance claimed by the Bhils for performing their duties as police was usually paid without demure. But during the period of universal poverty and distress, these payments were naturally enough dispensed with. ' At the time when police was most needed there was no food for the police. '[63] As village police the Bhils had held lands on the borders, exempt from assessment, besides being entitled to certain portions of grain from every crop.

As the villages were plundered and devasted, they lost all their means of subsistance, ' and all their interest in the unsettled occupations of the plain. ' [64] ' The Bheels ..... could neither exist amidst ruins nor procure food from the cultivators of other villages, and betook themselves to high-way robberies and lived in bands either in the mountains or took possession of villages in their neighbourhood. ' [65] Many Bhil naiks gathered strong followings and assumed the state of petty kings, and ' kept regular bodies of armed men in their pay for the purpose of plunder.' [66] The revenue contractors, it seems, were both unable and unwilling to spend money for maintaining soldiers for the protection of the popula-tion, ' and the Bheels in a very short time became so bold as to appear in bands of hundreds, and attack towns, carrying off either cattle or hostages whom they released by receiving handsome ransoms. ' [67] The methods and measures employed by the Peshwa or the local governments, to bring the situation under control were such as to give further rise to banditti. ' They did not hesitate to employ fraud as well as force, to effect their object , and many cruel massacres of the Bhils are said to have taken place '. This naturally excited the Bhils to avenge themselves, which they did on the surrounding area with such a ferocity that ' caused their very name to be equally draded and abhorred by the inhabitants.' [68] In October, 1818, Briggs reported to the Commissioner that 'high-way robberies attended with the most wanton and barbarous

murders are committed daily .....' [69] When Briggs told Deo Singh the Bhil naik that those Bhils who had watans in villages should return to them, Deo Singh replied, "what to eat, grass and firewood?"[70] This obviously did not endear the Bhils to the local inhabitants who seem to have carried an inbred hatred for them. But many a time advantage was taken of the revages committed by Bhils to cover the crimes of others. Briggs says that crimes of most henious character ' have been usually ascribed to the Bheels under cover of whose uniquities private revenge is, I fear, too frequently indulged. ' [71]

The devastation and insecurity caused by the Bhil incursion was really very enormous. On 23rd November 1818, Briggs reported that about 30 highway robberies, 3 murders and many instances of cattle raids having taken place in Khandesh during the period June 18th to August 7th, 1818. [72] Just to get a feel of the unsettled conditions of peace and order, a cursory view may be taken of the Bhil crimes during the early period. On 5th Nov. 1817, two English ladies were abducted by the Bhils. One was killed while the either died. [73] On 12th August 1818, Bhils took away 300 sheep from the Village of Khandala.[74] On 1st Sept. 1818 Briggs reports various raids on the Sindwa by Guajy naik Bhil and cattle lifting and general plunder and arson. [75] On 18th August, a party of 40 Bhils abducted two Dak runners; on 21st Aug. a party of 50 Bhils carried away a villager and a runner of the custom Department; on the 27th Sept. Bhils attacked a party of Govt. carcoons wounding many; on the same day another party attacked

Captain Swanston's servants killing one housekeeper and kidnapping a Muslim traveller. [76] On 8th October, 1818, Briggs reported to the Commissioner murder of one Balaji Bhikaji Kulkarni of Erandole Pargana. This man was accompanied by a child. The child was also murdered. The crime took place in the vicinity of Dharangaon attended with circumstances peculiarly shocking.[77] Murder of a wani was reported by Briggs on 11th Nov. 1818. This murder showed ' the true character of the Bheels and the state of society in Candeish.' The man, named Keshav Wani, accompanied by his nephew left the village of Lumcurny to buy ghee at the village of Kurandi. The Bhils waylaid him, killed him and one of the bullocks of the cart left the bay and other bullock. The money they found on the Wani totaled Rs.7/-, and the share of the individual Bhil in the booty was twelve annas. [78] On the 14th Nov.1818, Briggs reports continued raids by Bhils in Raver area. [79] Twenty five Bhils attacked the village of Anturwally. Two patils were severely wounded. One died almost immediately while other died after some time. The Bhils, of course, made away with the cattle. [80] Instance of similarly crimes can be multiplied. The Deccan Commissioner's Files (Inward) from number 172 onwards are full of reports of such crimes. It cannot be argued that the bitterness of both the inhabitants of Khandesh and the British authorities against the Bhils was based upon some fancied wrong. Nor can it be argued that the outrages of the Bhils during this period of Indian history were, in the nature of the things, organized rebellion against

the British authority. The Khandesh Jamav papers pertaining to the period prior to the establishment of the British rule in Maharashtra, speak eloquently of the Bhil outrages.[81]

Prima facie it looked that it was a simple problem of law and order that could be met with by a simple argument of force. To the colonel commanding the Detachment in Khandesh its solution was simple. ' If I had the means, I would endeavour to destroy this body of Bheels by following them both sides of the Ghauts.' [82] But Briggs realized the deeper social implications of the Bhil outrages. To him it was not a mere problem of law and order, but a deeper issue involving tradition, economics, culture and civilization. He firmly believed that the Bhil ravaged the country because their ancient claims were not attended to. Their becoming ' the principal scourage of the population' was, in his opinion , ' very ' natural.[83] Briggs sincerely believed that his duty was twofold. Firstly he must settle the country and secondly he must 'domesticate ' the wild Bhils. Both the objectives were interdependent. On the point of the Bhil claims to - privileges and perquisites, he was ' disposed to give liberal equivalents to gain an object so important...' [84] But while doing so, ' there was one thing on which I would insist, and that is that they should furnish a certain number of watchmen for each village to be supported by that village and these will be made responsible for any Dackas (raids) that may be made. ' Such an arrangement, Briggs believed, would make the

Bhils feel that ' their vigilance is necessary in protecting the villages. ' This feeling, he was sure, would give them ' a degree of consequence among themselves, a kind of self-importance ' and also a confidence in the British authority. In the course of time the entire hill population could so be brought to the plains and ' they will mix at last in the mass of the civilized people .....' [85] The alluring picture that Brigg drew from his native approach to social psychology in general and to the Bhil psychology in particular is - undoubtedly, simplistic. Yet the very picture makes his intentions and objectives crystal clear. ' ... The manner in which the Bhils who still remain in the village are treated is sufficient to drive them to desperation ...'[86] Explaining the complexities of the social acceptability of the Bhils by other sections of the society, Briggs draws a fairly accurate and realistic picture. ' The enmity of the inhabitants against the Bheels is carried to such lengths that they would rejoice and join heartily in any plan for their extrapation in consequence of their long sufferings and this same feeling prevails so much as to induce them to receive them into their villages unwillingly and to withhold from them that subsistance on which they principally must depend for support. ' Socially the Bhils were the ' outcasts from society, accustomed to the most servile occupation in the village from their birth...' The social problem was aggravated by its economic implications. ' That class of society which is bound to support them, the labouring farmer, is too poor to feed' the Bhils.[87] The

reclamation of Bhils, therefore, was a multifaceted problem. It was necessary to make them socially useful and acceptable; it was also necessary that the Bhils acquire economic stakes in the preservation of the then existing socio-economic order. In a scheme so wide in its connotation, every Bhil must be incorporated.[88]

One of the peculiarities of the Bhil culture was that there was no such thing as an individual Bhil unconnected to some tribe and chief. Such a Bhil had no standing in the society. This strong corporate feeling could have been, as Dr. Naik suggests, the result of a tribal socio-economic order of the things, [89] or a consequence of the totemistic religion of the Bhils as Enthoven suggests. [90] Whatever be the case, a Bhil was deeply attached to his village (hutty) and to his chief. [91] Briggs also realised this. In a way , it made his attempt at the reconciliation of the Bhils easy. It was difficult, nay, impossible, to deal with every individual Bhil. They could be dealt with through their Naiks. The traditional hucks and perquisites enjoyed by the Bhil Naiks could be restored to them, on condition of requiring them to control their followers. This conciliatory policy of course was to be supported by strong-arm measures, which would ensure that Bhil realized the intentions of the government. Already on 17th April 1818, Elphinstone had instructed his Collectors that ' in cases where persons are apprehended in the act of plundering the country, you will order them to be executed immediately.' [92] The Bhils, outwardly at least,

were not to be treated differently. If they continued their ravages, they were to be punished.[93] Briggs realised that it was a law and order problem that could be solved only through patient negotiations. Yet, ' while every measure is taken to conciliate the Bheels, the utmost exertion should be used in attacking those who invade and ravage our territory. '[94]

In a long letter of instructions that Briggs wrote to his assistant Lt. Hodges, the policy to be persued towards the Bhils was clearly spelt out. It is worth quoting at length, since it throws light on the execution of the policy. ' It is the desire of the government to render the Bheels inoffensive by negotiation and compliance with those demands which have been sanctioned by time, or submitted to by the last established government rather than by coercion. It will therefore, be your duty to ascertain what well founded claim they possess on the adjoining country and to satisfy those claims as soon as possible by arranging such a commutation as may afford them full satisfaction in the manner least burdensome to the people. ' The primary duty of the government of course, was to stop the ravages. It was from this point that ' the settlement of the Bheels in the villages ' was to be encouraged, since ' their local information and connection give them the means of detecting theft and informing against intended attacks. ' 'Whenever you find that their rights on

villages are held by this species of Vassal Tenure* , I request that their services may be called for, and they should be taught to believe that these claims are only granted on those terms,' i. e. their responsibility of policing the village.[95] One of the major preoccupations of Briggs in the settlement of the Bhil problem was the factor of the return of the village Bhils to their respective villages. Whenever he entered into an agreement with the Hill Bhils, he forced them to agree ' as a sine qua non to expel all low land Bheels ... in their Hutties to leave from the hills to their several wuttens in villages .....'[96] By doing so Briggs hoped to achieve two important results. Firstly, he could achieve a tolerable policing of the villages, and secondly, by drawing large bodies of Bhils away from Hills, he would be able to reduce the strength of the Hill Chiefs.[97] Once this was achieved, the Chiefs could be dealt with independently.[98] This, however, could not be achieved, unless the Hill naiks were contacted and treated with. Briggs tried to escape the dilemma by using both the policies simultaneously.

Most of the Bhil chiefs had their 'hutty's (establishments) in the mountain fastnesses. Khandesh is particularly well situated for the hideouts in the mountain ranges. It is a low land basin, mostly of the Tapi and her tributaries, surrounded on all the sides by rocky mountains. In

---

* This is a curious term having no meaning in Marathi land tenure system in village.

the north is the formidable Satpura range extending from west to east. At the eastern extremity it turns rather sharply southward and gradually merges with the Ajanta range that runs north-south. To the South-west, the Ajanta range joins the Satmalla range which runs in continuation of the Ajanta range till it reaches Anakai. The plains between Ankai and Chandore open Khandesh into Ahmednagar. Westward of Chandore is a range of hills that Briggs has called the Chandore Range. Intermittently broken, the Chandore Range reaches out west to join the northern range of Sahyadri that Graham has described as Sukhein Range. This Range moves northwards along the western border of the district till almost Navapur, from whence till Chikhali in the extreme west of the Satpura range, we have the fertile basin of the Tapi in between. All these ranges are very convenient border lines cutting off Khandesh from the neighbouring districts. In the north, the Satpuda range running east west divides Khandesh from the plains of Malwa. The Ajanta and Satmalla ranges cut it off from the erstwhile possessions of the Nizam, while the Chandore range in the initial period of Brigg's office in Khandesh separated Khandesh from Ahmednagar district. The Sukhein range divided Khandesh from Gujrath and the Dangg areas. In the year 1818, all the outlying districts of Khandesh, except Ahmednagar, enjoyed a tolerably stable governments. It was but natural that all the hill chiefs, therefore, should see inward into the plains of Khandesh for plunder and subsistance.

Going from west to east in the Satpudas, the first formidable Bhil chief was Deoji Naik Bhil, son of Joojar Naik, a powerful chief. Deoji Naik had a long-standing feud with the Ranas of Ranipoora, who were petty feudal chiefs who were thrown out of their possessions by the Pendharis and the Peshwa's officers. The Ranipoora family had considerable influence with the Bhils in the area.[99]

To the east of Deoji Naik, among the hills near the Burwany Ghats was Ramjee Naik Bhil. Ramjee Naik was essentially a plains man, and his followers, about 80 to 100 men, were also plains Bhils. Ramjee was originally the watchman of the Torkheda town. ' He is far the most desparate, the most enterprising and the most incorrigible ~~of all the~~ of all the Bheels I have had to deal with '.[100] Another chief was Auchit Naik.

Further to the east, in the vicinity of the high mountain ranges of Satpuda, was the powerful Bhil called Goomani Naik. He wielded considerable influence over the Bhils of the region and controlled the Sendhwa Ghat, the life link of the trade between Khandesh and the Northern India.

To the south of the Sendhwa and north of the pargana of Thalner, lay the pargana of Amba, perhaps the most devastated area in Khandesh. This pargana was the hideout of the three most notorious Bhil chiefs, namely, Unkaria Naik who terrified the area between Sendhwa and Kirgone; Gunjy Naik to his east and Dashrath Naik, a formidable man. A lesser chief was Roopsingh.

South of Amba, was the hilly tract of Thalner. Bhylia naik and Khandu naik associated with each other in their depredations. To the east of Amba and Thalner, began the long range of the Tadvi Bhils, whose outstanding leader was Kania Bhil.

The Ajanta range was inhabited mostly by the Nirdhi Bhils who professed Islam. Their area was within the territory of the Nizam, though they continued to ravage British territories. ' They are ... of a discontended and quarrelsome disposition, difficult to manage, and still more ferocious than their brethren to the eastward, and, during seasons of disturbance, the most atrocious acts have been invariably ascribed to their prowess. '[101] The most powerful amongst them was one Kooshaba and Jania, two brothers who had about 150 followers.[102]

Westwards of the Ajanta Bhils were the Satmala Bhils. In the paragana of Chalisgaon were Roomal naik, Mohun naik, Saheboo naik, and Shankar naik. In the Satkunda hutties in the Satmala range were Satwaji naik and Suryaji naik Bhils in the pargana of Kannad and Verul (Ellora). In continuation of the Satkunda Bhils were the Kaldurry Bhils, chief amongst whom were Bayaji naik, Wagh naik, Taraji naik, Jandulla Takira and Garud naik.

In the Chandore range were the Bhils known as the Awanddy Bhils. The principals among them were Sayajee naik, Bapoo naik, Jewaji naik, Sahib naik, and Rove naik Maria.

To the north of the Satmalla Bhils was Cheel naik, Crossing the plains and coming to the Western ranges, we encounter the Baglan Bhils. Most of the Bhil naiks of Baglan were under the influence and control of Khushal Kunwar, the Raja of Dharboly. They normally resided in the Jaitapur pargana. The most important among them was Chandu Pradhan naik, who enjoyed considerable prestige among other Baglan chiefs. Dashrath naik Zaitapurkar, Govind naik Waklikar, Shiwba naik Harkalikar, Ramsingh naik Bhordiwatkar, Singh naik Babhulnikar, Ukunda naik Dhakambikar, Poon naik Bhowarikar, Patul naik, Ucharkar and Munia naik of Chowky Sultanburuj, were some of the important Bhil chiefs of Baglan.

In the Bhamer pargana, on the high road leading from Gujrath to Khandesh, in the village of Kanapur, was Teghy-khan. He was not, strictly speaking a Bhil, but wielded considerable power over them, and employed many in his service.

Going north of the Tapi basin, to the westernmost corner of the Satpuda range and thus completing the circle of our view, we come across the Wasava family in the vicinity of Nandurbar. Of this Bhil family of the Wasavas, Jeeva Wasava was perhaps the most powerful. In the same area lived Laxman Parwi, with his base at Kukurmundha.

Besides these Bhil chiefs, other chiefs who, though not Bhils themselves yet, exercised considerable control over Bhils, and thus were indespensible in any Bhil settlement, were

the Ranas of Budawal, of Ranipura and the chief of Abhona. The plain Bhils, a s distinct from the Hill Bhils, were numerous and in the times of peace were not so well organized as their counterparts in the Bhils. But during the troubled times, they normally joined their Hill brothers in the vicinity under whose technical control they normally came. [103]

Captain Briggs believed that direct bilateral agreements with these Bhil chiefs were possible.[104] ' I beg you will have the goodness to explain to all the Bheel chiefs with whom you may have communication that the British Govt. is disposed to g forget the past and to make provisions for the Bheels in a manner to enable them to follow peaceful habits, that it is more inclined to forgive and reclaim the Bheels than to punish them .... ' Explaining further the policy of the British Government, Briggs says, ' ...one of the leading features of our policy is to make terms with each (chief) separately .....'[105] Early in his efforts at bringing about the pacification of the district, Briggs while addressing the Saranjamdars of Khandesh ' strongly urged the reconciliation of the Bheel chiefs as an object of great moment ...'[106]

The first Bhil chief with whom Briggs came to an agreement was Goomani Naik , ' a wild beast in the Satpura Hills ' He had 250 Bhils under him and controlled the area round the Sendhwa pass, the most important trade route between Khandesh and Malwa.[107] On 5th March 1818, Briggs signed an agreement at Dangri near Kukurmundha with Goomani naik. By this,

agreement the Bhil chief agreed to prevent any depredations or nightly attacks on the villages of the district of Thalner and to assist the civil authorities in the settlement of the region, particularly the district of Amba. No person passing through the Sendhwa ghat was to be molested by his people. The portion of the custom duty assigned to him in the times of Ahilyabai Holkar for protecting the trade through the ghat, was to be collected by the Govt. Custom House to be situated in the Sandhwa ghat and paid to him by the custom master. He on his own was not to collect any dues from the passangers. His duty was to protect the travellers unmolested through the ghat. He was also to inform the Government officials of any intelligence that he might receive about any plan of attack or assembling of troops for similar purpose. ' In consideration ' of his 'performing the above duties, the British Government will pay all those Huks which are proved by the records of the Mahal to have been customary and (pay you) out of the revenues as a Khillate annually the sum of 2000 Rupees.' [108] Briggs did not agree cheerfully to pay Ghomani. 'I was long averse to the stipulation for paying 2000 Rupees annually to him in addition to his other emoluments, but the fact is that the security of the Ghauts, the tranquility of the Parganas in his vicinity and the shortness of my stay in the vicinity of Talneir rendered it advisable that I should make some permanent arrangement before I left the District .....'[109]

However, on the whole, Briggs was satisfied about the arrangement. He wistfully looks forward when 'his (Goomani's) people will ... come to (Thalner) without their bows and arrows and are very useful as informers .....' Briggs was also satisfied that Goomani 'protects the Sindwa Ghaut and single passengers pass to and fro unmolested .... ' [110] The signing of an agreement with the chief , however, did not pacify the country totally. On 7th October 1818, Briggs had to reprimand Goomani for continued Bhil outrages in the area west of the Sandhwa. Briggs asked him to explain these outrages. [111] Again in December, Briggs accused Goomani of depredations and threatened him with the suspension of the Khillate. [112] In the same month Goomani collected a toll of Rs.354/- from Amritrao's men who were passing through the Sendhwa Ghat. Briggs promptly took him to task. [113] In January 1819, Briggs accused Goomani of the serious charges of cattle lifting in Chopda and of abetting the murderers of Keshav Wani. [114] Goomani's Vakeel promptly went back and brought back two murderers and the cattle, ' minus six animals eaten by the Bheels ' . Goomani, however, complained that his people resorted to cattle lifting in Chopda, since the Shinde's officials at Chopda had refused to pay his huks. Briggs immediately wrote to the Mamlatdar of Chopda to pay the Huks to the Bhils for which the British Government had given a guarantee to Goomani naik. [115] In spite of these defaults on part of Goomani, however, Briggs felt that Goomani

however, was trustworthy. He requested Capt. Leighton, operating around the Sendhwa, not to attack any of Goomani's Bhils, ' who, I am afraid still continue to infest Holkar's country beyond Sindwa, tho' he has most rigidly adhered to the agreement he made with me in February last. '[116] Goomani's conduct embolden the Political Agent in Khandesh to enter into a new agreement with him. By this new arrangement, the annual payment of Rs. 2000/- payable to Goomani naik was to be discontinued. Instead, Goomani's was to maintain a force of 20 sibandies, 10 Bargeers and 30 Bheels for the protection of the Sendhwa ghat. The salaries of the persons so employed were to be paid by the British Government. Goomany himself was to receive Rs.100/- per month. Briggs impressed upon Elphinstone that such an arrangement would save government a considerable amount and an idea of paying Goomani every month, would make him more amenable to the British Government. If the government was to undertake policing the Sendhwa ghat, then the total expenditure would come to Rs.2595 per month. Following is the table that shows the difference in the expenses between the Government policing the ghats and Goomani doing the same.

GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHMENT				GOOMANI'S ESTABLISHMENT			
Category:	No.	Pay P.M.	Pay yearly	Category:	No.	Pay P.M.	Pay yearly
Jamadar	1	15	180	Goomani	1	100	1200
Duftadar	4	40	480	Sibandi	10	69	828
Sibandi	60	480	5760	Sibandi	10	85	1020

GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHMENT				: GOOMANI'S ESTABLISHMENT			
Category	No.	Pay P.M.	Pay Yearly:	Catetory	No.	Pay P.M.	Pay yearl
Duffadar	1	60	720	Bargeers	10	51	612
Horsemen	50	2000	24000	Bhils	30	60	720
Total	-	-	31140	Total	-	-	4380
Add Goomani's Khillate			2000				
Grand total			33140	Grand total			4380

Source: Briggs to DC, 16.1.1819, DEF , 174, L.No. 377.

Along with Goomani naik, Neher Singh Raut was also to be employed in similar service with a force as follows:

Neher Singh Raut	Rs. 30 p.m.
2 Jamadars	Rs. 20 p.m. @ 10/-
30 Sibandis	Rs.150 p.m. @ 5/-
10 Horsemen	Rs.150 p.m. @ 10/-
	Rs.350 p.m.
	x 12
	4200/- per year

The total cost of protecting the Sendhwa pass thus would be 8580/- per year as against Rs.33140/- if the Government forces undertook the job. This would save for the Government a net yearly amount of Rs.24360/-.[117] After the scheme was agreed to by the Deccan Commissioner it was put into operation in early January, 1819.[118] This arrangement continued and Briggs

had no major difficulty with Goomani during Brigg's tenure in Khandesh.

Briggs was lucky in settling with Goomani with comparative ease. He was to find settlement with other Bhil chiefs in the Satpuda range a fairly difficult job. Goomani had come in not because he loved the British regime, but situated as he was early in 1818, he had the opportunity of seeing the British in action. He had heard, and probably seen, the fall of Thalner and the fate of the Killedar of the fort, Tulsiram Mama. It is interesting and important to note that the first agreement that he entered into with the British was almost immediately after the fall of Thalner. [119] Even then his attitude to the British remained 'equivocal '.[120] In the Satpuda, Briggs's easy reclamation of the Bhils stopped with Goomany. Most of the major chiefs were brought to order only through a strenuous military operation. Conduct of Gunjee naik of Sultanpur - pargana and his band was ' such as to authorize their being attacked '.[121] Gunjee naik's gang was responsible for daring depredations in Chopda. Briggs tried to incite Gunjee into submission by transferring latters privileges in the Amba - pargana to Goomani and hoped that this measure would work.[122] This measure did not have the effect that Briggs desired. Instead, it made him more wanton and desparate. He was killed while attacking a British detachment led by Capt. Munn . His band dispersed. [123] His son Dhanaji naik, abandoned the predatory

habits, came in on 21st March 1819 and was confirmed in his nemnook or privileges.[124] He 'aided the inhabitants of the devastated Amba pargana to resettle it ....'[125]

Satpuda chiefs like Kaniya Tadvi, Dashrath naik, Ramaji naik and Auchit naiks, Subhania naik and Kunwar Wasava defied the British authority and were brought to the bookmonly after a hazardous military campaign. It were principally these chiefs and the Bhils of Kaldaree area that led to the frustration of Capt. Briggs. In October 1818, he was ' confident that the instant the whole of the Bhil naiq are settled with, the tranquillity of Candeish will be in a great measure secured .....'[126] Within a month, however, he admits 'the total failure of all my endeavours to induce the Bhil chiefs in the neighbourhood (of Rawer) either to come in or to accept of any moderate terms for the abandonment of their habits or the relinquishment of their retainers ...'[127]

Of these Satpuda chiefs, Kania Bhil was perhaps the most powerful one. Kania's haunts were in the easternmost regions of the Satpuda. The Tadvi Bhils the tribe to which Kania belonged, were the Muslim Bhils , who were the hereditary watchmen of the Chopda, Arwad, Bayawal, Sawda, Rawer and Ashir paraganas. According to Briggs, they became formidable ' only since last five years ' when they came in closer contact with the Pendharis. The Tadvi Bhils never left their villages ' to go to Hindostan with Pindarries ' but always accompanied them southward. Kania had gathered a large force under him. He had about 1200 Bhils under his command who

were ' but the dregs of that community '. [128] Kania was supported by two Pendhari chiefs namely ' Shaikh Dulla and Sitto (Chitu ?)[129] Besides he also received support and protection from Shinde's officers at Ashir, Bayawal and Chopda. ' Recently Suryajirow Nimbalkar ... levied a fine of 10,000 Rupees (on Kania) and bound him to pay one fourth of his plunder to Suryaji. This fact of Nimbalkar sharing the spoils with Canniah Bheel is capable of proof....'[130] Briggs warned Suryaji against harbouring mauraders like Kania.[131]

The original hutty of Kania was located some four miles from Rawer. These Bhils enjoyed their Huks in return of the police duties. Kania's Bhils maintained themselves ' peacefully by cutting and selling firewood and grass. ' When the payment of their Huks was stopped, they were reduced to distress which became acute due to famines. It was then that they resorted to plunder and removed their hutty to the mountains near Pal . By then Kaniah had gathered a considerable following and also employed Sibandis of his own. In early 1818, he had 400 Bhils, 250 Sibandis and 100 horses. The Sibandis who lived in the Hutty received Rs.15/- per month, while those who joined in the plunder but did not live in the hutty received Rs.10/- per month. Kania had five different hutties, each one commanded by his trusted lieutnant. These hutties were :

1) Hutty of Jamsena Patil

2) Hutty of Seeta Tadvi

3) Hutty of Umeda Tadvi

4) Hutty of Jafara Patil

5) Hutty of Amlee Chowdhari

Besides Bhils and Sibandis, these five hutties had 82 horsemen among them.[132] It can, thus, be easily seen that Kania had a considerable force under his command and was a factor to be reckoned with in the settlement of Bhils in Satpuda. It was, therefore, natural that Briggs should try to bring this powerful Bhil chief on the side of the established government. To his overtures, Kaniah replied as follows: ' The Cawlnamah which was sent through the medium of Jemad ud deen Shah has been received. My situation is thus: There are 5000 men under me who and their ancestors for generations past have subsisted by plunder. You are now the Masters of the Country and thousands look up to you for protection and support. If by your means I and my followers are provided with subsistance , we will abstain from plundering. I have a great many Sibundeis and Swars in my service which are maintained at considerable expence ..... I am ready to obey whatever order may be conveyed through him (i. e. Meer Jemad-ud deen Shah) '.[133] This exaggerated figure of 5000 followers , is of course, discounted by Briggs, However, he encouraged Capt. Kaye to settle the claims of Kania on just lines. Unlike Goomani, Kania refused to take Briggs and the British authority seriously. He continued his depredations and on 24th October 1818, Cornet Kaye informed Briggs that Kaniah and Suryaji Nimbalkar had made common cause and were planning

to attack Kaye's camp. ' The plot is certainly feasible , but I should hardly think they would attempt anything so rashly.' [134] Briggs received similar information independently from Sir John Malcom . He directed Col. MacDowell, Capt. Munn and Maj. Jardine to move in the direction of Nassirabad and desired Maj. Jardine to provide protection to the area between Sendhwa and Nassirabad.[135] In the meantime, Kaye wrote to Kania asking him about the plot, and to prove its falsity by coming to Kaye's camp and meeting him. This , Kania, of course, did not do. Both the sides reciprocated each other's distrust.[136] On 31st October the village of Karandi was ransacked by about 275 Bhils of Dashrath Naik who was in league with Kania. [137] Briggs wrote a strong letter to Kania accusing him of bad faith. He pointed out to Kania that not only had he broken his solemn word but had refused to come and see Briggs when latter was at Rawer. ' I am now about to leave this District , but I shall not forget that you and your followers still remain here - we shall see what is to be done - '.[138] Briggs requested Major McBean ' to take measures for the defence of this District, recommending him to attack the Bheel post at once![139] Briggs asked Maj. McBean, the Officer Commanding in this region, to undertake a night attack on Kania Bhil 'who is said to have 320 infantry besides 900 Bheels'. Briggs, of course, does not believe this number.[140] Briggs was keen on breaking Kania's power, because so long as he remained at large, efforts at bringing other Bhils under control were

being frustrated. ' Some of the Mohomedan Bhils have been entertained by me as Sibundies, but they have been found of little use, nor can it be otherwise while Canniah's power remains untouched...'[141] On 10th December 1878, Kania's gang made an attack on the army and village of Mangrool in Rawer paragana.[142] Briggs believed that the Bhils had friends in the village and urged that the Patil of village ' should be made an example of'.[143] Pursuant to the Political Agent's instructions of 16th November, Major McBean made a surprise attack on Kania's hutty. Because of the difficult terrain , the element of surprise was partly destroyed, yet McBean was ' happy to say that we succeeded in destroying everything they had and a great number of their followers, 28 men were made prisoners.....' Both Kania and Shaikh Dulla, however, escaped.[144] This success of McBean put heart into Briggs. ' It is possible that the success of this attack will induce most of the Sibundeis with Canniah Bheel to quit him and it may probably be the means of breaking up the gang altogether.'[145] Briggs recommended the 28 captives from the hutty to be sentenced to hard labour on roads.[146]

A full fledged war against the Bhils had begun. It is true that Briggs, in a moment of anger did say that '... It is towards their extripation we should direct owe first attention.....'[147] Yet, his long letter to Elphinstone of 8th January 1819, spoke very humanely of the Bhil rehabilitation. The truth is, Briggs had come to an important conclusion that ' ... as to the fidelity of the Bheels, any pecuniary

settlement is less likely to operate than a knowledge of our full power over them ....'[148] Briggs was to carry this dual policy to its logical end. He felt that a liberal policy alone would not help the British government. The Bhils simultaneously must feel the pressure of British armed strength. He claimed that the attack of Maj. McBean had disheartened 1200 followers of Kania 'and we are now searching in vain to find him or his bands in order to reclaim them .....[149]

As an extension of this strong arm policy, John Malcom's Briggs issued a general Proclamation to the public in Khandesh in general, and in Rawer pargana in particular. Among other things, it said ' that any British subject convicted of assisting the Bheels ... by supplying them with grain , furnishing them with intelligence, or in any way guilty of forming a connection with them will be considered as traitors, and their goods will be confiscated and they themselves be subject to punishment'. The Bhils in the Proclamation meant Kania and other freebooters.[150]

The aim of Briggs was to disarm Kania, not to destroy him as a person. When his brother Janniah approached Maj. McBean, Briggs informed him that Jannia may be offered Rs.1000/ to 2000/- per year, but as to Kania, no agreement was to be made unless he agreed to dismiss the Arabs and the cavalry from his service.[151] It was the same policy that was now also continued. On 20th December 1818, McBean made yet another attack on one of the hutties of Kania. But the troops 'returned without meeting a soul ....' McBean sent a message to Kania

that he should assist in the arrest of Shaikh Dulla and if he did ' ... neither he or (sic) any of his people shall be touched and whatever aid he may require for carrying this plan into effect shall be sent .....'[152] Kania failed to respond to this invitation.

The Bheel campaign was now extended territorially from east of Rawer to Karandi in the west and north of the hills. It was to be an encircling movement, the Khandesh troops operating from east, south and west, and Sir John Malcom's detachment operating from the north.[153] A report of Kania's being at Boree was received, and Lt. Col. Heath sent a Detachment under Lt. Gordon to ascertain the fact. Gordon did not find Kania, who he believed had been to the village about eight days prior, but he did find some of Kania's Bhils there who had deserted Kania after McBean's attack on the Hutty.[154] Kania was now like a hunted man. He ran from place to place, and his following diminished. Briggs received communication from Capt. Bently as well as from Cornet Kaye about the willingness of Kania to submit on ' whatever terms offered'. Briggs assured him personal safety.[155] Bently informed Briggs that Jannia was trying to intervene on behalf of his brother while Kania himself was making overtures to Sir John Malcom.[156] Kania's emmissaries met Capt. Bently who gave them the customary shelapagadi (turbans)[157]. Kania's overtures with Malcom continued, and fearing that Malcolm might make extravagant promises, Briggs wrote a long

letter to him giving Sir John a complete history of Kania.[158] On 16th March 1819, Kania submitted to Lt. Col. Smith.[159] However, it was not till 9th June 1819, that Briggs could inform Elphinstone of Kania's final submission to the civil authority in Khandesh. Kania had a great number of retainers. Briggs thought it advisable to employ some of them. He consented to employ fifty of Kania's followers in the service on a pay of Rs.5/- per month. Their duty was to guard the Dholkot ghat that connects Nemad to the Deccan. Other followers of Kania returned to the villages to which they belonged as watchmen.[160] Kania himself was given a personal grant of Rs. 600/- per year, with 620 Beegha of land that was his traditional perquisite. Hereafter Briggs had no trouble from Kania.[161]

Dashrath naik was another Bhil chief who had to be beaten into submission. He belonged to the Amba pargana. He had about 100 Arabs, some Hindustani and about 200 Bhil followers. Since the pargana was almost totally devastated and depopulated Dashrath naik and his followers had no means of livelihood but plunder. This they did with a ferocity unmatched.[162] Dashrath was in league with Kania , and had attacked the village of Karandi with 275 men.[163] Dashrath had a backing from Suryaji Nimbalkar of Bayawal and ran into Shinde's territory whenever pursued. Briggs believed that getting Dashrath would be no problem if Shinde's officers did not protect him.[164] Briggs requested Sir John Malcolm to move

a body of troops to the back of Satpuda in the province of Nemad. Briggs himself would post a detachment south of Satpuda to hem in Dashrath naik ' who has been operating in the neighbourhood of Lasour.'[165] The idea behind this move was that Dashrath should not get any provisions and should starve. [166] It was reported that Kania had joined Dashrath after the former's hutty was attacked by Maj. McBean. Dashrath subsisted formerly from the villagers in the Chopda and Lassor areas, but ' this aid has been lately much withheld from him and he has turned his attention towards Nemaur (Nemad)..[167] Briggs suggested to Col. Huskission to move a Detachment of his forces through Amba district towards Lassor ' ... to prevent the Bheels flying westward. ' The main force was to move ' through Lassor and push into the Hills as and when opportunity afforded ' and attack Dashrath naik.[168] At the end of February , Lt. Col. Jardine got the opportunity the English had been waiting for. He got the exact location of Dashrath naiks hideout and attacked the place. Dashrath was not in , but Jardine was able to get hold of his uncle, Dadoo Naik. Jardine burnt the hutty to ground.[169] The attack had the desired effect. A week later, Jardine received a communication from Dashrath, ' who brought some sort of letter from Sir John Malcolm. ' Jardine could not follow the contents since the letter was in Nemadi language. Jardine reported that Dashrath was under great distress and was willing to submit. However, he (i.e. Dashrath) looked apprehensive.[170] Briggs , who already had the information that Dashrath has

gone to Sir John , considered it ' natural enough for his contempt of all overtures from me .....' [171] On hearing from Jardine, however, Briggs instructed him not to attack Dashrath, but to send him to Dhule.[172] At the same time, he wrote to Malcolm about Dashrath, describing the latter as a ' destardly person '.[173] However, in the meanwhile Dashrath had submitted to Jardine on 8th March. Jardine decided to send him to Dhule, but did not feel it necessary to ' put them (i. e. prisoners) in iron or confinement.'[174] Dashrath was pensioned off by the Political Agent. No pension could technically be granted to him, since the perquisites that Dashrath claimed and was entitled to lay in the areas of Holkar and Scindia. But Briggs hoped that he and his men could be used to protect the Dhawlcote ghat in the Chopda paragana, when that paragana was transferred to the British authority.

Ramaji and Auchit Naiks :

In the eastern part of Sultanpur paragana, among the hills near the Burwany ghats was Ramaji naik, originally the watchman of the town of Torkheda. As already pointed out,[175] Briggs considered him to be ' by far the most desperate , the most enterprising and the most incorrigible of all the Bheels .....' [176] Briggs considered Ramaji as a sort of an upstart among the Bhil chiefs. Ramaji ' having no claim himself being a watchman of one of the low land villages, has collected about 200 Bheels to gain advantageous terms. ' Briggs had offered him a pension of Rs.600/- annually. ' His agent went away apparently satisfied, but never returned.'[177]

The terms to which Ramaji and his brother Auchit had agreed to were as follows :

1) Newly established rights of Girass etc. in the paragana of Sultanpur, Bhamer etc. were relinquished by Ramaji and Auchit.

2) Certain Beeghas of ground in the villages of Newadeh and Warpuda were confirmed by the British Government.

In lieu of the newly established rights, Ramaji and Auchit agreed to receive an annual payment of Rs.600/- as shelapagadi and promised to send the village Bhils back and to protect the area in the neighbourhood of Torkheda. [178] In the light of this agreement, Briggs' annoyance with the two brothers is understandable, when reports of the ravages committed by them started coming in. Throughout the month of August and September 1818, reports came in of the ravages of Ramaji's gangs. Briggs ordered Lt. Briggs to send one of his Rissallas of Sibandis consisting of 480 men towards Thalner. With the help of these troops and the regular troops posted in the region Briggs was 'determined to make a sever example of Ramjee and his adherents.' [179] However, he would endeavour 'to postpone this measure till our information regarding their strength and the places of their retreat is more complete.' [180] When force was moved, and his supplies cut off, Ramaji fled away. His followers deserted him. He submitted to the British authority and Briggs granted him a small pension. [181] However, the arrangement proved shortlived, and Ramaji and Auchit ,

probably moved by the example of Kania and Dashrath, again went on rampage. Throughout the months of November and December, the brothers carried on depredations on the unfortunate country. ' Hardly a week passes without my hearing of atrocious robbery and not unfrequently attended with murder .....' [182]. In January 1819 , Briggs requested Col. Huskisson to undertake operations against Ramaji and Auchit. Informing him of the extent of the Naiks control, Briggs wrote ' This country (of Ramaji and Auchit) is very strong and the Bheels depend on Toorkeira, Seerpoor, Wagheria, Wagapoor and even on Curronde for provisions. ' [183] But Col. Huskisson could not move against them immediately, since the forces under Col. Jardine were engaged in the pursuit of Dashrath and those under Maj. McBean in pursuit of Kania . In March, Jardine attacked Ramaji and Auchit in their hutty. Both Ramaji and Auchit escaped. Jardine was able to arrest about 90 heads of cattle. Jardine burnt the hutties. [184] Briggs promptly issued a Proclamation against helping Ramaji and Auchit naiks. [185] In utter desperation, Auchit threw himself on the mercy of the British. He surrendered himself to Col. Jardine on 7th April 1819. Jardine decided to keep him in the camp for sometime to obtain information about other Bhils. He was to be sent to Dhule in due course. [186] Two days later Ramaji himself submitted to Jardine. His submission was the work of Kashirao, the Mamlatdar of Thalner.[187] But when told that he would be taken to Dhule, Ramaji escaped from the camp.[188] Jardine , however, was not perturbed. He knew

that Ramaji was deserted by his followers. He was confident that Auchit, Khandu and Goomani naiks, among themselves could apprehend Ramaji without trouble. [189] On the 5th May, Briggs wrote to Elphinstone as follows: ' I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that, with the exception of Ramajee naiq, there is not one Bheel chief of the whole range (i.e. Satpuda range) that is not now dependent on the British Government. ' [190] However, on 8th May Jardine reported the recapture of Ramaji naik. [191] Ramaji naik was captured and brought back by Khandu naik and Goomani naik. Khandu and Goomani shared the prize of Rs. 1000/- declared by Briggs for the arrest of Ramaji. [192] Ramaji was put in irons and sent to Dhule under an escort of 40 horse.[193] Auchit, however, was sent free and became a useful instrument in the hands of Col. Jardine in reducing others to submit. Ramaji was put in the jail. Auchit, however, killed a Patil and ran away. He was joined by Subhaniya. Throughout the year 1820 they were on rampage, when they were caught. Auchit died in prison in 1821. [194]

Kunwar and Jeeva Wasava :

The family of the Wasavas belonged to those Bhils who claimed a Rajput lineage. They originally held the lands of the hilly and woody country of Rajpipla lying north of Tapi and south of Narmada. The head of the family was Kunwar Wasava, ' but his power has been almost entirely subverted by his relation, Jeeva a younger member of the family...'

Jeeva had, like other Bhils in Satpuda, taken advantage of the times to establish his power and rights over the neighbouring fertile districts. He boasted that ' at his whistle, he could command the service of 4000 Bowmen. ' Like Goomani, however, he submitted quite early and agreed to desist from ravaging the country in lieu of an yearly payment of Rs.3000/ besides his perquisites. The toll and customs to which he was entitled was to be collected by the British government and paid to him. Briggs agreed to support 11 horsemen and 40 foot for him, and with this force he was to protect the country. Briggs also agreed to accept his son and one of his own son principal assistants in the government service.[195] Briggs had no trouble with Jeeva hereafter.

But Kunwar Wasava was a different matter. He continued his ravages. In league with Laxman Padvi, a Bhil chief of Kukurmundha, he terrorised the country west of Sendhwa ghat. They sent orders to various villages to pay a fixed sum, and did not come to discuss matters with Briggs.[196] Their major dairing effort was the attack on the village of Ranipura,which they attacked with 150 Sibandis and 400 Bhils. The town defended itself resolutely and the Bhils returned with 13 of their fellows dead and 28 wounded. The wounded were carried away by the attacking Bhils.[197] In early January, 1819, a party of Bhils attacked Banjaras in Bhamer paragana. Col. Jardine could not ascertain the name of the leader of the attacking gang, [198] but Lt. Hodges was confident that the Bhils belonged to Kunwar Wasava's gang.[199] Kunwar Wasava

retired to his hill fastness at Konkral, a village about 20 miles from Kukurmundha. Hodges suggested that he should be attacked in his hutty and every means be employed ' to distress him.'[200] Jardine pursued him relentlessly. Kunwar Wasava offered to submit, but did not actually come in. On the other hand , his associate Laxman Padvi , threw himself on the mercy of the British govefnment. [201] Kunwar Wasava,however, fled away. In may, 1819, Jardine reported that Kǒǒwar Wasava ' is the only Bheel chief who has not submitted ....' [202] With all his professions of submission, Kunwar Wasava proved to be elusive. But by the end of May, 1819, Kunwar seems to have moved away into the Gaikwad territory. He carried on depredations from there. Subhedar Bhawan Singh, mamlatdar of Nawapur, reports incursions by Kunwar's men in Nawapur paragana. [203] By the end of 1819, Kunwar Wasava was the only Bhil chief who was not claimed by the Political Agent, though he had opened negotiations with the Gaikwad government to achieve that aim. [204] Briggs could never really never master Kunwar, though agreements were made by the latter only to be broken. Even Briggs's successor in Khandesh did not have much success with Kunwar. Later on he did settle on a personal pension in Chikhali in western Khandesh, but rose in rebellion in 1846, was arrested and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. He was released in 1854, but was removed from the headship of Chikhali. [205] By the end of June , 1819, the Satpuda range had become comparatively quiet. On the

5th May Briggs officially terminated operations against the Satpuda Bhils. He requested Col. Huskisson to withdraw the troops from the Hills.[206] However, as a precaution a sizeable force was left at the following posts:[207]

1)	Kukurmundha and Nawapur	1 European Officer 150 Rank and file 50 Auxilary horse
2)	Thalner	40 Rank and file
3)	Galna	Such a garrison as deemed competent to guard the arab prisoners.

He, however, would not leave the north-western Khandesh unprotected. It was ' important to render it safe ' since the highway from Surat to Khandesh ran through it.[207-A]

The campaign against the Bhils in the Satpuda range was undertaken with a view to reducing the Hill Bhils. It did not form an inevitable part of Briggs general policy towards the Bhils. He undertook it more in the spirit of a police action against errant subjects than a military campaign against an enemy. His attitude to the Bhils differed materially from that to the Arabs. He wanted to get rid of the Arabs, while with the Bhils, he wanted to reclaim and domesticate them. He realized that the Bhils were an integral part of the social order. ' Every Bhil chief originally is a watchman of some plain village.'[208] ' My little experience in this country is sufficient to convince me that the Bheels must be provided for, ...'[209] For doing

this they must be reclaimed. That object could be achieved by cutting off the supplies that they receive from the plains.[210] ' They rely solely on the plain for their subsistance and the weakness of the inhabitants makes them readily consent to supply them in order to secure themselves from their attacks.....' 'When deprived of their Sibundeis, they have no longer the means of attacking villages and driving off cattle, and when their provisions are cut off neither they nor the Sibundeis can exist in the hills ...'[211] But it was not always that the inhabitants supplied the Bhils with provisions out of fear. Many a time it was also out of ' affection '. [212] The knowledge of the fact that the whole of the Hill Bhils are dependent on the plain, and for this purpose ' each Hutty or Bheel village, has a corresponding one on the plain from whence it procures grain, ' was ' of the greatest importance, ' whenever ' it shall be found necessary to attack them .....' [213] The Bhil chiefs maintained a close contact with the village Bhils, and Briggs believed that the village Bhils were normally in league with those in the hills. [214]

As result of these conditions the campaign was to have a two-fold objective. One was to reduce the hill chiefs into submission, and other was to control the Bhils in villages and also to give protection to the people. The army was to occupy the area at the foot of hills, from where surprise attacks could be made on the Bhil hutties in the hills, and

at the same time control could be maintained on the Bhils in the villages. ' The only way the Bheels can be attacked is by surprise ...'[215] Once they were disloged from their hutties, most of the Bhils became fugitives. Then ' they are driven to the necessity of begging ' in the areas to which, ' they are for the most part unconnected and have no general feeling .....'[216] As for the village Bhils, any person found guilty ' of aiding and abetting Bheels ' was to be executed ' on the spot.' [217] If the Bhils were found in the act of plundering, or immediately after plundering, ' They should be tried (by a court - martial) and if found guilty, executed on the spot'. [218] These orders of Briggs were questioned by the supreme government and Briggs had to justify them in a long letter. The Deccan Commissioner, however , considered Briggs orders fully vindicated and supported him.[219]

The operations were under the over all command of Col. Huskisson. They covered the area of almost the whole of the Southern slope of Satpuda including the parganas of Rawer, Akawad, Thalner, Sultanpur, Nandurbar, Bhamer and Songhir in West Khandesh, Amba, and Sendhwa in the East Khandesh region. It was a vast, hilly and woody tract. The British force was divided into three major Detachments; one under Col. Huskisson, - it operated in the centre - one under Lt. Col. Jardine - it operated in the West; and one under Lt. Col. Heath, operating in the Rawer paragana. The three pronged attack was further supported by a detachment under Lt. Col. Smith from Sir John Malcolm's troops in Malwa. This detachment

was to press the Bhils from the north. The relentless pressure of these detachments reduced the Bhil chiefs to submission, and one by one, they submitted to the British authority, as has been seen earlier. The British losses, though few, were not insignificant. Yet most of them were victims of the climate, rather than of the Bhil attacks. The detachment operating in Rawer suffered particularly. Its commandant, Lt. Col. Heath died because of bad climate, his second in command Maj. McBean felt seriously ill, and the detachment came under the command of Capt. Bently.[220] - ' During a short campaign of three months, of five officers, one died and three left India on sick certificate; and of three hundred regulars employed, one hundred and twenty marched back to Malligaum.' [221] This was, as Graham tells us , due to Malaria, Cholera was another, and more dreaded foe. Some cases were reported in ~~Col.~~ Col. Huskisson's camp by Briggs. [222] Both Col. Jardine [223] and Maj. McBean [224] reported cases of Cholera among their troops. Briggs urged Elphinstone to send immediate medical help and informed him of the ' terrible state of army ' in Khandesh reporting 84 deaths in a Battalion of 500 due to Cholera. [225] Yet the military operations were successful and they did relieve Khandesh of a major distress.[226]

Satmalla Bhils.

While Briggs's attention was held by the Satpuda Bhils, his principal assistant, Lt. Hodges was busy elsewhere. In

keeping with the instructions issued to him by the Political Agent in his letter of 14th May 1818,[227] Lt. Hodges proceeded to adjust the just claims of the Bhils in Satmalla, Satkunda and Kaldarry areas. Of these Bhils, Briggs speaks in the following manner. ' ..... Their habits are like the rest in these Hills, and although everything has been done to induce them to relinquish their habits, little more, I fear, has been gained than a temporary relief from invasion in large bodies and confidence on their part of being dealt fairly with .....'[228] Lt. Hodges found that the perquisites claimed by the principal Bhil naiks in the Satmalla region were as follows:

1) Roomal naik, Mohan naik, Saheboo naik, and Shankar naik in the Pargana of Chalisgaon.

a:	Bhetty (present) @ ₨.1/- from each of the 16 inhabited villages.	16-0-0
b:	1 maund of grain from each village @ ₨.2/- per maund.	32-000
c:	2 maund of grain from Chalisgaon and Patoda	4-0-0
d:	Tobacco (Pan-tambakhu) from each village	8-0-0
e:	15 Seers of Goor (Jaggury) from each village that plants sugarcane.	12-0-0
f:	Sundry perquisites on festivals	25-0-0
		97-0-0

In the Pargana of Mehunpura .

a: Bhetty, @ Re. 1/- from each of the 12 inhabited villages	12-0-0
b: Tobacco from each village	7-0-0
c: 4 maunds of grain @ Rs.2/- per maund	8-0-0
	27-0-0

In the Kasba of Ranjangaon

a: Bhetty	1-0-0
b: 4 maunds of grain @ Rs.2/- per maund	8-0-0
	9-0-0

In the Pargana of Bhuml(?)

a: Ready money	350-0-0
b: Bhetty @ Re.1/- from each of the 57 inhabited villages	57-0-0
c: Clothes	25-0-0
d: Claims in the village of Sahura	50-0-0
e: Sundry perquisites on festivals	25-0-0
	507-0-0

In the village of Chikhalthan, paragana Kannad:

4 maunds of grain @ Rs.2/- per maund	8-0-0
Grand Total	648-0-0

All the above huks of the Satmalla Bhils were confined and accepted by the British government. Briggs agreed to pay the Bhils a lump sum of Rs.648/- per annuam . In return, the Bhils agreed to give up molestation of villages. They also agreed to return all the plain Bhils to the villages, and to become watchmen to protect the area. [229] However, in late January, one of the Bhil chiefs from Satmala region, a Bhil named Cheel naik, went on rampage. It seems that Cheel naik had sufficient cause to do so. In a letter that he wrote to Lt. Hodges, he pointed out that of Rs.648/- agreed to by the Sarkar, only Rs.175/ had been paid so far. Besides these, Cheel naik laid claims to perquisites in Lalinga paragana as well, These claims were to the tune of Rs.800/- per year. It is worth quoting the letter of Cheel naik to Lt. Hodges, as it exhibits the state of Bhil mind and his general condition. Cheel naik says -

' Is it right in you to desire us not to plunder and yet make no provision for us ? First cause to be paid to us our just claims and then call us to account for any robberies committed by us. Do as you please, but to give us nothing to eat and leave us to feed on leaves and grass is an admirable plan - We are Sirdars. What occasion is there for us to write more - ' [230] He attacked the village of Dhamangaon. Hodges, acting as the Political Agent in the absence of Briggs,threatened him with the discontinuation of his pension.[231] The above quoted letter from Cheel naik was the reply. Hodges claimed that Cheel naik had no claims on Lalinga. He requested Col. Huskisson to attack Cheel naik, whose hutty was near Ranjangaon.[232]

Briggs, more annoyed by the tone of the letter, and frustrated by the depredations, directed Major Hall to march towards the range of hills and occupy posts along them from Ankai to the vicinity of Kannad, and attack Cheel naik, who had ' from 20 to 40 horse ' . 'Your principal object will be to obtain the possession of the person of Cheel naiq ....'[233] Cheel naik was proscribed and 'whoever protects him or his followers' was to be attacked. A reward of Rs.500/- was to be given to anyone who apprehend him.[234] Cheel naik surrendered himself to Maj. Hall. Maj. Hill considered his voluntary surrender as a ' mitigating ' factor, and suggested that execution be stayed.[235] Briggs asked Maj. Hall to ascertain whether Cheel naik was present in the attack on Dhamangaon, and if he wrote the impudent letter. If Maj Hall was satisfied on both the counts about Cheel naik's involvement ' he should be executed on the spot in front of the Bheels.' [236] ' I have judged it advisable to direct the trial and execution of Cheel naiq by a military court and in the midst of his haunts in preference to his being brought here (to Dhule) as I am of opinion that a summary example has become absolutely necessary among the Satmalla Bheels. ' [237] Satisfied with the involvement of Cheel naik on both counts referred to by Capt Briggs , Maj. Hall executed (though reluctantly as it seems from his letter) Cheel naik at 5 p.m. on 26th January 1819. [238] Cheel naik incidentally, was the only major Bhil chief of that was executed by Captain Briggs.

In the Satkunda hutties, in the near vicinity of Satmala hutties, Satwaji naik and Suryaji naik in the paraganas of

Kannad and Verool (Ellora) agreed to accept a consolidated sum of Rs. 343 p.a. in full payment of their yearly claims and agreed to perform their traditional duties of police, and abstain from plunder and robbery. [239]

The Kaldary Bhils :

The area of the Kaldary Bhils differed from the area of the Bhils in Khandesh proper. The Gungthadi region in which they lived, was not so much devastated or deserted as the Khandesh region. In Gungthadi every Bhil had a home in the village to which he could return and therefore controlling them was not so much of a problem as controlling the Khandesh Bhils.[240]

These Bhils submitted to the British government in November 1818. Lt. Hodges ascertained that Bayaji naik, Wagh naik in the paragana of Bargaon had a consolidated claim of Rs.266/- p.a. Jandulla Takira and Garud naik in the paragana of Burner enjoyed claims to the tune of Rs.244/- p.a. The Kaldary Bhils had proven claims on the pargana of Lohara (Rs.72), Shendurni (Rs.50), Erandole (Rs.250/-), Mhaswad (Rs.38/-) and Utran (Rs.68/-). Altogether, the Kaldari Bhil claims totalled upto Rs. 948/- per year. The British government agreed to pay the Bhils a consolidated sum of Rs.948/- per year in return of which the Kaldari Bhils agreed to refrain from plunder. [241] However, within a few days , the Bhils returned the money and declared that they would collect their rights themselves. This , of course, was prohibited.[242] Hodges, tried again, but with doubtful results.[243] They did not part

with their followers, and indulged in small scale robberies.[244] Murder was not commonly committed, as it was in Khandesh. [245] ' Village jaglas in Gungthury appear to be the most mischievous, and it is seldom that a Bazar day passes without someone or other being robbed on his way to market. ' [246] This was petty larceny, not a very serious affair, and it was not difficult to reduce them. [247] Cundoo (Khandu ?) naik and Jandulla Takira wrote a letter to Briggs claiming that their dues were not being paid by the Jamindars. They had nothing to eat . ' It is better to eat and die than die without food .....' [248] The same Jandulla claimed responsibility for cattle lifting, which was eaten up. If no provision was made for them, they would follow the same practice.[249] In June, a large area of the reigh was transferred to Ahmednagar collectorate. Along with the problem of Bhils was also, in large measure transferred. Yet Briggs maintained a mobile force to check their incursions in Khandesh at Nasirabad, Jamner, Bhadgaon, Chalisgaon and Mehoonbara.[250]

The Arrnuddy Bhils :

' From Unkaye to the Eastward commences the range of the Arrnuddy Bheels ' [251] They were pretty powerful chiefs, who were not merely the watchmen of villages, but also the guardians of the region. ' In 1816 and 1817, Gen. Smith by kind treatment and promises, induced the Bhil chiefs of Arrnuddy to send their agents to him and this laid the foundations of that confidence to which we are indebted probably for the present

settlement .....' [252] Following is a table that shows the claims and perquisites of the Arrnuddy Bhils which were confirmed by Briggs and in lieu of which Briggs promised to make a consolidated cash payment of Rs.3000/- per year on the usual condition of the Bhils giving up their practice of plunder and returning to their villages.

Paragana	Ready money	Bhetty	Grain	Sheep	Festival	Total
Patoda	300	550	120	220	97.8.0	1287.8.0
Baijapur	300	280	120	-	45	745.0.0
Khandala	200	98	80	-	20.8.0	398.8.0
				Grand Total		2431.0.0

These were the claims of Bapooji and Jiwaji naiks.

The claims of Rove naik were as follows:.

Paragana	Ready cash	Bhetty	Grain	Sheep	Festival	Total
Debur	200	122.8.0	80	-	23.2.0	425.10.0
Chikhal-wahal	200	70	80	-	17.8.0	367. 8.0
Nimbayat	350	196	120	-	31.0.0	697 .0.0
				Grand total		1490.2.0
				Total sum to Arrnuddy Bhils		3921.2.0

(Source : JB to ME, 27.10.1818, DCF 172, enclosure to L. No. 217)

These arrangements were followed by both the parties and Briggs had no major trouble with these chiefs.

The Bhils from Dang did make threatening gestures in July 1819, but their affairs were satisfactorily settled, through the agency of Laxmanrao, the Mamlatdar of Pimpalner.[253]

The three years following 1819, there were robberies and plunders in plenty, and one can get the grim but monotonous picture in Deccan Commissioner Files from number 180 to 190. There were no large scale rebellions of Bhils . Essentially they were law and order problems . The policy of Briggs was determined in the fateful year 1819, and continued throughout his tenure as the Political Agent in Khandesh.

Briggs believed that the pacification of the Bhils was an integral part of the settlement of the District. He hoped that the Bhils would return to the villages, if not driven by fear into the hills. ' Our object certainly is to induce the Bheels to live in their villages as peaceable inhabitants. We want people too much to spare any either for the gallows or for the hills ... They are extremely useful to the cultivators if they could be deterred from highway robbery and murders , and I hope a few severe examples will effect this. Indeed I have little doubt of it myself .....'[254] ' I find more than half the Bheels in the villages have Bows and arrows, these must be taken from them, but it should be done in a manner not to alarm them and not in hurry either ...' [255] The primary object, however, was to provide for the Bhils. He firmly

believed that once the Bhils were provided for on a regular basis, the domesticating of the Bhils would not be a serious problem. But the major question was how to provide for them. ' The greater portion of the villages is so poor that it cannot afford to maintain its own Bheels even, and many villages being deserted altogether, the Bheels of these villages and of the inhabited portion combines to carry on highway robberies.'[256] His experience with the Bhils had convinced him that ' the Bheels must be provided for .... the condition of the village Bheel .... is truly measerable...' [257] He was also convinced ' that nothing but a bare subsistance ... is necessary to induce most of the Bheels to relinquish their habits... I would do all I could to provide for them ... '[258]

Since most of the villages were depopulated or very poor, Briggs proposed to levy a ' Bheel Putty ' on all the inhabitants of Khandesh. Out of this income he proposed to pay Rs.2/ per month to every Bhil. The sum was obviously very low,'which in Candeish will not support more than one person of the very lowest order with food...' Yet it was sufficient to induce the Bhils or so Briggs thought, to relinquish their predatory habits.[259] A certain but low income would induce him to do some extra work which would have a reforming effect on his traditional habits. This was Briggs' logic.[260] There were 2321 villages and 1,10,182 houses in Khandesh. If an assessment of 1½ area monthly was levied by way of Bhil tax on every house, he would get 1,38,034 rupees ' which independently of the Naiqs would

support 4588 Bheels at 2 Rupees monthly '[261] He proposed that a chief naik of Bhils should reside with the mahlatdar of the paragana, and the Bhils should be made a part of the establishment. These naiks should receive ½ rupee per village per month as their salary. The tax would not be very heavy and all the sections of the society would contribute to a useful social and administrative service. [262] He was certain that the people would pay such a tax cheerfully.[263] Elphinstone, however, rejected the project. The Commissioner believed that any imposition, however light, would have the effect of desertation of villages in Khandesh. Nor did he approve of the idea of creating a permanent caste of Bhils in the administration. Instead he proposed that the Bhils be paid by the villages, and the amount so paid be deducted from their revenue assessment. This was approved by the supreme government.[264]

The idea of creating a sort of Bhil militia was tried by Briggs. In October 1818, he proposed to the Commissioner the establishment of ' a past of Sibundeis and Bheels together, or perhaps Bheels only.' [265] In the case of Goomani naik, he did actually practice it.[266] But a purely Bhil Corps of the Tadvi Bhils that he raised at a monthly cost of Rs.700/- had to be disbanded since the Bhils ' were constantly in a state of intoxication, never capable of any exertion themselves... '[267] After his departure from Khandesh, the experiment of the Bhil Corps was tried under Col. Robertson. In the first few years it did not show much promise. It was in the second half of

the thirties that it started showing positive results. [268] It was not only the result of the humanatarianism of the administration as Graham has ventured to suggest.[269] The Bhil problem could have been solved only in two phases: submission and reclamation. It felt to the lot of Briggs to force them to submit. He did that with a great deal of sympathy. Civilizing them was a long process which Briggs could aim at, but never achieve.

Notes to Chapter III

1. Ballhatchet, K., op. cit. p.125
2. Briggs to Elp., 1.3.1818, DCF 170
3. रयत परागंदा गाव बुध्द(व)स्त जाहले . Khandesh Jamav, File 26, Bundle 5, letter No.14113, n.d.
4. Ibid, letter No.14147
5. SPD Vol.41, letterNo.44
6. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172
7. Khandesh Jamav, op.cit. letters No.14113, 14146, 14147, 14151. मिल मुकेमुळे जेक्त येतात. दंगा करतात.
8. Briggs to Elp. 20.4.1818, DCF 170
9. Yad given by Briggs to Goomani Naik Bhil, 5.3.1818, DCF 170. Also, Ghadni, Rumal No.545 I.C. 7921.
10. Naik, T.B., The Bhils (Delhi, 1956), p. 9
11. Enthoven R.E, The Tribes and Castes of Bombay (Delhi, 1975, Indian Reprint), p.154
12. Elphinstone, M., Report , (Delhi 1973, Indian Reprint) p.2
13. Graham, D.C. Historical Sketch of the Bheel Tribes Inhabiting the Province of Khandesh. Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, New Series, No. XXVI, (Bombay, 1856) p.204, Hereafter called Historical Sketch.
14. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172
15. Doshi S.L., Bhils , (Delhi, 1971) p. 5.
16. Naik, op.cit. p. 172 ff.
17. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172.

18. Historical Sketch, p.204
19. Enthoven, op. cit. p.154, ' The plain Bhils are scarcely to be distinguished from local Kunbis' .
20. Elphinstone, Report, p. 2
21. Ibid, p. 68.
22. Briggs's Report on the Bhils, October, 1818, DCF 172.
23. Briggs to Elp. 24-10-1818, DCF 172.
24. Historical Sketch, p. 204.
25. Ibid.
26. Briggs Report on the Bhils, Oct.1818, DCF 172.
27. East India Papers, Vol. 4, pp. 701-704.
28. Ibid
29. Briggs, John, The Present Land Tax In India (London 1830), p. 35.
30. Enthoven, op.cit. p. 156.
31. Ibid
32. Historical Sketch, p. 206.
33. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172
34. Elphinstone, Report, p. 4
35. Ibid
36. Historical Sketch, p.202
37. Ibid
38. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172
39. Historical Sketch, p. 204
40. Ibid

41. East India Papers, Vol.4, pp. 701-704.
42. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172.
43. Historical Sketch, p. 204.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid, p.207
46. Briggs Report on the Bhils, Oct. 1818, DCF 172.
47. Briggs to Elp. 19.3.1818, DCF 170.
48. Indian Commission Papers, Ghadani, rumal No.545, L.No.7921.
49. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172.
50. Briggs to Elp. 20.8.1818, MSS EUR F88 BOX GD Vol.I
51. Briggs to Elp. 8.1.1819, DCF 174.
52. East India Papers, Vol.4, p.701 ff.
53. Elphinstone, Report, pp. 46-47
54. Briggs to Elp. 8.1.1819, DCF 174
55. Briggs to Elp. 19.11.1818, DCF 173, Salami Watan in this context meant a watan in lieu of protection provided. The total value of Salami Watan for ten years prior to 1818 was Rs.10622.8.9. मराठ्यांच्या शितिहासाची साधने, खं.२२, सुलतानपूर परगण्यासंबंधीचे कागद, (घुळे, १९४७) लेखांक २५).
56. म.शि.सा. खं.२२, लेखांक १.
57. Elphinstone, Report, p.4
58. Briggs to Elp. 22.12.1818, DCF 174.
59.
60. Briggs to Elp. 22.12.1818, DCF 174.
61. Ibid
62. Ibid.
63. Simcox, A.H.A, A Memoir of the Khandesh Bhil Corps, 1825-1891, (Bombay, 1912), p. 7.

64. Briggs, Autobiographical Notes, cited in Bell, op.cit. p.76.
65. Briggs to Elp. 22.12.1818, DCF 174.
66. Capt. Ovans, the first Southern Bhil Agent, quoted by Simcox, op.cit. p.9.
67. Briggs to Elp. 22.12.1818, DCF 174.
68. Capt. Ovans, cited by Simcox, op.cit. p.9, also Briggs to Elp. 27.10.1818, DCF 172.
69. Briggs Report on Bhils, Oct. 1818, DCF 172.
70. Briggs to Elp. 14.8.1818, MSS EUR F88 6D, Vol.I.
71. Briggs to Elp. 8.10.1818, DCF 172.
72. Briggs to Elp. 23.11.1818, DCF 173.
73. SPD Vol.41, letter No.124
74. Cd. McDowell to Briggs, 12.8.1818, DCF 172.
75. Briggs to Elp. 1.9.1818, DCF 172
76. Briggs to Elp. 7.10.1818, DCF 172
77. Briggs to Elp., 8.10.1818, DCF 172
78. Deposition of Gakeera Bhil, enclosure to letter No.281, DCF 173.
79. Briggs to Elp., 14.11.1818, DCF 173.
80. Briggs to Elp. 27-11-1818 , DCF 173.
81. Khandesh Jamav, particularly Rumal No.5, and Inam Commission, Ghadani, Rumal No.545.
82. Col. McDowell to Briggs, 12.8.1818, DCF 172, enclosure to letter No.162.
83. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172.

84. Briggs to Elp. 20.8.1818, MSS EUR F88 BOX 6D, Vol. I.
85. Briggs to Elp. 11.7.1818, MSS EUR F88 BOX 6D, Vol.I.
86. Briggs quoted to Simcox, op.cit. p.8
87. Briggs to Elp. 8.1.1819, DCF 174.
88. Ibid
89. Naik, op.cit. passim
90. Enthoven, op.cit. passim
91. Historical Sketch, p.207
92. Elphinstone to Robertson (circular), 17.4.1818, DCF 402.
93. Briggs to Col. McDowell, 12.8.1818, DCF 173
94. Briggs to Lt. Hodges, 14.5.1818, DCF 171.
95. Ibid
96. Briggs to Elp., 8.8.1818, MSS EUR F88 BOX 6D, Vol.I
97. Ibid
98. Briggs to Lt. Hodges, 14.5.1818, DCF 171
99. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172.
100. Briggs to Elp. 19.11.1818, DCF 173
101. Historical Sketch, p.206.
102. Briggs to Elp. 27.10.1819, DCF 178
103. All the information above cited regarding the various Bhil chiefs is drawn from the correspondence of Briggs with the Deccan Commissioner, the military officers serving in the area, and his principal civil Assistants. His reports of October and November, 1818, and January 1819, are of great value in this respect.

104. Briggs to Elp. 20.4.1818, DCF 170.

105. Briggs to Capt. Bently, 6.3.1819, DCF 175.

106. Briggs to Elp. 13.5.1818, DCF 170

107. Briggs to Elp. 11.7.1818, MSS EUR F88 BOX 6D, Vol.I

108. Yad given by Briggs to Goomani Naik, DCF 170.

109. Briggs to Elp. 19.3.1818, DCF 170.

110. Briggs to Elp. 11.7.1818, MSS EUR F88 BOX 6D, Vol.I

111. Briggs to Elp. 7.10.1818, DCF 172

112. Briggs to Elp. 10.12.1818, DCF 175.

113. Briggs to Elp. 2.1.1819, DCF 174

114. See above.

115. Briggs to Elp. 16.1.1819, DCF 174

116. Briggs to Capt. Leighton, C.O. Sindwa Garrison, 3.10. 1818, DCF 172. It is the same agreement of 5th March; Briggs is speaking generally.

117. Neher Singh Raut was hereditary zamindar of Thalner Pargana. As Raut he had responsibility of protecting the area in which he lived. Though during and after the war of 1818, with the Peshwa the British did not pay much attention to the claims of the ruined Rauts, Briggs wished to use their services and local influence. Neher Singh Raut was an enterprising man recommended by Briggs to Elphinstone for heading a police force in Thalner. Briggs to Elphinstone, 24.10.1818, DCF 174.

118. Briggs to Elp. 16.1.1819, DCF 174.

119. Thalner fell on 28th March 1818, and Goomani entered into an agreement on 5th March 1818. See DCF 170.

120. Briggs to Elp. 23.12.1818, DCF 174.

121. Briggs to Elp. 24.10.1818, DCF 172.

122. Briggs to Elp. 25.10.1818, DCF 172.

123. Briggs to Elp. 19.11.1818, DCF 173.

124. Briggs to Elp. 9.6.1819, DCF 176.

125. Ibid.

126 Briggs to Elp., 27.10.1818, DCF 172

127. Briggs to Elp. 16.11.1818, DCF 173

128. Briggs to Elp. 19.11.1818, DCF 173

129. Briggs to Elp. 16.11.1818, DCF 173

130. Briggs to Elp. 19.11.1818, DCF 173

131. Briggs to Suryajirao, enclosure to Briggs to Elp., 16.11.1818, DCF 173

132. Briggs to Elp., 8.1.1819, DCF 174.

133. Enclosure to Briggs to Elp., 10.10.1818, DCF 172.

134. Capt. Kaye to Briggs, 24.10.1818, DCF 172.

135. Briggs to Maj. Jardine, 28.10.1818, DCF 172

136. Kaye to Briggs, 24-10-1818, DCF 172

137. Briggs to Elp., 31.10.1818, DCF 173.

138. Briggs to Kania Bhil, n.a. DCF 173, enclosure to letter No.289.

139. Briggs to Elp., 16.11.1818, DCF 173.

140. Briggs to Maj.McBean, 16.11.1818, DCF 173.

141. Briggs to Elp., 18.11.1818, DCF 173.

142. Maj. Mcbean to Briggs, 10.12.1818, DCF 173.

143. Briggs to McBean, 14.12.1818, DCF 173.

144. Maj. McBean to Briggs, 15.12.1818, DCF 174.

145. Briggs to Elp., 19.12.1818, DCF 174.

146. Ibid.

147. Briggs to Col.Huskisson, 23.1.1819, DCF 174.

148. Briggs to Elp., 16.1.1819, DCF 174.

149. Briggs to Elp., 8.1.1819, DCF 174.

150.

151. Briggs to McBean. 10.12.1818, DCF 173.

152. McBean to Briggs, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.

153. Briggs to Col.Huskisson, 23.1.1819, DCF 174.

154. Lt. Col. Heath to Lt. Hodges, acting Political Agent the absence of Briggs to Poona, 1.2.1819, DCF 175

155. Briggs to Elp., 2.3.1819, DCF 175.

156. Bently to Briggs n.d. DCF 175

157. Col. Huskisson to Briggs, 6.3.1819, DCF 175.

158. Briggs to Sir John Malcolm, 10.3.1819.

159. Lt. Col. Smith to Malcolm, 16.3.1819, DCF 175

160. Briggs to Elp. 9.6.1819, DCF 176.

161. Ibid

162. Briggs to Elp. 19.11.1818, DCF 173.

163. Supra

164. Briggs to Elp., 8.1.1819, DCF 174.

165. Briggs to Malcolm, 11.1.1819, DCF 174.

166. Briggs to Huskisson, 13.1.1819, DCF 174.

167. Briggs to Huskisson, 23.1.1819, DCF 174.

168. Ibid

169. Maj. Jardine to Huskisson, 28.2.1819, DCF 175.

170. Jardine to Huskisson, 6.3.1819, DCF 175.

171. Briggs to Elp., 2.3.1819, DCF 175.

172. Briggs to Huskisson, 10.3.1819, DCF 175.

173. Briggs to Malcolm, 10.3.1819, DCF 175.

174. Jardine to Huskisson, 8.3.1819, DCF 175.

175. Supra.

176. Briggs to Elp.

177. Briggs to Elp., 7.10.1818, DCF 172.

178. Briggs to Elp. 18.11.1818, DCF 173.

179. Briggs to Elp. 7-10-1818, DCF 172.

180. Briggs to Elp., 24.10.1818, DCF 172.

181. Briggs to Elp. 19.11.1818, DCF 173.

182. Briggs to Elp. 29.12.1818, DCF 174.

183. Briggs to Huskisson, 23.1.1819, DCF 174.

184. Jardine to Huskisson, 23.3.1819, DCF 175.

185. Briggs to Elp. 29.3.1819, DCF 175.

186. Jardine to Huskisson, 8.4.1819, DCF 175.

187. Jardine to Huskisson, 10.4.1819, DCF 175.

188. Jardine to Huskisson, 11.4.1819, DCF 176.

189. Jardine to Huskisson, 1.5.1819, DCF 176.

190. Briggs to Elp., 5.5.1819, DCF 176.

191. Jardine to Huskisson, 8.5.1819, DCF 176.

192. Briggs to Elp., 9.6.1819, DCF 176.

193. Jardine to Huskisson, 8.5.1819, DCF 176.

194. Historical Sketch, op.cit. p.231.

195. Briggs to Elp., 24.10.1818, DCF 172.

196. Briggs to Elp. 7.5.1818, DCF 170

197. Briggs to Jardine, 28.12.1818, DCF 174.

198, Jardine to Briggs, 21.1.1819, DCF 174.

199. Lt. Hodges to Huskisson, 23.1.1819, DCF 174.

200. Hodges to Huskisson, 28.1.1819, 174.

201. Briggs to Elp., 2.3.1819, DCF 175.

202. Jardine to Huskisson, 8.5.1819, DCF 176.

203. Bhawansingh to Capt. Rigby, 14.6.1819, DCF 176.

204. Briggs to Huskisson, 25.6.1819, DCF 176.

205. Report by Capt. Rose, Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government New Series, No. XXV‡, (1856,) p. 237.

206. Briggs to Huskisson, 5.5.1819, DCF 176.

207. Ibid

270-A Briggs to Elp. 15.5.1819, DCF 176.

208 Briggs to Elp., 8.1.1819, DCF 174.

209. Ibid

210. Ibid

211. Briggs to Huskisson, 23.1.1819, DCF 174.

212. Jardine to Huskisson, 23.2.1819, DCF 175.

213. Briggs to Elp., 24.10.1818, DCF ‡ 172.

214. Briggs to Elp., 8.1.1819, DCF 174.

215. Briggs to Huskisson, 23.1.1819, DCF 174.

216. Briggs to Elp., 8.1.1819, DCF 174.

217. Briggs to McBean, 20.12.1818, DCF 174.

218. Briggs to Huskisson, 23.1.1819, DCF 174.

219. Briggs to Elp., 16.3.1819, DCF 175. See also the marginal notes made by Elphinstone on the letter.

220. Bently to Briggs, n.d. DCF 175.

221. Historical Sketch , op.cit. foot note, p.211

222. Briggs to Elp., 4.4.1819, DCF 175.

223. to Briggs, 2.11.1818, DCF 173.

224. to Briggs, 6.11.1818, DCF 173.

225. Briggs to Elp., 7.11.1818, DCF 173.

226. Briggs to Elp., 9.6.1819, DCF 176.

227. Letter No.113, enclosure, DCF 171.

228. Briggs to Elp., 7.12.1818, DCF 173.

229. Briggs to Elp., 7.12.1818, enclosure, DCF 173.

230. Cheel Naik to Hodges, n.d. Let.No. 390, enclosure, DCF 174.

231. Hodges to Elp., 31.1.1819, DCF 174.

232. Hodges to Huskisson, 30.1.1819, DCF 174.

233. Briggs to Maj. Hall, 4.2.1819, DCF 175.

234. Ibid

235. Maj. Hall to Briggs, 19.2.1819, DCF 175

236. Briggs to Hall, 21.2.1819, DCF 175.

237. Briggs to Elp., 21.2.1819, DCF 175.

238. Hall to Briggs, 26.2.1819, DCF 175.

239. Briggs to Elp., 7.12.1818, DCF 173.

240. Briggs to Elp., 8.1.1819, DCF 174.

241. Briggs to Elp., 7.12.1818, DCF 173.

242. Briggs to Elp., 18.11.1818,DCF 173.

243. Briggs to Elp., 7.12.1818, DCF 173.

244. Briggs to Elp., 8.1.1819, DCF 174.

245. Briggs to Pottinger, 31.5.1819, DCF 176.

246. Ibid

247. Briggs to Elp. 8.1.1819, DCF 174.

248. to Briggs, 5.9.1819, DCF 177.

249. Briggs to Elp., 11.10.1819, DCF 177.

250. Ibid

251. Briggs to Elp. 27.10.1818, DCF 172.

252. Ibid

253. Briggs to Elp. 7th & 15th July, 1819, DCF 176.

254. Briggs to Elp. 14.11.1818, MSS EUR F88 BOX 6D, Vol.I

255, Ibid

256. Briggs to Elp. 14.12.1818, MSS EUR F88 BOX 6D. Vol I

257. Briggs to Elp. 8.1.1819, DCF 174.

258. Briggs to Elp. 14.12.1818, MSS EUR F88 BOX 6D. Vol I

259. Briggs to Elp. 8.1.1819, DCF 174.

260. Ibid

261, Briggs to Elp., 14.12.1818, MSS EUR F88 BOX 6D. Vol I

262. Briggs to Elp., 8.1.1819, DCF 174.

263. Ibid

264. Ballhatchet, op.cit.,p.130.

265. Briggs to Elp., 26.19.1819m DCF 173.

266. ~~Ibid~~ Supra.

267. Briggs to Elp., 8.1.1819, DCF 174 .

268. Historical Sketch, loc cit. and Simcox loc cit.

269. Historical Sketch, op.cit., p.212.

CHAPTER IV

Administrative Settlement of Khandesh

In the solution of problems like the Arab insurgents or the Bhil depredations, the Political Agent in Khandesh had, of necessity , a great deal of discretion and initiative. These crisis were peculiar to Khandesh and had to be resolved on local basis. Even the Political Agent had to give a great deal of freedom to his own subordinates. Briggs had to allow his subordinates ' to prepare such remedies as your local knowledge may enable you to suggest... ' [1] But setting up of an administrative knowledge pattern or laying down the principles of state revenue were matters beyond the scope of the powers of the Political Agent. It is true that the unsettled conditions of the country might, in a few instances, give the local authority some room to adjust to the local conditions, yet this adjustment had to be within the general framework of a broad policy laid down by the higher authorities. Viewed from any angle, the Revenue settlement in Khandesh, fell within the framework of general policy, and was carried out according to the plan laid down by the sole Commissioner in the Deccan.

Mountstuart Elphinstone, the sole Commissioner in the Deccan, is credited, and rightly, with the founding of the so called Deccan System. [2] Yet, to believe that Elphinstone created a system out of any context, is to deny the existence of a central government and a central policy within British

India. As to the revenue, particularly the land revenue, the attitude of the British rulers of India was well defined. ' ..... The principal concern of the East India Company in dealing with the extensive territories that fell into its grasp appears to have been the realisation by quick and expeditious methods of as large revenue as possible...'[3] This view of the British concern with the collection of the land revenue is further endorsed by Baden Powell. He says that ' to assess and to collect the Land Revenue has been the chief care of all past governments for many centuries, and for this purpose territorial divisions and official agencies have been devised, and these, however modified, still form the basis of modern arrangements.....' [4] The territories conquered from the Peshwa were looked upon as sources of income rather than of expenditure and when they did not show any profit for the East India Company, the Indian government did not relish it. ' A moment's reflection will satisfy you that the court will never tolerate such a prospect and that I should incur merited reprobation were I to acquiesce in it.....' [5] In any case, the territory must not be ' dead loss ' to the Company.[6]

Elphinstone had to work within this framework. The initial expenses of conquering the territories and all that went along with it were sanctioned in the hope that sooner than latter, the territories would start paying profits. After the initial stage all expenses were to be cut down.

If it was not possible, if the expenses of holding the country were to exceed ' fifty lacks annually ' the Governor-General had ' no hesitation in saying that it would be impolitic to hold it...' It must not be 'an unprofitable burthen ', and were it so, ' the authorities at home ' would never approve of it.[7] The company looked upon its Indian possessions as profit earning holdings, and all the expense incurred in conquering and possessing it as capital investment. As R. C. Dutt has commented, it was ' not in human nature ' that the company 'should concern ' itself 'with the welfare ' of the Indian masses.[8] That the East India Company was exploitative was agreed upon by Adam Smith as early as 1776. ' Such exclusive companies, therefore, are nuisances in every respect; always more or less inconvenient to the countries in which they are established, and destructive to those which have the misfortune to fall under their government'. [9] With all his humanism and enlightenment, Elphinstone was a servant of the East India Company. His revenue policy was, in the nature of the things, bounded by the basic approaches of the Company to the finances in India. Yet, it must be said that he tried to make the best of a bad bargain.

Elphinstone's entire revenue system was based upon one cardinal principle, ' No innovations'. The principle on which the revenue collection was made was to remain the same as under the Marathas. There was to be change only in the form of collection. Farming was to be abolished; but otherwise

the system was to remain as it was.[10] However, he was shrewd enough to ask his collectors not to give up the rights of interference in those rights of watandars by which they claimed a part of the revenue.[11]

The revenue system that Elphinstone wanted to preserve (minus the lately introduced system of farming of the revenue) is described by Elphinstone himself in his celebrated 'Report on the territories Conquered from the Paishwa ' that he submitted to the Supreme Government in 1819.

' The first and the most important feature ' of the native administration in the Deccan was ' the division into villages or townships. ' The inhabitants of the villages were ' almost entirely cultivators of the ground '. A few traders and artisans lived in the villages. Besides, these , and many times forming some part of these, there were the twelve hereditary servants of the Community called Bara Balutedar. The chief or the head of the village was the Patil, who was assisted in his responsibilities by two subordinate officers, Kulkarni and the Chaugula. The Patil was the head of the police and also of the justice, besides being ' an officer of revenue' . In his capacity as a revenue officer, he performed ' on a small scale what a Mamlatdar or a Collector does on a large'. He collected the revenue from the ryots, allotted lands to such who do not have land , and fixed the rent each had to pay. ' Though originally the agent of the Government , he is now regarded as equally the representative of the ryots...'

The Kulkarni was the village accountant, who kept all the revenue accounts and land records of the village. The Chougula assisted the Patil in his duties, and had the safe custody of the village records.

' Each village ' had ' a portion of ground attached to it, which ' was 'committed to the management of the inhabitants. ' All the remaining cultivable land of the village was held by the cultivators by either of the two tenures, Miras or Upari. The Mirasis were the ' landed proprietors ' while the Uparis were 'farmers' .

Elphinstone believed that a large portion of the ryots were proprietors of their estates, subject to the payment of a fixed land-tax to Government. Their property was hereditary and saleable, and they were 'never disposed' , while they pay their tax. Even in default, they had right to reclaim it within thirty years. ' The Meerasadars ' were perhaps 'more numerous than the Ooprees all over the Maratta country.' This fact, Elphinstone believed, proves that ' the Revenue system under the Hindoos ... was founded on the private property in the soil' .

All land that did not belong to Mirasdars belonged to the Government. ' The property of the Zamindars in the soil has not been introduced, or even heard of, in the Maratta country'.

Out of the land that belonged to the Government, a small portion was kept aside directly under the Mamlatdar. The rest ' was always let out to Ooprees, who had a lease, with the expiration of which their claim and duties expired'.

Above the village was a division called the Taraf. ' A Turuf is under no particular officer'. Several Tarafs made a Paragana. The Paragana was under a Deshmukh, assisted by Deshpande and Deshchaugula. The Deshmukhs and Deshpandes were hereditary officers whom Elphinstone calls Zamindars. These had certain perquisites of the offices they performed. These were normally in the form of a stipulated share in the revenue of the region along with certain customary and traditional dues from the community. The basic purpose of these perquisites was in the nature of wages.

'In general 'reported Elphinstone','each Revenue division was under an officer, who in a large district was called Mamlatdar, and in a small one Camaveesdar; under these were Turufdars or Carkoons, who had charge of a considerable number of villages and under them Shaikdars, who had charge of four or five villages.' The nomination of the 'Mamlutdars rested with Government, that of the inferior agents with the Mamlutdar.' Besides these, in every Division there were permanent officers called Darakdars 'whose signature was necessary to all papers, and who were bound to give information of all malpractices of the Mamlutdars.'

On their appointment, Mamlatdars were given by the government an estimate of the revenue of their respective districts. They were also supplied with a list of authorised expenses. After deducting the charges of expenditure from the collection, the Mamlatdars sent the balance to the Government. A portion of the collection estimated ' generally half ', was to be paid immediately. ' The rest was paid in instalments, but always in advance.' The accounts were submitted, after they were duly countersigned by the Zamindars and darakdars, at the end of the year.

The assessment was made on the basis of the survey conducted long ago by Malik Ambar in the north and the Adilshahi kings in the south. ' Each field ' was 'classed and assessed ' according to its 'circumstances and quality. ' The assessment fixed by the earlier monarchs was called Tankha. The total amount of Tankha ' was never actually realised. ' The highest ever realised Tankha was called 'Kamal' tankha of that village while the revenue realization of the previous year, 'or any recent year ' was called Wasul or Akar. The mamlatdar settled the revenue of the ensuing year after a perusal of previous years records ' combined with a regard to the actual state of things '. The Patil, accompanied by the more prominent of the villagers was invariably present at the time of fixing of the assessment, and normally pleaded for relaxation in favour of the peasants whom he represented.

' ..... All hereditary officers ' were considered as connected with the Ryots. ' After a thorough discussion of the individual and general cases involved, 'a second more particular agreement' was concluded between the Patil, as the village representative, and the Mamlatdar, as the delegate of the government. The Mamlatdar's agreement fixing the revenue was called the Jammabandi Patti, while the Patil's agreement was called 'Kbool keetba ' (Kabul katba). Until the final settlement was made the crops in many parts of the country, especially in Khandesh, were kept in charge of a security officer, Havaldar, who allowed them to be carried off as soon as the settlement was made.

The land revenue proper was called the ain Jama. Besides this, there were other levies which all or some had to pay. Collectively these levies were called Shiwai Mamma- Elphinstone enumerates a long list of some of the imposts. Taxes could be levied for defying the village expenses under the head Gaon Khurch. Besides these levies, there were extra imposts in times of emergancies. These were called the Jasti Patti.

Under the farming system, this system underwent a change for the worst. In the farming system, ' a man's means of payment, not the land he occupied, were the scale on which he was assessed.' No moderation was shown in levying the sum fixed, and oppressive methods were used to extort money from their cultivators to their ' utmost.' [12]

The land was held in different tenures. The major tenures by which land was mostly held under the Maratha government were Miras, Watan, Inam, Saranjam, and Upari. [13] Miras tenure was perhaps the oldest tenure by which land was held in the Deccan. It entailed a proprietory right on the part of the holder, and could not be taken away without a violent disregard to the law of land and tradition. The proprietor had a right to alienate his land. Captain Briggs believed that the meerasdars paid a tax on their holdings and not a rent. Their ownership of the land was complete.[14] Waten was a grant of land made by the government to an individual for the services rendered by that individual to the State. In most of the cases the watans were recognized by the office to which they were attached, viz. Deshmukhi Watan, Patilki watan etc. The land so granted was rent free. The watan land was not alienable , normally though it could be sold with the permission of the government.[15] Inam was agrant of land in perpetuity for services rendered to the State. The major difference between Watan and Inam was that the watan was a fee for the office occupied by individual while the Inam was a gift. Inamdar was not bound by any office by virtue of the Inami land held, whereas a Watandar was bound to perform an office in lieu of which the watan was held . Saranjami tenure was essentially a military office tenure. It was a grant of land rent free, for the military services. The Saranjami tenure was held only during the period when the

services were actually performed.[16] The Upari tenure was a tenancy tenure. The holder had no proprietory rights in the land. They were ' Tenants at will '. They come and settle in the village and are permitted by the Patail to cultivate a certain portion of land...' [17]

It was this system that Elphinstone wanted to remodel to suit the purposes of the English East India Company. Yet he was fully alive to the distressed condition of the ryot, and did not want to put them through further distress. Accordingly , he issued orders to all his collectors that the assessment that they would levy must not be very heavy. The distress caused by the war and the exploitative farming system must not be aggrevated.[18] At the same time , the officers in charge of districts were to collect as much information about their charges as possible so as to put the entire system on more rational basis .[19] Even before the war was concluded, the English officers were making detail enquiries about the villages and towns that came under them. As early as December (?) 1817 the English were collecting data about the land, people, etc.[20] Elphinstone wanted the collectors tocollect information about the land revenue for the previous ten years so as to be able to come to some rational and permanent basis for assessment.[21]

The entire charge under the Deccan Commissioner was divided into five different administrative and revenue units.

These were Poona, Ahmednagar, Khandesh, Dharwar and Satara. Over each unit, was an officer with extensive administrative and magistrial powers. This officer was called the Collector or Political Agent depending upon the circumstances prevailing in the region under his charge. Captain Briggs enjoyed the office of Political Agent and his salary was fixed at Rs.2000/- per month with an additional expense account upto Rs.1500/- per month.[22]

II

Khandesh that Briggs administered during the initial period of British rule in Maharashtra, was a vast land mass of 13,187 sq. miles, with a population, in 1822, of 4,18,021 souls giving a population density of 31.25 per sq.mile.[23] This area and population was less than what Briggs actually took over in early 1818, since late in the year, he transferred a considerable portion of his charge to Capt. Pottinger's district of Ahmednagar. The figures quoted above belong to the year 1822. In June 1819 he transferred the territory south of Chandor and north of the Godavary to Ahmednagar collectorate.[24] It was indeed a formidable charge. Its physical vastness made it almost an unmanageable charge. One of its Taluka head quarters, namely Ambad, for instance, was was some 200 miles away from the District head quarters at Dhule.[25]

Khandesh had been a fertile country. ' It was formerly one of the most productive provinces of its extent in the Deccan...'[26] The soil of Khandesh was varied. That in the districts under the Satpuda and along both the Banks of the Tapi had ' a rich loam , which is extremely fruitful.' In Central Khandesh it was ' alternately gravelly and rich', to the south of this tract it was more fertile and just above before it approached the southern range of hills, it became rich but ' much interspersed with loam and stones' . However the pride of Khandesh was the region of Baglana and the tracts along the banks of the Tapi upto the foot of the Satpuda hills. This area was ' by far the most capable of improvement, and will eventually become the most productive portion of the province'. [27]

Khandesh was one of the largest forest district in the then Bombay Presidency, with over 2326 sq. miles or 22.3% of the entire area of the district, covered by Government reserves in 1880.[28] In the days of Akbar, Khandesh was' spoken of as being celebrated for its cloth manufacture ' [29] The districts of Sultanpur and Nandurbar were once famous for their fruits, ' especially the vineyards of Sooltanpoor.' [30] The agriculture was extensive and flourishing under the administration of Mahadaji Shimde, Ahilyabai Holkar and Nana Fadnis. 'It may be said that Candeish was in flourishing condition upto the year 1798, when Bajee Row succeeded to the Peshwaship.'[31] But thereafter there was a decline in the fortunes of district.

The state of anarchy that prevailed in Khandesh in the wake of Yashwantrao Holkar's campaign of 1802, and later on compounded by the Arab ravages and Bhil depredations 'tended in a very great degree to depopulate some of the fairest districts in the province' [32] In the districts of Sultanpur and Nandurbar, 'at present, there is perhaps not a fruit garden....' [33] When Briggs came to Khandesh, desolation was apparent everywhere. ' Immense tracts ' were covered with jungle, depopulating the entire region.[34] ' You pass from one village to another through perfect jungle of several years growth '[35] As far as the eye could see there was jungle : ' it is truely melancholy'.[36] It was only in the near vicinity that the jungle was broken ' into strips of fields.[37] The rich and lush nature also harboured beasts of prey. Tiger was the chief wild animal that roamed and destroyed in the very heart of the district.' [38] In 1822, the beasts killed 500 human beings and 20,000 head of cattle. In the three months of May, June and July, 1822, sixty tigers were killed. [39] In a short period of two weeks, Briggs himself killed two tigers, one of them being ' one of the greatest tigers ' he 'ever saw.' [40]

As a direct consequence of the unsettled conditions in the district , there was a large scale migration of people, depopulating villages. On the record there were in all 4032 villages, of which 540 were alienated, 1243 were totally

deserted, 413 were partially deserted, and only 1836 were fully populated.[41] Of the 1243 deserted villages, ninety seven had been so totally destroyed that even their names were not remembered. These villages were generally called as Gumgaons in the records, though their lands were attached to some other villages.[42] All land of Khandesh, except the impenetrable jungles and inaccessible hills, was included within the boundries of villages. All villages in Khandesh were either walled, or protected by a ghadi or a fort 'against wild beasts, marauders and robbers.'[43] The cultivation was done in the fields outside the village walls, and as the dangers increased, the area under cultivation decreased. In 1821, of the total land area of Khandesh, only 12% was under tillage , while 43% was 'arable waste'.[44] The once famous textile industry was ruined and in 1818, there wase ' some very coarse bad cloths made in a few of the principal towns.'[45] The major items of manufacture were ' turbans and women's clothes of an inferior quality.'[46]

With
A The increasing disorder and lack of security the condition of the population, which was mostly agrarian, deteriorated. ' Their means are so small that they are driven to the greatest distress for wholesome food.' The daily food of the commom farmer consisted of ' a small quantity of milk and a coarse black unleavened cake, made of Jowary or Bajry,' for their morning meal, while for lunch the same bread was 'rendered palatable by a mess of chillies and dall with a mixture of salt

and turmeric, and a small handful of vegitables procured from the fields.' Meat was eaten only on festivals or at weddings. The clothes that they wore were scanty and houses were ' indifferent.' [47] Most of the cultivators were Hindus. There were a few Muslim husbandmen, but their number was very small in keeping with their proportion in the general population. There were no cultivators of great wealth either Hindu or Muslim, in Khandesh. [48] The peasantry, as a general rule, was poverty striken. Even before the ploughing season arrived, the peasant had to borrow ' a few rupees in advance on the next year's crop to pay this year's demand of the government ' . The normal rate of interest that he paid on on this loan was above 40 to 50 %. At the time of lawani (sowing) he had to go to the Sawkar to borrow seed ' for which he promises to pay 1½ seer for every seer and frequently 2 seers, at the harvest time.' During the period intervening between sowing and harvesting, his condition was not all that bad, since he subsisted on the greens that were easily available in the field. The moment the grain was gathered, this easy means of subsistance was denied to him. The government now made its demands on him. The farmer, however, found himself in a queer position; he had the grain to sell, but there was no market for it. To meet the demands of the government, he had once again to go to the Sawakar. With the borrowed money he pays a portion of his dues. Most of his produce went into liquidate his loans. Very little was

left either for subsistance or for trade.[49] The farmer could not sell his produce in the market, since almost all revenues in Khandesh 'have been for many years paid by Hawala.' When the grain was on the threshingfloor, 'guards were posted to prevent its removal till merchants or bankers became security for the payment of rents', and 'the farmers were compelled to sell their grain and sometimes mortgage the ensuing crops at reduced prices...'[50] More often, the Sawkars paid the cash direct to the Mamlatdar and took an undertaking from the cultivator for fifty or one hundred per cent of the rent being paid to the Sawkar in kind at the time of harvesting.[51] Since most of the Sawkars were also the grain merchants, it was easy for them to manipulate the grain prices, thereby causing great distress to the farmers. This arrangement completed one productive year of the farmer, and 'before the time for sowing comes on again, he is precisely in the same dilemma as at the beginning of the year ....'[52] buying perhaps the same grain that he himself had grown at a higher market price from the merchant.[53] The only people who perhaps benefitted from this arrangement were the Deshmukhs and Deshpandes, who also were sawkars and merchants.[54] Even the Patil played that role sometimes.[55] In extreme cases, the farmers borrowed money from the Arabs, who charged an interest that was as high as 120%.[56] ' Where such is the history of Ryot's progress throughout the year, we cannot wonder at the poverty that exists, but we rather feel surprised

that it is from objects of this nature, the Government continues to expect to realise its principal source of revenue.'[57]

There were hardly any towns worth the name in Khandesh, and most of the life was rural biased. Like all other villages elsewhere in Maharashtra, Khandesh also had a viable village community with its traditional functionaries, the Balutedars. Briggs gives us a list of fourteen such functionaries to be found in Khandesh. They were, Patil, Kulkarni, Mahar, Sutar, Chambhar, Lohar, Kumbhar, Nhavi, Dhobi, Mang, Joshi or Bhat, Sonar, Koli and Mulla.[58] In the list that he supplied to Chaplin, he also includes the Jaglya or Bhil.[59]

At the head of the village community stood the Patil or the village headman. He was government's agent with the village, but his deep rooted associations with the village made him also the representative of the people. He had no defined powers as such, but traditionally he had prescriptive rights over the Bara Balutedars and the villagers in general.[60] The moral power of the Patils was so great that Elphinstone wanted their authority to be respected by Mamlatdars and even by the collectors.[61] The Patils held a large area, 108,000 bighas of rent free land, all over Khandesh, representing about 4% of the district's lands revenue. They also had a claim to 1½% of the village produce and this claim was called tachuri or Mushahira.[62]

The Kulkarni, Patil's assistant, was found in every village and in many ways was Patil's superior.[63] He also held rent free land and had a share of the revenue called moskara, and a share of the crop called Vanola.[64]

The Mahar was found in almost every village of Khandesh. He was a sort of official assistant to the Patil and in the establishment worked as a messanger .[65] In spare time he prepared baskets and other bamboo articles for his livelihood.[66] The Mahars held large rent free lands totalling some 39,534 bighas, and representing about 1% of the whole revenue. He had the same grain claim as the Kulkarni. [67]

The Sutar or the carpenter was to be found in some villages. They held very little rent free land, i.e. 221 bighas in the whole district and had a grain claim a quarter less than that of the Mahar.[68]

The Chambhar or cobbler was found only in the larger villages. They held almost no rent free land. Their total holding of rent free land in Khandesh was only 14 bighas. They had grain perquisites at the rate of the claim of the Sutar.[69]

The Kumbhar or the potter, was found in about half the villages of Khandesh. He supplied the district officers and the patil regularly with earthern vessels. To other villagers the vessels were supplied once a year. All over Khandesh, the Kumbhars held only 60 bighas of land as rent free land. His grain claim on the village was one fifth less than the carpenters. [70]

The Nhavi or the barber, was to be found in every village. Besides being a barber, he was also the village surgeon. Besides the professional duties that he had to perform, he also lighted the headman's pipe, shampooed his feet, went with his daughter to her father-in-law's house. The nhavis held very little rent free land, about 100 bighas all over Khandesh. Their grain claim was the same as the potters. Besides, he received a meal from every person he shaved.[71]

The Dhobi or washerman, was found in half the villages. He washed the clothes of male members of the village officers and at wedding supplied white floor cloth. He held no rent free land, and his grain claim was the same as the nhavi. At the end of every wedding he was honoured with a turban.[72]

The Mang or the tanner, was to be found in only a quarter of the villagers. He maintained himself by making ropes and strung cots (Baj). He held no rent free land and had a claim one fifth less than the potter on the village grain. He had a right to the skins of all the dead animals. He also made baskets. Where there were no mangs, their work was done by the mahars.[73]

The Joshi or the Bhat was the village astrologer. He was found in every village. His duty was to perform the religious duties, particularly on the 1st and the 11th day of every half of the month. (Pratipada and Ekadashi). He also officiated at the weddings, for which he was separately

paid. The Joshis held large grants, 9659 bighas, of rent free land. But their grain claim on the villages was the same as that of the mang.[74]

The Mulla or the muslim priest was to be found in a few villages. He performed muslim religious rites, like officiating at marriages, reciting prayers and sacrificing sheep at religious festivals. Their rent free land holdings were considerable for their number, being 1200 bighas all over the district. He had an equal grain claim as that of the Joshi.[75]

The Sonar or the goldsmith was found in one fourth of the total villages. His primary duty was to examine the coins paid by the peasants to the government. The sonars held no rent free land and their grain claim was identical to that of the mangs.[76]

The Koli or the waterman or fisherman, was found in about one third of the villages. He provided water to the travellers, and at the rivers, made rafts and boats. The rent free land holdings of the Kolis were very considerable, being 16,307 bighas in Khandesh . Their grain perquisites, however, were the same as the mangs.

The Jaglya , the Bhil watchman, was found in every village. To watch over the village security was his duty. The Jaglyas held large i.e. 32,520 bighas of rent free land. In some villages they were paid small sums of money. They had the same grain claim as that of the mangs.[77]

All the balutedars according to Briggs, were watandars. They could alienate their land and office. [78] Of these village functionaries, the Patil, the Kulkarni and the Mahar were the most important. They performed the duties on behalf of the government, and in the small community represented the government. The Patil was the dejure head of the village, but ' from the circumstance of the Patil being unable to read, the Coolcurny for the most part has the superior management. He is usually a Bramin, and from his caste and qualifications, is well adapted to usurp the power which is exercised in the name of the Potail. But this circumstance must depend on the characteristic of each.' [79]

The fields of the village were normally on the outskirts of the village. The fields were never fenced or walled, except those opening on roads. The fencing was normally done with thorny bushes. In the interior, the fields were divided by a patch of green grass, which was never ploughed or encroached upon. It was the duty of the Patil, Kulkarni and Mahar to see that the boundaries were scrupulously observed and maintained. [80] Every field had a name. [81]

In December 1818, in his first annual report, Briggs had stated that in Khandesh soil of every description was to be found. [82] Answering the questions put to him by Chaplin, the Commissioner, vide his letter of 4th November 1821, Briggs proceeds to give a detail break up of the soil in Khandesh. He divides the said soil into eight different

categories. Those were : (1) UlamKali or Uttam Kali, best black, (2) Madhyam Kali or middling black, (3) Chikan or dry mixed with gravel , (4) Burud or gravelly, (5) Sale Burud or red gravelly, (6) Piwala Burud or Yellow gravelly, (7) Mal Burud or hilly gravelly and (8) Jirayat or arable. All these types were non-irrigated. All irrigated lands, whether by well or canals, were called Bagayat lands. The estimated total cultivable land in Khandesh was 73,77,161 bighas. Of this, 10,44,683 bighas were actually under tillage. Out of the remaining 63,32,478 bighas, Briggs believed that at least one half or more was forest. This was a conjucture and not a report based upon an actual survey for which Briggs had been pleading. In 1820, the land cultivated under irrigation was just 76,636 bighas. The rest was non-irrigated land. Assuming 16 as a whole, the proportion of the cultivated lands of all types was as follows: Best black 6 , middling black 3, chikan or dry 3 and Burud of all types 4. [83]

Besides the unsettled conditions in Khandesh, Briggs believed that there were two other reasons for the low cultivation in Khandesh. One was the obvious poverty of the people and the second was the lack of irrigation facilities.

As far as the poverty of the people was concerned Briggs describes it with a single adjective 'abject'.[84] For most part, one plough and a pair of bullocks were shared by two

or three farmers, and normally there were not more than 2 to 4 ploughs and pairs of bullock in a village. '...Nothing can exceed the slovenly mode in which the cultivation is carried in this country. The fields are seldom, if ever , ploughed in the hot months. They are frequently only hoed by the machine called the Vuckur (Wakhar) even at the time of sowing, and the long grass sometimes entirely destroys the crop.' The plough, when used, was ' small and slight, and seldom enters more than four or five inches from the surface....' The ploughs, it is obvious in the light of the poverty of the peasants, were not drawn by more than one pair of cattle. [85]

The lack of irrigation was mostly because of the neglect on the part of the government and people. There were no tanks in Khandesh, though every village had from 5 to 6 wells from which the land was chiefly irrigated. However, the principal means of irrigation was ' by water courses formed by throwing dams across the rivers'. Out of 187 such dams only forty were in order in 1819.[86]

The poverty of the people, the almost primitive methods of cultivation, lack of irrigation were the problems that were further compounded by lack of markets. ' The mass of population being so poor, it is to be concluded there can be little encouragement for trade or manufactures, and such is really the case...' Even the shepherds with their flock of sheep, did not go in for wool gathering, but remained contended

with selling sheep milk and flesh.[87] There was no commercial farming. The entire agricultural activity was at subsistance level. This was partly the reason why there was hardly any cultivation through labourers. The cost of marketing the goods was so high that labour farming was not profitable. [88] This explains why large tracts of land were given on upari tenure. The ratio of mirasdars to uparis in Khandesh was 1:6. [89]

The land, according to Briggs was held on either of the two tenures: Watan or miras and upari. Throughout his correspondence, Briggs identifies watan with miras. He sometimes identifies meeras with Inam.[90] In fact, he goes on to assert that strictly speaking there were no mirasdars in Khandesh. He could not ascertain ' if the land in Khandesh was ever Meerassy ' there being no records to that effect.[91] This extreme position was taken by Briggs, probably on the assumption current in Europe at that time, that the ownership of land was, in the final analysis, always held by the State. This, he believed, is proved by the fact that ' all the cultivators, with the exception of the Inamdars, consider the land as belonging to the Sircar. Only the Inamdars consider it as their own.' [92] Even here, he is at pains to establish that even the Inams or watans - words which he uses rather indiscriminately - were grants of immunities. ' I know of no immunities of one class of cultivators over others which does not originate in reward for former services or for the

performance of future duties.....' [93] By plain logic, Briggs was denying individual proprietory rights in the land to any individual. Such a presumption was undoubtedly a political necessity for the new rulers. It was only on such a presumption that lands could be resumed by the new government. Explaining the possible reasons for the absence of mirasi lands in Khandesh, Briggs draws upon history. He believed that when the Muslims conquered the territory of Khandesh, they abolished all ownership in land and gave back the land to the farmers on an agreement that the latter would pay half of the produce by way of rent or tankha. So whenever a farmer paid one half of the yield to the State, he was, in the opinion of Briggs, a tenant and not a proprietor. [94] Whatever miras land was there in Khandesh was not saleable. ' It is however considered meeras or inheritance, if a farmer has cultivated a field for many years....' [95] The miras land in Khandesh was saleable only in the following parganas. Parganas of Jaitapur, Tilwan, Karoli, Kamassy, Pimpla, Galna and Hatgad. It was however considered unjust to deprive a mirasi farmer of his land as long as he paid the government dues.

In Khandesh, Briggs reported, of proprietors there were very few, not one in six, and almost all were district and village officers. [96] Almost the only mirasdars who were not also the village or district officers were settled in Baglana. [97] A peculiar feature of the Khandesh mirasdars noted by Briggs

was their legal inability to sell their lands. The mirasdars who were officers could dispose their lands and office by sale, whereas the mirasdars could mortgage them.[98]

Besides the mirasdars and watandars, there was yet another, and perhaps a larger, class of cultivators called the Uparis or the tenants at will. A tenant or upari could not transfer his land 'having no proprietory rights in the land. '[99] A upari cultivator could not be removed, without injustice from his land so long as he paid the rent. ' The tenants hold their lands year after year and generation after generation in the same family and this establishes a right by which they cannot be deprived of their holdings'.[100] The government could requisition his lands for public purposes ' provided he was given equal amount of land elsewhere. ' The difference between a mirasdari or a watandari and a upri holding, besides the alienation right, was that the government could not take over a miras land without the consent of the holder, ' and then also, the compensation of the land would be his choice on same term as the holding of the old one.'[101] The same rates were levied from the mirasdar as from the Upari, 'the chief point of difference ' being that if an upari gave up his field he had no claim to take it again, while no length of time was a bar to the watandars.[102]

To lay down a rational and viable revenue policy, it was necessary to collect as much information as was possible. Elphinstone had instructed his collectors to collect information

for at least ten years past.[103] But Briggs had ' hardly any hopes of getting ten years successive accounts from half of the country....' [104] He instructed his subordinates officers to collect the necessary information. 'You will procure the records of the District 30 years ago for three successive years. You will also procure the records of the time of Idla Bye (Ahilyabai) for three successive years and the amount of revenues collected within the two years....' [105] But with all his officiousness, Briggs was pragmatic. It was difficult to get record for past ten years. Whenever he got them, he knew that they were unreliable. '... A minute examination of the whole of the Coolcurney papers which have evidently from their appearance all been made up for the purpose, has convinced me that no dependance whatever can be placed on the detailed accounts of the last twenty years. ' [106] He ' firmly believed ' that no Kulkarni in his district had submitted correct accounts.[107] The insistance was rather unfortunate. It led to ' made up ' accounts, as many of ' the records are destroyed in the last war.[108] ' Notwithstanding ' his ' unremitting exertions ' Briggs could not get reliable accounts. [109] Taking a realistic view of the situation, he urged Lt. Hodges ' to refer to the Village Documents for the last two or three years taking also one or two years accounts of the most flourishing periods. ' [110]

After a careful study of the practices as seen and recorded, Briggs came to the conclusion that the commonest

mode of settlement in Khandesh was the Autbandi.[111] Autbandi was a payment of a fixed rent for the use of each plough and pair of bullocks. Molesworth describes it as ' the system of taxing the used ploughs, instead of the land; leaving the farmer to plough and cultivate as he pleases '[112] Another form of settlement was the mundbandi [113] ' or one founded on the appearance of the country generally.....' [114] The extent of the cultivated land was not measured 'within the memory of any person in Candeish ' [115] The actual payment was essentially the result of a 'bargain between the Deshmukh and the Patil.'[116]

On going through the records, Briggs found that there were three classes of rent normally levied in Khandesh. The classification was done according to type of land and the irrigation facilities. The land was divided into, i) Jirayat or dry land irrigated only by rain; ii) Motsthal or land watered by wells; iii) Patsthal or land irrigated by canal. For practical purposes, the land was classified as Jirayat and Bagayat, the latter covering both the irrigated varieties. The Jirayat assessment rates depended ' solely ' on the quality and the extent of the land, while in Bagayat they were dependent partly on the quality of the land and partly on the kind of crop grown. [117] It is possible that higher rates for richer crops in Bagayat did not encourage the cultivators to undertake that type of cultivation, thereby increasing the poverty of the district. This fixed rent on land was called Dardam.

However, there was no one fixed system by which the assessment was determined. ' In several Pergunnas the assessment is made on the nature of the crops and not merely on the extent of the land as in the whole of the country lying to the westward of a line drawn from Sindwa to Unkye' [118] In other regions of Khandesh the fixed rent varied ' so much as renders it almost incredible. ' [119] Incredible though it may seem, it was certainly not unnatural , if we realize the fact that unlike other parts of the Maratha kingdom, Khandesh did not form a unit of administration under one single authority. Parts of it were held by the Peshwa, parts by the Holkar and parts by the Shindes. Again, like the British themselves, the Marathas also followed a policy of ' no innovation ' in this relatively late addition to Maratha kingdom. The Marathas ' went entirely by the old Musalman papers. ' The old records of the Mughal government, moazinas, were held the most authentic that could be produced. They were accepted by the Maratha governments and assessment was based upon them and the usage. [120] In the Bagayat lands, the Dardam varied from Rs. 2.8.0 to Rs. 70 per bigha, according to crops. [121]

To an alien to the Indian conditions, the system looked extremely complicated and unequal. Briggs was convinced that ' no equitable assessment can be made till there is an accurate survey of the soil obtained and a new assessment fix't

according to actual measurement and the nature of the soil.....' [122] This, however, was to be prolonged process. The survey was begun in 1818. In the initial stages the survey had become a military necessity. The range of the Satpuda was surveyed by officers under Sir John Malcolm. Briggs strongly pleaded for a similar survey of the area under his charge, ' some parts of which are wholly unexplored' . To undertake this job, he suggested the name of ensign Underwood of the Madras Engineers. [123] This survey,however, soon turned out to be mere topographical one, and Briggs had to depend more upon his own subordinates and locals for a revenue survey. Till the land was surveyed, Briggs decided to follow the pattern of the Maratha government.[124] Briggs directed his Mamlatdars that 'the present custom of collecting the revenue through the Patil and Kulkany to be generally adopted'. [125] By and large, Briggs followed the system followed by the Maratha government. He preferred to settle with the Patil the assessment for the village . The mamlatdar was instructed to ' settle his jamabundy with the Patail..'[126] He wanted to avoid the mundbundy upon the quality and produce of the land.[127] This would have become impossible , if Briggs was to insist on doing the entire jamabandi of Khandesh all by himself. He therefore decided to settle with the Patils and Zamindars of Khandesh at Dhule, and those of Gangathadi at Kopargaon. [128] It was therefore necessary to delegate larger authority to the Mamlatdars, who became the

most important cogs in the British revenue wheel. They were almost the eyes and ears of the administration. In an elaborate letter to his Collectors, Elphinstone had laid down the functions and duties of the mamlatdars. [129] One of the most important duty of the mamlatdar, of course, was the revenue settlement and collection. Briggs, in his General Instructions to Mamlutdars, laid down the revenue programme of these functionaries.

At the commencement of the season for ploughing and sowing of the seeds, the mamlatdar was to go to each village in the area under his charge ' and promote the Lawany by his presence and encouragement. ' He was to revisit the villages in the course of the months of May, June, July and August. This was to ascertain for himself the extent of actual cultivation and see that the government was not defrauded. ' In the month of September he should make his first collection on the Khureef.' This was exactly as it was done under the earlier government. ' It was usual under the best maratta government for the mamlutdar to go round his districts in the months of September and October, when the crops were inspec--ted ' and a settlement made. [130] Briggs's mamlatdars did the same. From September onwards till the end of December it was ' his duty to settle with the Ryots and Patils the total amount of assessment for the year. ' [131] This was the time that jamabandi was made. During his previous visits the mamlatdars had already ' ascertained if more or less ground

has been cultivated ' than the previous year. Now by referring to the last years accounts, he was to form a tolerable estimate of what the present year will yield ' and he was to settle his jamabandi with the Patil ' with reference to that circumstance'. While making jamabandi with one village, the mamlatdar was to consult the people of other villages. This was felt necessary because ' while the Patil (of the village) will endeavour to reduce the rate as much as possible, the smrrounding villages will probably take care that the assessment is not smaller in proportion than that to which they have agreed.[132] This having settled, a deed of agreement was drawn up by the mamlutdar and signed by the Patil and the Kulkarni. A ' Jamabandi Pattrak ' was to be given by the mamlatdar to the Patil, and personal surety, muchalka, taken from him. The patil was to give receipts to the cultivators and submit them to the mamlatdar.[133] The Patils were also expected to pay the perquisites of the local haqdars and nemnookdars. 'Article 4th. You are to pay the Haqdars and Devistan Expense of the Gaonkarch according to the allowance above made for them, taking receipts for the payments, which are to be delivered to the Mamlatdars'.[134]

There were no lands held in quit rent, except by the ' Inamdars and the persons holding lands for due performance of service'. All quit rent lands held under the previous government, were resumed.[135] The income from salamee rights was also resumed.[136]

The total revenue acruing from land alone was called ain jama. The highest, ideal realizable revenue from cultivation was called Tankha. The actual assessment, even under the Marathas was much less. [137] Though the rate was calculated on dardam basis, the assessment was made on the total cultivable land of a village. An actual case study would illustrate this point. In the Kasba of Galana the total land (called Rakhba) was three thousand bighas. Out of this 750 bighas was waste land, while 1000 bighas was Inam land. The total land assessable under the normal conditions therefore was 1250 bighas. On these 1250 bighas, the ideal realizable revenue , the tankha , was estimated , at Rs.2173.8.0 . However, in the fasaly year 1227, i.e. 1817 A. D., the total land actually cultivated was just 117 bighas and 7 pands. (20 pands make one bigha) , while 1132 bighas and 13 pands were accounted as fallow land . Of these 117-7 bighas, 13 bighas and 13¾ pands was bagayat land, while 103 bighas and 13¼ pands was jirayat . The bagayat land, which was just about 11% of the cultivated land, paid a revenue of Rs.39.14.0, while the jirayat land paid a revenue of 119.5.0. The dardam for the bagayat came to approximately 2 Rs. 14 as. 7 pai, while that for jirayat was about Re. 1.2.2 . [138] The total land assessment was Rs.159.3.0 . Out of this Rs.123.0.1 were deducted on account of nemboks like devasthan, dharmadaya, warshasana, huqdars, gaonkarch, babtee, nazzar and zamindar's perquisites. The

total rent available to the government was 36.3.3. The British government had resumed the Maratha government's claims like Babti and nazzar pancham hissa, amounting, in this particular case to Rs.33.11.1. Thus the income from the land revenue that the government got was Rs.69.15.0 . [139] In many villages, Briggs found that large tracts of land were either undervalued (i.e. in terms of quality) or were given out at less than the full rate of assessment. This type of settlement was called Heen Kowl. [140] Briggs disallowed all heen kowls. [141]

The Bagayat crops of sugar cane in Baglana region were assessed from Rs. 50 to 60 per bigha. In other districts, the same was charged at Rs. 4 to 6 per bigha. [142] In Baglana the rate came to be fixed, as the records told Briggs, according to the value of the produce in the market, ' which gave about Rs.50 to 60 for the production of one Beegha '. Commenting on this high rates, Briggs says, ' The story did not lead to any remonstrance on the part of the villagers nor did they seem to consider the present rate exorbitant.' [143]

In 1820, Briggs introduced standard dardam rates through out Khandesh. The new rates were as follows:

A) <u>Dry or Jirayat land</u>: i) Best - from Rs.2 to 3½ per bigha
ii) Middle-from Rs.1 to 2 per bigha
iii) Worst- from Annas 4 to Rs.1 perbigha.

The average worked out for the district at Rs.1. As.9 .6 Ps.

B) Bagayat land :

a) Motasthal : i) Best - from Rs.5 to 7 per bigha.
ii) Middle - from Rs.3 to 5 per bigha
iii) Worst - from Rs.1 to 3 per bigha

b) Patsthal: i) Best - from Rs.21 to 70 per bigha
ii) Middle - from Rs.8 to 21 per bigha
iii) Worst - from Rs. 1 to 8 per bigha.

These rates were accepted by the government and continued till a new settlement was effected. But then, that was after Briggs time in Khandesh. [144] These rates, Briggs felt, were not excessive. He gives a comparative statement of the produce, cost and profit to a farmer as a result of these rates.

Kind of land	Area under Tillage	Gross Income	Cost of production	Rent	Profit.
Jirayat	100	575	352	200	23
Motasthal	12	528	408	72	48
Patasthal	25	924	577	294	53

It is a rather interesting tabulation, and one that cannot be taken at its face value. In the explanatory comments, Briggs claims that the 100 bighas of the jirayat that he has taken as his unit, is black soil. He further states that in normal case it should produce 3000 seers of any product saleable at 30 seers a rupee. Actually, his calculations tell

us that the land has produced approximately 14,600 seers or 132.5 quintals of different crops. He claims that the farmer could produce and sell chana for Rs. 100, Bajari (4000 seers) for Rs.100, wheat (5000 seers) for Rs.200/-, jawar (5250 seers) for Rs.105/-, and straw and grass for Rs.70/-, the total income being Rs.575/-. Assuming that the prices were not lowered further during the period, [146] it is obvious that the soil which had this fairly high productivity (1.6 quintal per acre) was the best black jirayat, for which the government rent was 2 to 3½ rupees per bigha, and certainly the dardam would be charged at an average of Rs.3/- per bigha. This would mean that the government's share was Rs.300/- and not Rs.200/-. The 100 bighas of land come to 82.6 acres, an area which was impossible for one farmer to cultivate. Further Briggs assumes that the ploughing would be done by 8 bullocks. This means that the farmer would be using 4 ploughs, a condition, Briggs himself admits, that was not to be found common in Khandesh. [147] Assuming again, that this particular farmer did have 4 ploughs and 8 bullocks, and further assuming that two pairs were worked by him in his family, he would even then require the services of at the least two more workers. The minimum wages for the year would come to Rs.100/-.[148] Even if we assume that along with the prices the wages also fell, the cost of production would remain the same, i.e. 350/-. The recalculation then gives us the

following table. (for 100 bighas of jirayat best black)

Gross produce	Rs. 575/-
Gross cost of production...	Rs. 350/-
Government share	Rs. 300/-
Net loss	Rs. 75/-

There is no reason to assume that the government rent would be charged at the minimum. Even if it was charged at a mean of Rs.2½, the poor farmer does not have anything to gain in agricultural pursuit.

Even if we accept Briggs's dubious calculation of a marginal profit of Rs. 23/- to the farmer, the table cannot be considered as a permanent state of affairs. The next season, with barely any money in his hands, would take the peasant to the Sawkar for a loan. If he takes a loan of Rs.400/- for meeting the cost of production at a rate of 24%, [149] he has to pay an interest of Rs.96/- at the end of the year, thereby increasing his cost of production by that amount and bringing it to Rs.446/-, <u>without any corresponding increase in his gross income</u>. Thus a process of perpetual indebtedness of the peasantry was set into motion.

The system of revenue assessment and collection as framed by Captain Briggs was, at least on paper, an ideal one. He began by re-measuring the land in almost every village through

the agency of Shaikdars. The measure of land that he introduced was a standard rod of nine feet in place of the old one of ten feet. The area of bigha under the new system of measurement was 32,400 s.feet.[150] This bigha was smaller than the old one by approximately some 7000 sq. feet. However, this fact was not taken ' into account when the assessment was fixed .' In many cases I understand, this reduction of the rod , ... which agumented the number of Beegahs, has not only been followed by a corresponding abatment of the Assessment, but on the contrary, an addition has been made to the rent of this Bugah of reduced size by the new rule of classification.'[151] The rules of classification of land introduced by Briggs were novel and appeared on the surface to be scien--tific. Under this system the soil in every field was to be dug to the depth from 1 to 3 feet and the quality of the soil then determined. The soil thus classified was to be rated according to the schedule referred to above.[152] Besides being an innovation of radical character, the new rules were unscientific and oppressive. As Chaplin pointed out to Briggs, in a given field the soil so dug , could be black , but based upon a deeper layer of saltpetre obstructing vegitation; it could be swampy and loose, thus not very useful for cultivation; The very location of the field among the village lands also would determine its cultivability. Chaplin reminded Briggs that ' rent must vary with its (soil's) fertility whatever may be the produce and with its situation whatever

be its fertility.....' [153] Under Briggs's new scheme Chaplin found that the lands which paid 8 annas per bigha as rent were now, under the new rules, had to pay Rs. 2.8.0 . [154] ' ..... From the rough and imperfect method produced in carrying into execution this system of classification, the lands of the greater portion of the district were included in the highest class of rates. The consequence of this was that the ryots , not being able to meet such heavy demands, threw up their lands ....' [155].

The impact of this new system of classification on Khandesh was almost disasterous. In the village of Bhammod near Savada, the villagers clamoured that their assessment had been increased by 50 to 70%. In this village theaggregate demand had not been increased, by reducing the rate of some 46 holders.[15] In cases where the aggregate demand also increased as a result of the new rules, Chaplin feared that an individual's rent would increase by 150 to 200 %. ' Such an increase in most cases .... can neither be demanded without injustice nor paid without ruin.....' [157] The Commissioner asked the Collector to treat the new rates as purely temporary and experimental in character . In 1823, the entire system was changed and new rates introduced. But by then Briggs had left Khandesh.[158]

Chaplin was critical of the survey that Briggs had undertaken for revenue purposes. [159] Though Briggs's work had 'detected concealed cultivation and hence useful and has

increased the revenue, which would otherwise have been taken by the village and district officials, ' Chaplin did not consider the revenue survey to be perfect. ' .... A superficial measurement and classification made by a few Karkoons and Sheikdars, checked by the Moamlutdar and corrected by your cutcherry servants, can hardly .... constitute what you have deemed, nearly a completion of a systematic survey.....' Chaplin lauded the intentions and efforts and believed that the data so collected would certainly be useful in any future survey, yet , ' conducted as the survey has been, it cannot possess that character of accuracy, which is necessary to make it permanently useful.....' [160] As a result of this criticism, Briggs reverted to the old system and gave up his survey. [161]

As a result of the introduction of the new rates based upon new classifications, so severely criticised by Chaplin , the Commissioner, and yet continued till 1823-24, Briggs was able to show an increase in the revenue collection from land. The following table shows the increase.

	Gross land Revenue Rs.	Gaonkharchand other deduction Rs.	Net for collection Rs.
Average till 1817-18	14,19,725	5,68,000	9,51,725
Revenue in 1818-19	14,90,866	2,45,000	12,45,866
Average Revenue in 1819-20	17,03,412	2,21,000	14,82,412
Revenue in 1820-21	16,33,481	2,10,000	14,23,481

From the table given above we see that the increase of revenue in 1819-20 over that of 1817-18 amounts to Rs.5,30,687/ while that in 1820-21 was to the extent of Rs. 4,71,756/-. The years are significant, These two years saw the most hectic anti-Bhil campaigns of Briggs as well as his complaints about the loss of revenue. Briggs explained the increase in terms of land that was cultivated without being entered into the records, savings on account of the fixed ceiling of 4% on gaonkharch, abolition of hawaldari payments (which now acrued to the Govt.) etc.[163] As a result of the new classification of land, 7,16,153 bighas of land yielded a revenue of Rs. 15,67,241 giving a per bigha average of Rs.2.2. The upward trend of land assessment needs no further proof.

In the first year after the establishment of internal peace 1820-21 the increase in the revenue pleased the government, though it had made the Commissioner a little apprehensive.[164] But soon the effects of the high assessment started becoming evident . In May 1822, Briggs wrote to Chaplin seeking the latter's permission to reduce the demand on the ryots, since the ryot were not able to pay so much. [165] There was plentiful of grain in the market, a direct result of the introduction of money economy, and the prices had fallen considerably. ' .... The present price of grain had ... not been known at any time in the past 30 years. The price in the past, during the time of any good government, is taken to be about 15 to 20% higher (than) what they are now .....' [166]. The

Commissioner agreed and wherever there was need 25 % abatement was granted, though reluctantly. [167]

It can be clearly seen that Briggs's assessment was fairly high. This was accepted both by Briggs as well as the government. The revenue administration of Briggs did not show any improvement in the condition of the peasantry. This was probably because of two important factors : firstly a srong assumption of higher revenue income under the Peshwas, and secondly introduction of money economy. Since the rent had to be paid in cash [168] selling of grain in the market became an imperative, and led to the fall of prices, thus deteriorating the condition so much that in 1823-24 , government had to revise the whole revenue administration. [169]

The actual land rent was not the only levy that the farmer had to pay. Besides the ' ainjama ', the 'Jamabandi patrak ' had other changes included in it under the heading ' Sewai Jama ' or additional levies. The 'Siwai Jama ' included cesses like Havaldari, Inam Salami, Pandhri Patti , Hadola , Balute patti, Mazaar patti. [170] In the statement of the revenue of the Paragana of Kumbhari, Briggs, however, adds 'Mohatarfa ' and ' Amrai ' as cesses in addition to Sewai Jama. [171] Besides the Siwai Jama, which was a series of well regulated dues payable to the government or other functionaries like the Balutedars etc. sometimes an additional cess was levied under the name ' Sadilwar Patti. ' The

Sadilwar patti was used for a variety of purposes. ' It supplied food to guides and Beggarries, to Govt. troops and Harricarrahs, on duty, supported the Mamlutdar and his suite on tour to the village, it supported the expenses of Bhetty or offerings to great people passing the village; it catered the expenses of oil to the public buildings like kutcherry, gates ' etc. etc. Besides, ' .... in Candeish it has not unfrequently been applied to the payment of the interest of debts to Sahoocars who have advanced money to the village in times of its distress .... ' [172] In keeping with Elphinstone's instructions of 22nd April 1818, most of the claims of the past government were retained by Briggs. These claims were included in the Sewai Jama. The Basti, the Nazzar pancham, the Sahotra, which all were well established ancient maratha claims, along with salamy (honour) , Amrai (gardens or orchards), Mohaturfa (tax on shops) were retained. But Briggs was determined to abolish the Sadilwar patti. It was a cause of a great distress to the villagers, and the only people who benefited from it were the civil officers of the government.[173] At the same time he realized that the village as a community would require some funds to defy its various expenses. These expenses were included in a generic term - ' Gaonkharch ' . Briggs allowed the Patils to deduct 4% from the total revenue assessment (both ain and siwai jamas) to meet the expenses of the village. All the village expenses were to be met from this 4% deduction. The Patils

were sternly warned that they must not levy any extra cess to meet any expenses. At the end of the year, the Patils were to submit accounts of the Gaonkharch to the mamlatdars. ' ... There is now no reason to believe that the Patils will charge extra.' [174]

The admisibility of the gaonkharch was a direct result of the nature of the settlement that Briggs had concluded in Khandesh. The settlement was essentially a maujwar or community settlement. The cultivated land of each village was measured annually, individual cultivator's extent was determined, and then the rent amount was fixed through the Patil of the village. [175] Previous to making the Jamabandi, surveyors or the Pahani karkuns, were sent to village ' to measure every Beegha of cultivated land '. This operation was begun in the month of November and ' hardly ended in February.' [176] The Mamlatdar visited every village at the time of lawany (sowing) and determined the soil and crop, relevant to which, the rent was determined. [177] The settlement of the rent was done publicly, 'and before any number of villagers who choose to be present the Patil then entered into a penal bond not to collect more than the sum fixed for every individual.' [178] The Patil undertook to be responsible for all the cultivators in his village and 'in the event of any casualty among the Ryot by death or absence ' undertook to inform the Mamlatdar and do the needful. [179]

The corporate character of the village in matters financial was nowhere better expressed than in the matter of village debts. In times of distress or under compulsion or threat, the villages borrowed money from sawkars. For instance, the villages of Nimboree and Kirdee borrowed Rs. 16000 and Rs. 1235/- respectively from Suryajirao Nimbalkar for meeting the demands of the Pendharies. The villages, as whole, were responsible for such debts. [180] The rates at which these debts were given by the Sawkars were exorbitant, varying from 100 to 120% per year. Bonds were entered into by the villagers and in many cases, within three or four years the principal was paid back by way of interest and the villagers still were in debt for the principal. ' No class of people have enriched themselves so much by these means as the Arabs, many of whom have found security for their conduct, and are still in the country.' [181] Under the Maratha government, the villagers repaid these debts by using a part of sadilwar patti to that end. But now, with the abolishing of the sadilwar patti, the government had to think of some means by which these debts were discharged. It was necessary in order ' to restore to them (the villagers) that security with regard to personal property, which by giving them a spirit of honest independence will render them industrious subjects ....' [182] In any mode that might be applied to adjust these debts, Briggs believed that the government will have ' to become guarantee for the payment '. For the adjustment of these debts, Briggs proposed

four alternatives. First : A committee should be appointed to go into the whole problem ' and after admitting the full interest of several bonds, allot a certain sum to be paid annually for the liquidation of the debt on the old terms ...'

Second : Ascertain the amount of the indebtedness of the villages at the present, without going into the past, deduct 20% to cover the impositions practiced by the Sawkars , and pay the balance immediately.

Third : Taking the bonded debt as the true sum due, an arrangement should be made with the village by which the village should agree to pay the whole amount by instalments through the government, in a period of five years. Only the principal was to be paid.

Fourth : Admitting the validity of the present bonds, the villages should be bound to pay the whole sum with a simple interest of 12% , in a period of ten years. Whenever, the Sawkars are given land for the payment of the debts, their exemption from the tax be calculated to the date, and the amount deducted from the debt amount. After the repayment of the debt, no exemption be continued on such lands.

Briggs rejected the first alternative as being too favourable to the exploiting sawkars and unjust to the villages. The second, third and fourth alternatives were acceptable to him. He personally preferred the fourth one,

and added that the village waste lands be given in mortgage in lieu of interest to sawkars, ' so that the waste land would come under cultivation and the villages relieved of the burden '. [183] Briggsactually did follow the fourth one with the approval of Elphinstone who commented that it was excellent if practicable '. [184]

With the bonded debts of the village taken care of, the only other occasion on which the village as a whole would have to incur expenditure, as visualized by Briggs, was the visit of the Government officers. For this, however, he laid down strict instrictions to his mamlatdars. They were not to take any ration, (shidha) or free labour, begari, without paying for the same. Nor were they to accept any presents, however trifling, from the people. [185]

Another impost that Briggs strongly objected to was the ' Hawaldari '. Havaldari was a payment made to the Havaldars whose duty was to restrain the ryots from selling their products before making the payment to the government. [186] The system led to a complicated socio-fiscal relationship within the various classes of the society. It was because of this system that a sawkar became an important and inevitable part of the revenue system. The hawaldars would allow a farmer to sell his goods in the market only if somebody stood surety for him. Normally a sawkar would do that. Many times he actually paid the rent on behalf of the peasent. This had become a universal practice. [187] For doing this work, the hawaldars got a share

of the revenue. Their dues in the year 1819 were estimated at Rs.15000/-. Briggs recommended that ' no restraint be put on the free sale of the produce.' But keen as he was on getting rid of the hawaldars, so long as the hawaldars existed he wanted payment to them to be made in cash rather than kind. [188] This was to safeguard the fiscal interests of the peasents. Since most of the hawaldars were agents of the sawkars, who in their turn, were also the merchants, manipu-lation of market prices was far more easy for them. [189] Briggs discontinued the hawaldari system in the revenue year 1820.[190] However, Chaplin did not agree with him. He recommended an individual abatement of settlement, and not the giving up of the Hawaldari imposition on the entire village.[191] The Hawal-dari, then was reimposed.

An issue closely related to the land-revenue was the rehabilitation of the deserted villages. It has been noticed earlier that a large number of villages in Khandesh had been depopulated and deserted. Besides natural calamities, there were other factors responsible for the village desertations. One of them was heavy impositions. It was not rare that villa-gers deserted their fields due to heavy demands and the callousness of the creditors. [192] But such cases were fewer. The majority of desertations were due to insecurity of life and property. How to repopulate them was a major problem.

In the villages that were partly deserted, Briggs re-commended that the uparis be encouraged to take up land on

preferential terms. The deserted lands could be resettled through the agency of the disbanded soldiers. Briggs agreed with the suggestion of Elphinstone that waste lands be given in Inam to a certain number of ex-soldiers , thereby achieving two goals of populating the villages and settling the soldiers , who in case of emergency could be turned into militia. [193]

In consequence of the depopulated condition of Khandesh, Briggs gave general permission to Mamlatdars to give permission to individual ryots to cultivate new lands on the terms usual under the old government. The usual terms were as follows : ' Total remission for the first year , to allow the Husbandman to cut down the weed , and to clear the ground, and a successive increase of one, two, three and four quarters till the full proportion of the ground rent is paid in the fifth year' . [194] This was in keeping with the general directives issued by the Commissioner. ' Whatever village you find deserted, it is your duty to repopulate it ..... by an indulgent consideration of their hardship ' and ' (you) will afford them an opportunity of regaining their former condition..... ' [195]

But Briggs had not merely a village or two so deserted on his hands; he had the whole paraganas that needed repopolating. The zamindars of the paragana of Sultanpur approached Briggs with a request to take measures to repopulate the paragana. Of the 280 villages in the Paragana, only 116 were

inhabited. Then again, only 1/2 of these inhabited villagers had their proper inhabitants. Most of the villagers went to their own fields belonging to neighbouring but deserted villages. The zamindars asked for Tagai, but the amount involved was so large that Briggs had to turn down their request. To resolve the problem, Briggs resorted to a well meaning but evidently ill-conceived plan. At the request of the zamindars, he decided to send for one Ganapatrao Bhagwant, of Nasik, whose father and who himself had held the charge of the paragana under Ahilyabai Holkar, and asked him to settle the paragana. He proposed to Elphinstone that Ganapatrao be allowed to advance money to the inhabitants at a rate of 12%. Ganapatrao was to be allowed 10% of all surplus revenue over last year and was to receive a salary according to the size of the paragana. Briggs believed that this arrangement would combine all the advantages of amany (temporary) collectorship with that of an Istowa settlement, without any of those inconveniences arising out of contractors by which the internal administration of the paragana is left in the hands of the Collector, and all sorts of abuses may be practiced without the knowledge of the govt '. [196] The Commissioner's disapproval was categorical. He asked Briggs to forward such sums in tagai as he could, hoping that after sometime people would come back to settle in Sultanpur from the neighbouring Guj rath.[197]

In the paragana of Amba, Briggs followed a more practical policy. He advanced Rs.2000/- to the inhabitants of the paragana. The money was for buying live stock. An additional amount of Rs.500/- was given to enable the inhabitants ' to build habitations ' for themselves. Briggs promised them remission of land rents for the first year ' to enable them to fell the jungle , form villages, and build houses ' . After that they were to pay the rents as is usual in waste lands. The amount was to be repaid ' in the same year that the whole rent is to be collected with an interest of 12 % per annum, which it may be considered advisible to relinquish at the expiration of that time '. The loan for the houses was to be interest free. [198] It is arguable that the collector could have paid the tagai in kind rather than in cash. He could have supplied them with live-stock, seeds etc. This, of course, would have led the government in commerce, a thing which no British administrator would have even thought of in an age of laissez faire.

Besides this, subsidy or tagai was to be given to encou--rage cultivation. As early as 7th March 1818, Briggs reported that unless subsidy was given to zamindars (i. e. cultivators) even next year's revenue prospects were very black. [199] In several instances, he authorized the bankers with whom the cultivators had dealings in the past to make advances to farmers. [200] Tagai was recommended again in August, as because of the total lack of rain during June, the crop was lost, and

without subsidy even the rabbi crop was endangered. [201] Tagai money was to be advanced to those who were returning to Khandesh to settle there. The advance was meant for their journey, and building habitations. [202] Briggs laid down minute rules for the grant of tagai. Before giving the grant, the Mamlatdar was to obtain the ' Sakal Zamin ' or bail security from several ryots and if the advance was large enough in one village, the Patil was to obtain the Sakal Zamin of several Patils. Advances made for the purposes of cultivation were to be recovered during the year, while those made for rebuilding houses were to be recovered in two or three years, according to circumstances.[203]

In the light of the desolate conditions of the district, large remissions also had to be made. In the Jamabandi of fasaly 1229 (1819 A.D.) Briggs allowed remissions on following grounds:

1) For all the cattle carried off by the Bhils since the occupation of the country, he gave half the value.

2) For the repairs of the gates of the towns, actuals.

3) For the repair of the wells from which drinking water was drawn, actuals

4)For the destruction due to the march of the troops, actuals.

5) For the failure of the crops, according to circumstances.[204] Though remissions were normally pleaded for, Briggs records with a certain amazement, that ' the inhabitants of the country

generally speaking are not desirous of taking the Surcar money ... ' He felt that people as yet were apprehensive about the stability of the new order, ' but the moment people become convinced, Candeish would be repopulated. ' [205]

Briggs believed that the conditions of the peasantry and of the country would improve greatly if the irrigation system was repaired. Throughout the district there were ' 187 substantial dams of masonary '. ' Each of these dams enables acqueducts to be formed from them of from 12 to 16 feet wide and from two to three feet deep running for several miles in length...' The repair of these dams would cost the government a total expense of Rs.2,14,900/-. Briggs believed that the money spent on the repairs of dams would be recovered within three or four years by the increased rent on the land brought under irrigation. He wistfully looked forward to the period when these acqueducts could be used for turning water mills for such purposes as grinding, expelling oil or extracting juice from sugar cane. The repairs of dams, he believed to be an 'important improvement in this branch of revenue '. [206] The repair of dams in Baglana would have increased the revenue of Baglana pargana by Rs.10,000/- per year, while the cost of the repairs would have been Rs.4750/-. [207] However, the government was reluctant to invest money in the repairs of the dams, and at the same time did not allow the collector to make remissions in the revenue to villages for the repairs. [208]

Besides land revenue, the other important source of governmental income was customs or zakat.[209] Under the Peshwas, there was no state machinery in Khandesh for the collection of customs, and in the initial stages of the British administration, Briggs did not feel it expedient to establish one. He proposed ' to enter into contracts for the customs of the ensuing year as has been invariably practiced under the late govt.' Though the system was ' radically bad ' , Briggs considered it ' an expedient we must adopt, and submit to the evil rather than incur a greater by innovation '.[210] He considered forming of custom as ' by far the most profitable mode of realizing that part of the revenue '.[211] Though Briggs considered forming as a bad system, yet he believed that in the particular case of custom, it was a very good device which would bring profit to the government.[212] The total income from the custom farming in 1818 came to Rs. 94,288/-. It must, however, be borne in mind that the collection of customs was a problem closely related to the settlement with the Bhils, and no satisfactory solution could be found unless the Bhils were settled. It was therefore decided that the farming system should be continued even during the next few years.[213] In 1819, Briggs brought the farming of customs on a more regular and profitable footing. The new contracts that he entered into with the customs contractors, showed an increase of Rs.27339/-, thus bringing the total to Rs.1,21,621/-. This net increase of 29.23/32%. The farmers of customs were

to pay all the ' Nemnooks ' (grants) made out of the customs. However, in the parganas of Nandurbar and Sultanpur, all charitable nemnooks were to be paid from the government treasury since ' the claims on the zakat (in these parganas) amount to considerably more than is now realized from that branch of revenue .....' [214] The increase in customs did not necessarily mean an increase either in industry or in trade. In fact, the condition of trade was so bad that Briggs proposed a 'prospectus of Immunities and Privileges to be granted to Merchants ... in Candeish' . Under this scheme, Briggs proposed to grant rent free land ' sufficient in extent for the erection of a Bazar, store-House, and Houses for shops. ' He was willing to give ~~to give~~ the merchants remission on taxes like Pandhari patti for the first year. [215] On the ' Export Merchandize ' , he was willing to grant large remissions, a veritable 'customs Istowa '. ' To Merchants exporting goods, the duties of which in one year, aggregate to the Circar, 1000 Rupees, a drawback of 15 pr. ct. (%) for the first year, for the 2nd year 10 Pr.ct., for the third year 5 pr. ct. and for the 4th or last year, 3 Pr. ct., after this period they will pay the Customary Duties of the province on the same footing as other Merchants. ' For those merchants whose annual export duties did not exceed Rs. 500/-Briggs was ready to grant remission on the same pattern, but at a reduced rate. They were to pay 10 % less in the first year, 6 % less in second, 4 % less in the third and 3 % less in the fourth year. On all imports

the government was to grant a remission of 4% in the first two years and of 3 % during the third and the fourth years. The merchants were to be granted Dastaks (permits) by the Huzoor Kachery and were to move about ' unmolested and unexa--mined ' by the subordinate nakas (posts) of the province. Even for the merchants who did not intend to trade in Khandesh, but had to pass through it, Briggs promised escorts, ' if necessary, to and from the Boundaries of Candeish ' . [216] The improvement of trade had been almost an obsession with Briggs. He sincerely believed that ' the manufacture and trade of the country should be encouraged as the principal source of revenue and not the secondary source ...' [217] He suggested to Elphinstone that the merchants of Kurgone, Maheshwar, Indore, Ujjain and other capital towns of Malwa be invited to bring their merchandise by the routes through Jawn (Jamb?) and Sindwa ghats towards the Deccan. He believed that this movement would ' bring advantage to the public interest ' in Khandesh. [218] The merchants and traders had to be invited from outside, and contrary to the principle of free trade , a preferential custom treatment had to be offered to the merchants by the State. ' The mass of the population being so poor, it is to be concluded (that) there can be little encouragement for trade or manufacture... ' [219] and therefore the State , in the opinion of Briggs ought to intervene. ' Commercial revenue ' was , in his opinion , so important an object ,that , his treatment of the Bhils, who were the traditional guardians of the commercial routes, tended to be almost

liberal.[220] He was convinced that ' the bulk of the revenue should be derived from trade and manufactures including duties on exports, imports, licences and stamps ' .[221]

The entire problem of governmental income through revenue was an interrelated one. It moved in a vicious circle. Since the people were poor, trade could not flourish, and since there was no trade, poverty increased. To get off the horns of the dilemma, Briggs proposed a two-fold policy . In the first place , he wanted the land rent to be reduced, and in the second place , he wanted trade to be encouraged through State protection. ' ..... The more I think on the subject, the more I am convinced that a low permanent quit rent or tax on land equal to about 1/6th of the net profit will, in the end, be found the most advantageous system of Indian finance...'[222] He believed that if this was done, the farmers would be left with some surplus, that would be used for the purchase of manufactured goods . '... (I)t is evident that till the condition of the mass of the population is altered so as to enable it to encourage trade by purchasing, that trade, the first and essential principle to the circulation of wealth , must be slow in proportion to the demand ....'[223] With his ideas about the quit rent no one agreed, but he was allowed a relative freedom in matters connected with customs.

III

Unlike Western Maharashtra and the Southern Maratha country, there were few Jahagirdars of note in Khandesh.

Vinchurkar, the two families of Raja Bahadur descended from Naro Shankar , Parolkar , Parshuram Pawar of Bhaul , Balwantrao Kadambande were perhaps the most important of the Peshwa Jahagirdars in Khandesh. Briggs classified the Khandesh jahagirdars into two classes. One : Those who held their lands in feudal tenure from the Maratha government, and two : those who held the lands through grants as ancient as the times of the Mughal empire. The former lived in Khandesh plains, while the latter in the hills of Khandesh and Baglana. [224]

Of the Maratha jahagirdars, the greatest was Vinchurkar. ' None of the other jageerdars are of much note, except the Vinchoorkar. The present jageerdar is a find young man... '[225] During the war, Vithal Narsinh Vinchurkar was close adherent of Baji rao and had fought with the British till the end. When Bajirao surrendered to Malcolm, Vithal Narsing was present. He tendered his submission to Sir John Malcolm, when his master, the Peshwa , accepted Malcolm's terms. He was advised by Malcolm to return to the Deccan and use his prestige and influence to pacify the country. He had submitted at ' a moment when submission had little merit....' and ' by exerting his influence to promote the general peace of the country ' alone he could 'institute claims upon the company.'[226] Malcolm believed that Vithal Narsinh was, to a large extent, responsible for influencing Bajirao to accept the terms granted by Malcolm. [227] He could not, of course, expect to be treated

on par with those Maratha chiefs who had deserted the Peshwa early in the struggle. The Governor - General decreed that ' having adhered to Bajee Row to the last ' , the Vinchurkar, could ' have no claim to the kindness of the British Government ' ,'however creditable such conduct ' might have been ' to his fidelity towards his master ' . Anything that may be retained by the Vinchoorkar beyond his enaum lands ..... must be regarded as purely gratuitous. ' The Governor-General was ' indeed not yet prepared to say whether any such favour will be expediently extended to that chief.'[228] Submitting to his fate, Vithal Narsinha returned to Khandesh, where he held extensive personal jahagir. He sought permission from Briggs to come to Khandesh. Believing that the Commissioner intended to restore the personal jahagir to that chief, Briggs asked him to see him at Malegaon.[229] In his meeting with Vithal Narsinha, Briggs impressed upon him that he could not hope to get possession of his entire saranjam and ' that whatever the British government might do in his case should be considered as a matter of grace ' .[230] Elphinstone had instructed Briggs to let the Vinchurkar go and reside at Vinchur. Vithal Narsinha, accordingly proceeded to Vinchur, unmolested. [231] He discharged his troops as instructed by Briggs and was staying alone with a few old retainers at Vinchur. [232] Elphinstone had decided to leave him to manage his estate ' for the present with little interference '. [233] The government restored to him his personal jahagir in Khandesh

to the value of Rs.55,556.2.0. The total value of the jahagir and Saranjam held by the Vinchurkars was estimated at Rs.12,38,568/-.[234]

As far as the other Peshwa Jahagirdars were concerned, they had ' refused to unite with Bajee Row, or to accept any employment under him in the late war. '[235] Not only that, but they had also helped the British to establish their authority in Khandesh. The Pawar of Bhaul had joined Meer Fazal Alikhan, Briggs's civil officer in eastern Khandesh, with 50 horse and aided him in occupying the country, while the agents of Balwantrao Kadambande went at Briggs's request with Briggs's mamlatdars to meet Maj. Jardine and ' has been most useful and zealous in furnishing local information, and in exerting in our favour that influence in this part of the country of which he possesses a commendable share ' .[236] In accordance with the policy laid down by Elphinstone, their estates were restored . Malegaon , which was the headquarter of Raja Bahadur Gopalrao, was relieved by the British forces and occupied , was taken over by the British. Briggs believed that the Raja Bahadur was really a poor man with 150 dependants. He pleaded with the Commissioner that Gopalrao's watan rights and personal jahagir ' except the fort and town of Malegaon ' be restored to him.[237]

The Raja Bahadur family of Amalner, ruled over by Madhavrao had been a prisoner in the hands of the Arabs, while the Kadambande family, perhaps the most ancient jahagirdars

in Khandesh had been living in extreme poverty at Surat for six to eight years prior to the establishment of the British rule. Briggs recommended that these chiefs be given money pensions instead of land grants, except of course their personal jahagirs. [238] The total claims of the important chiefs in Khandesh were as follows:

	Personal Jahagir	Total (Saranjam + Jahagir)
Gopalrao Raja Bahadur	21195.14.2	243467.14.2
Madhavrao Raja Bahadur	42000.0.0	494467.13.3
Kadambande	Patilki of many villages and number of rights held jointly by the six brothers.	₹7500. 0.0
Shivram Pawar	16000.0.0	70000. 0.0

All the personal jahagirs and watany claims of these chiefs were restored, but the Saranjam claims were resumed by the government. The resumption of the Saranjami claims by the government was a matter of administrative expediency. [239] Politically these chiefs were insignificant, and came to be known later on as Sardars, rather than Princes.

As for the jahagirdars of second type, i.e. those in the hills of Satpuda and in Baglana who held their jahagirs by an ancient claim, Briggs considered their conciliation as of great importance since they possess considerable influence

over the Bheels and colies. ' [240] Briggs had received their agents in April, and had promised them favourable treatment if they aided the British Authority in pacifying Khandesh.[241] He spoke very enthusiastically about the Koli raja of Peint in Baglana who cooperated with the British in fighting the Peshwa forces. [242]

The Raja of Peint (called Peth in Marathi) had his possession in the vicinity of Trimbak. Dalput III the reigning raja, had ninty-nine villages in the Konkan hills (Sahyadri) ' by virtue of a sunnad granted to him by Mohamad Shah of Dehly ', [243] and one of the conditions of the grant was 'his keeping in subjection the colees and Bheels in his vicinity.' These villages were very small ' some consisting of not more than five or six houses. ' His estates were never resumed by Bajirao. The Raja joined the British on their entering the Bagalan area, and continued to give proof of his good intentions and friendly disposition. [244] ' ... It .. appeared politic to waive Government's right with a view to secure the chief's assistance in maintaining tranquillity in his hilly country , the Honorable Mountstuart Elphinstone confirmed the restoration of the principality to the said chief.' [245]

The Raja of Abhoona and the Rana of Boodawal, were 'the ancient servants of the house of Timoor ' who ' within the few last years ' had ' been deprived of their petty jageers by the rapaciousness of Baji Row's Ministers..... ' [246]

Raja Chutter Singh Thoky, the Jahageerdar of Abhoona, claimed his jahagir since the days of Aurangzeb. Though his sanad was lost, his claims were corroborated by the zamindars in the area. Chutter Singh, the incumbent Raja during the government of the last Peshwa alternately lost and regained his saranjamy lands, ' but his personal jageer was not resumed till about 6 years ago, when Trimbuckjee Daingla sent a Mamlutdar for that purpose. ' The Raja retired to the hills among the Kolis, and harassed the mamlatdar to such an extent, that the mamlatdar agreed to restore the jahagirs to him on the condition of the Raja's paying 1/3rd of the revenue to the government. When the British forces came in Baglana, the Raja joined them, and Briggs promised him his jahagir. ' There have been no attacks of Bheels in that quarter since we entered the country, and I ascribe it principally to the good deposition of Chutter Singh ' to the British Govt. His possessions were confirmed by the Government. [247]

Rana Chunder Sing of Boodawal in the Sultanpur Pargana, was a petty jahagirdar, who made his submission to Briggs fairly early. ' The Rajah of Boodawul has lately been plun-dered by a party of Guykwar troops, and altho' he has been reduced to poverty, yet he has never lost his rastes ....' Briggs considered him as an extremely useful instrument in his settlement with the Bhils. He granted him a pension of Rs.2000/- per year besides his jahagir and believed that by

this arrangement ' which is altogether just to them and advantageous to the British Government ', he had secured the tranquility of the area. [248] The Raja's estate consisted of 32 villages 15 of which were deserted. [249]

Among the hill jahagirdars, the most important and influential was the Rana of Ranipura. The estate of the family consisted of a hundred villages yielding a gross revenue of Rs. 15,000/- in a prosperous year. Most of the inhabitants were Bhils. When the war broke out in 1817, Anand Singh , a lad of 16 years old, raised some money and fought the Peshwa forces. Under the early months of the British administration, he became a rallying point for the disaffected throughout Khandesh. Instead of pensioning him off, in view of the influence that he weilded over the Bhils, Briggs advanced him a loan of Rs.10,000/- which was to be repaid in six years, and for the better administration of the jahagir, he induced Bhikaji Pant, the diwan of Kadambande, to undertake the management of the Ranas affair .[250] However, the scheme fell through. Kuwar Bai to whom the estate originally belonged was 'an infirm old woman of 70 years of age and is in her second childhood. Dhulul Singh, her brother is old and his intellect originally weak has now approached to idiocy. Annund Singh, his son now 20 years of age, might , from his youth, be expected to manage the affairs of this little government, but from natural imbecility of intellect combined with the life he had led, he is totally incapacitated' .[251] Briggs felt that there were

only two ways open to the British : either the whole jahagir be occupied by the British and the family pensioned off, or the Dharangaon ghat and the fort of Akurnny be occupied by the British and the area north of Hills be given to the Ranipura family along with some pension.[252] This was agreed upon and the Rana handed over the forts of Dharangaon and Akurni to the British. [253]

The settlement with the Jahagirdars was a minor issue in the revenue settlement of Khandesh. But it acquired major importance when connected with the Bhil settlement. Briggs's indulgence towards the hill jahagirdars was motivated partly by his genuine respect for the traditions of the people and in more important part, by political and administrative expediency.

IV

On the 10th of July 1818, Elphinstone instructed all his collectors by a circular letter that they were to use panchayats as the basic court of justice and that the panchayats were to be exempted ' from all new forms of interference and regulation ' on the part of the British authorities. [254] This instruction was not just a part of his general dictum of 'no innovations, ' but formed a part of Elphinstone's belief that the judicial system of the Marathas required very little, if any, reform. It was a system in which ' the innocent might sometimes suffer, but the guilty could scarcely ever escape'.[255]

Even his successor, Chaplin admitted the worth of the traditional system, when he asked his collectors the question uppermost in his mind, ' If there was no resource for a poor man against a powerful man, what prevents the utmost oppression such as was certainly not exercised in this country ?' [256]

Under the Maratha system, justice was despensed at three levels, viz. the Centre, the Paragana and the village. Except perhaps at the centre, the judicial business was carried out by a group of people collectively. This group was called by various names at various points in history. Majlis, gotasabha, Brahmasabha, Panchayat etc. [257] This was an indigenous popular system of justice sanctified by tradition and usage. The most remarkable feature of this system was that it provided cheap and undelayed justice in conformity with the law of the land and its local variations. Like all the medieval judicial systems, the Maratha system also combined the executive and judicial authorities together, yet with a remarkable difference. The executive officer who presided over the judicial tribunals was aided and restricted by his non-executive colleagues on the tribunal. The political authorities interferred very rarely in the judicial business of the tribunals, and then only if there was a miscarriage of justice. During the Peshwa period, the Panchayat became the most accepted form of transacting judicial business, though there seems to have had very little substantial difference between the old majlis and the Panchayat.[258] This independent

character of the judicial system, suited the English rulers immensely as it was bound to bring less friction between the rulers and the ruled. Besides, as Briggs commented, it ensured ' a public and fair trial '.[259]

Instead of trying to create new judicial machinery, Elphinstone wanted to use the Panchayats. Accordingly, he instructed his collectors to use the Panchayats to transact judicial business in their collectorates.[260] The composition of the Panchayats was based upon a tradition of having odd numbers of members, generally five, but it could be three, seven and in some cases as large as nine.[261]

As Prof. Ballhatchet rightly concludes, ' in these instructions, Elphinstone was referring to civil cases' rather than criminal cases to be tried by the Panchayats, 'although he did not specifically say so'.[262] In April 1818, he had already issued instructions for the trials of criminal cases. ' No express provision being made in any instructions for the trial of capital offences, I beg you to proceed in them as in other criminal cases, and forward the proceedings with your decision to one previous to carrying the sentence into effect.' Trial by Court Martial was discontinued , and all 'acts of rebellion and plunder ' were henceforth to be ' cognizable by the civil authority'.[263] It is clear that by civil authority, Elphinstone meant the collector and the mode of trial that he probably intended was the same as the court martial carried out by the civil authority. He did not refer to the

use of panchayat mode in these trials. However, in a letter of March 1818 he did refer to Panchayats for criminal trials as well.[264] But here also, he was rather ambiguous stating that the panchayats could be used by Briggs's subordinates in cases which were ' not of sufficient importance to be re--ferred to you.'[265] This seems to have been more a vote of no confidence in the individual capacity of the native subordinates, rather than a wholesale sanction for the trial by Panchayats.

Briggs who did not fight shy of confessing his difference in matters judicial where he had ' no experience or expertise ',[266] 'misapprehended ' Elphinstone's instructions regarding the criminal trials. He thought that he was to try both the civil and criminal cases through Panchayats.[267] He therefore, unwittingly began the experiment of trying criminal cases by Panchayats. He, however, found the experiment - successful and rewarding. ' I am, however, of the opinion that the mode I recommended (criminal justice through Panchayats) has great advantages and except in any very popular crimes, is not likely to inconvenience (the government)' . The members of criminal panchayat perhaps might not aid the judge much in investigation, ' but they will essentially assist in all points of local information, idom of expression in the evidence, and in explaining customs and habits of cast (Sic) with which the judge may not be fully acquainted ..... '[268]

In fact, therefore, what Briggs was doing was not criminal trial by Panchayat at all. The panchs were not the judges themselves but assistance to the judge. This was contrary to the spirit and tradition of the Panchayats which, as noted above, were bodies or tribunals that handed down decisions and not opinions or advice. This mode, according to Briggs had an additional advantage of leading to ' the courts of justice being crowded with auditors and the investigation and sentence being more impressive and notorious.' [269] The justice that would be handed down by this court would be British justice and not Indian. ' The more our mode of justice is understood, the deeper will be the impression of its inflexibility and rigour and this is as likely to deter criminals as to render our rule popular.' [270] It is, therefore, obvious that Briggs was implementing British justice through a system mistakenly called the criminal panchayat. Briggs felt that the Hindu law was ' very linient ' and believed that a little more rigour must be put into it. [271] In fact, the conditions then prevailing in Khandesh made it expedient that the criminal justice should be swift and 'impressive and notorious.' 'In all criminal cases, the court ought to be superintended by an European officer....' [272] A few days later Briggs clarified his ideas further. 'With regard to criminal trials generally, I beg to suggest that a Panchayat or Jury should be impanelled to decide the question of the guilt of the prisoner as in England....' [273] Though he had misunderstood the intentions

of the Commissioner in so far as he believed ' that it was your intention that Punchayets like a military court should not only have the finding of the verdict, but allot the portion of punishment in the sentence also .... ' [274] he quickly retracted his steps and took the award of sentence away from the Panchayats in criminal matters. He required the Panchayat , however, for determining the guilt of the accused. In the absence of any written criminal code, he had to fall back upon the law of the land , and the Panchayats could and did help him in ascertaining the traditional law.[275] Elphinstone did not object to the particular mode of criminal justice instituted by Briggs in Khandesh. This was most probably done not out of any spirit of chivalry or oversight,but mainly because it did not contradict the conditions and intentions of the Commissioner. In the garb of a traditional panchayat system it retained the essence of executive control.

The mode of criminal trials by panchayat was approved and was subsequently adopted. [276] The panchs were normally impanelled by swearing them.[277] A Hindu Shastri and a Muslim Kazi were always present to swear in the panel as well as the witnesses. The Kazi of Dhule was first called in to swear in the witnesses. But Briggs subsequently found that the Kazi could neither read nor write. Since the cases did not, hitherto, require any exposition of the religious law , Briggs continued with him till he could get a better one from either Barhanpurkar or Aurangabad.[278] His Hindu Shastri had

only one book and had a propensity to keep on speaking and and introducing matters that had no bearing on the decision.[279] As for the members of the Panchayat itself, Briggs thought that they felt 'very little, if any, interest in this duty. They only consider the inconvenience they are individually put to by being called on to superintend the trials and as they derive no direct advantage from it, they are slow and careless in their attendance.' And yet Briggs considered that trial by Panchayat was 'being everyday more popular.'[280]

Briggs was deeply impressed by the efficacy of the Panchayats. He claimed that ' ... no delay is occassioned as several Punchayets sit at one time in the same town in proportion to the number of complaints...' [281] The justice imparted was fair and impartial and the contending parties 'invariably admitted the justice of the decision. ' [282]

All civil suits were invariably settled through Panchayats. But their proceedings were by and large tardy and slow. This one common peculiarity of the Panchayat was found vexatious by other collectors as well. Capt. Grant from Satara bitterly complained about the slowness of the Panchayat proceedings ' ... they sit day after day and keep taking kusa, kusa, but no decision.' [283] But besides the slowness, Briggs realized that there were motivated causes for delays in civil suits. He found that the Panchayats sitting for the sake of litigated property were put to a great deal of distress and inconvenience.

' ... I find in almost every instance where the zamindars are concerned that the parties whose claims are disputable endeavour to protract the business by all kind of artifices and not unfrequently when the cause would otherwise be decided refer to papers or persons at a distance .....'[284] He suggested that no litigation involving pecuniary claims be admitted 'till the parties can find security for paying the expenses of those persons they call on and the Panchayat themselves...'[285]

The judicial business was perhaps the only decentralised part of the early British administration in Maharashtra. At the village level, the petty disputes regarding property were to be settled by the Mamlatdars through Panchayats. Briggs laid down elaborate procedural rules for assembling Panchayats and also for their conduct. All disputes other than criminal or treasonable acts, were to be settled by Panchayats ' in which Mamlutdars ought not to interfere, but only to confirm the decision. ' The composition and procedure of the Panchayats was to be as follows : The Panchayat was to consist of five members, each party to the dispute selecting two members each, while one member to be nominated by the Patil or ' the chief civil authority. ' The parties then were to agree to abide by the decision of the Panchayat before the proceedings began. In the absence of such a pre-commencement agreement , the entire proceedings were to be void. The Panchayats were to be invariably held in some public place, ' where the

inhabitants can all have access to hear it. ' The cause of dispute or complaint should be written on one side of a paper and the award or sentence on the other with the names of the persons forming the Punchayet affixed, stating on whose part each are selected, and this paper to be countersigned and sealed by the Mamlatdar. ' Mamlatdars were to prepare three copies of this document, sending one to the government, handing over another to the plantiff, and keeping the third one with himself, ' So that if the parties are not satisfied, the Surcar may be enabled to act according to circumstances when they come to appeal. '[286]

The Mamlatdar had original jurisdiction in matters which may be termed as small causes. His jurisdiction extended to imposing fines of Rs. 2/- or 3/- and in case of accused of lower classes, even a personal confinement upto two days, ' but he is not allowed to levy higher fines or to inflict corporal punishment on any account. ' If the crime was of a nature demanding heavier punishment, the mamlatdar was to bound the case over to the collector. Persons guilty of house breaking , felony, homicide and other serious crimes were to be apprehended and sent to the Collector, ' with a deposition taken at the moment in writing and to be accompanied by witnesses. '[287]

The procedure of criminal courts was described in details by Briggs in a letter to Sir John Malcolm. Whenever any crime

was committed anywhere in Khandesh, the nearest civil authority was notified. On receiving the information , the civil authority proceeded with the informant to ascertain the truth, ' either by taking the depositions of the parties, or if a murder has been committed by going to the spot and acting according to the circumstances. ' If the criminal was not secured, all the particulars about him were collected for notification to other civil authorities for apprehending him. All the information about the crime, viz. the nature, place, time, the informant, the witnesses was then forwarded to the collector, along with the parties. As soon as the parties arrived, a panchayat was assembled by orders of the collector. The Shastree, the Kazi and the clerk who recorded the proceedings, sat on one side of the Bench, while the Panchayat members sat on the other. ' This court is formed according to no particular law and bound by no particular form, its object being merely to ascertain the truth. ' Though the English maxim that a prisoner cannot be asked to criminate himself, was not respected, the prisoner had a right to challenge the witnesses. If the evidence was only collateral the prisoner was cross-questioned and examined. If more than one accused were involved, each one was separately examined before the court. Each accused was asked if he consented to be tried by the court. No preliminary deposition was brought in as an evidence of the guilt, 'unless the party is unable to be produced, when it is admitted, and receives its due weight only. ' All witnesses were examined

on oath. The prisoner or the accused was given an opportunity to plead in his defence. After listening to the accused and the witnesses, the panchayat proceeded to pronounce its verdict of guilty or not guilty. The law officers of the court, i.e. the Shastri and the Mufti or Kazi, then pronounced the law pertaining to the particular crime. The law was entered on the face of the proceedings. The Civil Authority or the judge, then passed the sentence. When the judge dissented from the panchayat or the law officers, he entered his reasons on the same page on which the law was entered. ' The law officers in this court, therefore, ... are not the judges; they are the expounders of the law. The judgement is solely vested in the European officer sitting as judge.' The award given by the Shastri or the Mufti was generally accepted, ' unless the punishment should be at variance with our customs.' The name of the book from whence the land was taken was invariably recorded. The proceedings then were forwarded to the Commissioner for his confirmation. After the confirmation, the sentence was executed. [288]

It is evident from the above that Briggs had not passed the original jurisdiction in criminal matters to the Panchayat, though he was fully conscious that this mode of trial was at variance with the instructions of the Commissioner. [289] However, the practice was in keeping with the traditional form of criminal justice as was practiced during the times of Ramshastri Prabhune, the chief Shastri under the Peshwas. ' This famous Shastri

could not decide the suits by himself, he heard them by appointing Panchayats.' [290] His court handed down a Saramsha or the decision of the Panchayat which was not a judgement . The judgement was or the Nivadapatra was issued by the Peshwa's secretariat on the basis of the Saramsha.[291] In fact, therefore, Briggs did something more than follow the no-innovation policy of Elphinstone; he revived the traditional judicial system with a definite Western ideological bias.

In a bid to decentralize the judicial business, Briggs suggested to the Commissioner that the subordinate officers should be allowed to settle small matters through Panchayats.[292] The reference here seems to have been to the criminal justice rather than to the civil, since the subordinate officers were already granted a right to assemble Panchayats for civil disputes.[293] The specific reference to the Patils 'in their magesterial capacity ' being allowed to settle all village disputes ' in which property was not involved ' by Panchayats, makes it clear that Briggs had criminal justice in mind.[294] Briggs's suggestion got a very lukewarm reception in Poona. His another suggestion that a fee be charged on all appeals, ' in order to check the propensity to litigation among the lower orders ' [295] was also not well-received by the Commissioner, who turned it down, saying '... but as yet, I cannot sanction the imposition of fees .... ' [296]

Even though he claimed that the Hindu law was rather lenient and needed strengthening, Briggs's own justice could

not be considered as particularly very harsh. Mitigating circumstances and traditions were normally taken into account. To illustrate, one particular case may be referred to. In the village of Wagheri in the pargana of Thalner, one Abdulla Arab was killed. Briggs ordered Bhikaji Jamadar of Kopril to investigate. The depositions of the people claimed that the said arab was very licentious and a great womenizer and in consequence of his attempt to rape a woman, the Patil's sibandee wanted to disarm him and that in the scuffle that followed the arab was killed. Bhikaji Jamadar reported that the Patil had died sometime ago, and the sibandee took its order from the Patil's widow. It was suspected that the widow had planned and ordered the murder. Briggs felt that a proper trial was necessary.[297] Elphinstone ordered that should a trial for murder be necessary, it should be done in the presence of Briggs.[298] Accordingly, a panchayat was assembled to decide upon the case. The panchayat found Girjabai, the widow guilty of planning the murder of Abdulla, but while referring the case to the Collector, pleaded for mercy since the murder was an execution of a socially degenerate - person. It was confirmed that Abdulla's character called for no sympathy. Briggs accepted the plea and sentenced Girijabai to two years imprisonment, pleading to the Commissioner that this punishment should meet the demands of the letters of the law.[299] At the same time, he notified to the people why Girijabai was given so light a punishment, and warned all people

including the jahagirdars, Patils and others against putting any one to death without the express orders of the Government.[300] However, where mitigating circumstances did not exist , the penalty for murder was death. An accomplice to murder, even if no charges of manslaughter could be proved against him, was not acquitted. One Futeh Singh against whom charges of murder could not proved, yet his presence at the place and time of murder was proved, was fined Rs. three hundred and condemned to imprisonment for eighteen months.[301] For robbery two persons were sentenced to seven years of rigorous imprisonment, while Fredrick, Briggs's personal servant was sentenced to one year's hard labour for stealing two gold mohurs from Briggs.[302] The officers of the government against whom complaints of eppression were made , were given a fair trial. Gulab Rai, the intelligence munshi of Maj. Jardine was charged with beating the people. The panchayat ~~was charged~~ found him not guilty and acquitted him;[303] while Wasul Khan, the Duffadar of Shibandi under Lt. Mackintosh, who oppressed the people by exploiting their ignorance, was put in irons.[304]

The civil disputes varied from land disputes to problems involving marriage and its annulment. In civil cases, the opinion of the panchayat was normally adhered to. These cases involved the law of land and the community, and the government had no desire to interfere with either. Briggs did not always preside over these panchayats, nor were other European officers necessarily present.[305] But every decision taken by these

panchayats had to be approved by the civil authority.[306] The decisions were based upon tradition and were more in the nature of settlements, than judgements.[307]

The business of judicial administration was a time consuming one. It took about one fourth of Briggs's time. He pleaded that the proceedings should take place once in a quarter.[308] Even Chaplin agreed that the collectors did not have enough time to supervise the judicial business.[309] Briggs plodded through the work, every month sending to the Commissioner what he described as his judicial returns.

There is no doubt, however, that the judicial business carried out in Khandesh was small as compared with the other collectorates. During the three years between 1819 to 1822, in Khandesh a total number of 302 cases were decided by the various courts, with an average of 100 cases per year and about 8 cases per month. As against this, in Ahmednagar - collectorate during the same period 2285 cases were tried with an average of 761 cases per year and 63 cases per month.

The smallness of judicial business in Khandesh was to bring about the ridicule of Strachey. ' Is Candeish heaven, are there no injuries ? This looks bad. There are men in Candeish and there is power. '[310] There is no doubt that there was something wrong with the judiciary in Khandesh. Either people did not come to get justice from the government, or they

were summarily disposed of by the subordinate officers without reference to the government. Throughout this period, Khandesh was in troubled state. With the Bhil operations still continuing, majority of the crimes were usually laid at the doors of the Bhils. Crimes often happened ' and they have been usually ascribed to the Bheels under cover of whose uniquities, private revenge is, I fear, too frequently indulged. ' [311] Unsolved crime was large in Khandesh. Very often local people did not report the crime at all. The fear of the Bhils or other maurders taking revenge was much more real than imaginary. In the case of two Bhils who were tried by the Panchayat for highway robbery , the Bhils threatened the Panchas with dire consequences, if the accused were not released forthwith.[312] The crimes committed by the Bhils hardly ever came before the courts, since during the operations against Bhils in the years 1819 and 1820, most of the Bhils were summarily dealt with.

Engaged in the pacification of the country, Briggs seems to have relied rather heavily upon his subordinates, both English and Indian, for civilian support. However, his principal English subordinate, Lt. Hodges, committed a number of 'enormities ', as Elphinstone himself admitted. [313] His native subordinates carried on corruption on the sly thereby deterring the people from approaching them. [314] Besides this, it is probable that the unsettled condition of Khandesh accompanied by devastating epidemics, to some extent accounted for the smallness of judicial business. During the year July 1818

to July 1819, total deaths due to cholera morbus were 11521.[315] In Dhule alone, 150 of the Patils who had come for jammabandi died of cholera. Towns like Baijawad and Satana were deserted.[316] Under these circumstances, the smallness of the judicial business was not wholly unexpected. Yet, it was undoubtedly too small and did raise questions about the administrative competence of Captain Briggs.

Briggs believed that his administrative establishment was fairly reliable. He had tried to make it as unoppressive as he could. He instructed his mamlatdars not to take ration (shidha) or free labour (Begari) from the people without payment. [317] But his confidence was shattered when he received complaints about the use of the practice of Begari. All people practiced it in spite of strict instructions to the contrary . He reissued a proclamation prohibiting this sort of oppression.[318] However, in his supreme 'self-confidence ' of which Elphinstone was to accuse him, [319] Briggs also tended to ignore complaints against his subordinates. On 17th June 1819, Elphinstone forwarded to Briggs an anonymous letter, complaining about the native subordinates of Briggs. The letter referred to five specific charges viz:

1) The mamlatdars and others enroll their private servants in the shibandi.

2) They pay the shibandi only Rs.5/- per month.

3) Briggs consults Apparao, his Duffadar, in matters where Apparao himself is involved.

4) The mamlatdars trade.

5) The people who made money during the Peshwa period, still continue to do so and in the same manner. Answering these charges, Briggs pointed out that no specific charges were preferred and therefore it was difficult to investigate. As for the first charge, he agreed that it was possible that some mamlatdars might have employed their own servants in the shibandi, but it was difficult for him to know who the private servants were. The official pay of the shibandi being Rs. 5/- per month, the second charge did not amount to any malpractice. The third charge was meaningless since, Apparao had to be consulted in any matters relating to establishment. His advice of course, was not binding. Briggs cited cases of two mamlatdars who were diminished for misappropriating the pay of shibandis. If the mamlatdars trade, which according to Briggs, was not impossible, ' they do it at the risk of losing their situation when discovered.' The last was ' so general a charge that it cannot be replied to otherwise than that I have had no complaints of this nature.' [320]

Till the arrival of Laxmanrao from the Madras presidency, the principal native officer under Briggs in Khandesh was - Appajirao. Appaji Krishna Rao, was a native of Arcot. He was trained in the revenue administration by Major Graham. He was employed later on by Col. Close at the Poona Residency. For a few years prior to his joining Briggs, he was serving Col. Close in Hindustan. Briggs appointed him his principal duffardar.[321]

Briggs entertained a very high opinion of Appajirao. ' I am very highly indebted for his zeal, fidelity and honesty in all his proceedings from the moment I entered on the duties of my present appointment.' Briggs recommended that Appajirao's services be rewarded by a grant of a village or two yielding annually a sum of Rs.3000/-.[322] In August 1819, Laxmanrao reached Khandesh. He already had great experience under Munro who considered him ' very timid, and a great believer in plots,' though clever and efficient. [323] Laxmanrao's salary was Rs.500 p.m. Briggs requested that his old duffardar Appaji also be paid the same salary. [324] Elphinstone , however, refused arguing that Laxmanrao was getting Rs.500/- while serving Col. Munro. [325]

The complacency of the Collector, however, was to receive a rude shock within a short time of the arrival of Laxmanrao. In October 1818, Laxmanrao unearthed a fraud committed by Briggs's Huzur catchery servants. On investigating, Briggs found that the mamlatdar of Malegaon paragana, Raghupant rao along with Bapu Kulkarni of Malegaon and Sangmeshwar and Vankoba Deshpande of Nimbayat, had practiced a fraud on the government. These district officers raised extra levy for personal use and also defrauded the government. [326] Raghupant mamlatdar was dismissed from the office. Haripant Shirastedar and Jagoopant Kotwal were also dismissed. All the three officers were to refund the amount illegally collected to the government. Haripant, however, was to pay double the amount he had received. Bapu Kulkarni and Vankoba Deshpande were deprived of their office,

had to refund the money unlawfully gained, and were exiled from their villages for a period of one year.[327] Laxmanrao himself was found guilty of malpractices and was dismissed.[328] But the Huzur catchery was full of corrupt officials. Soon it was found that everyone, including Appajirao was corrupt, and a total overhaul of the establishment, was undertaken.[329] Chaplin was convinced that the Bhil disturbances and the corrupt administration were a vicious circle, and that something needed to be done.[330]

At this juncture, Briggs came under a heavy cloud, particularly in relation to his execution of Chil Naik Bheel. The Court of Directors felt the action to be unwarranted and severe and wanted to remove Briggs from the civilian service altogether and send him back to army. The Board of Control, however, - intervened and kept him in service pending a thorough inquiry into the Chil Naik case. Briggs was removed from Khandesh and appointed as the Resident at Satara.[331] He was exonorated by the authorities, and even Chaplin came to realize the difficulties that Briggs had to face in Khandesh. Briggs's successor, Col. Archibald Robertson continued Briggs's policy towards the Bhils.[332] Briggs, the man in the dock, however, was supremely self-confident. Khandesh was improving, though 'still in a wretched state of poverty ' and the people, were happy and contended ' 'as far as is consistant ' with the wretchedness of the country. Briggs believed that the people were sorry to lose him. [333]

Notes to the Chapter IV

1. JB to Hodges, 14-5-1918, DCF 171.
2. See Ballhatchet, op.cit. pp.104 ff.
3. Report of the U.P.Zamindari Abolition Committee, quoted by Gupta S.C. Agrarian Relations and Early British Rule in India, (Bombay 1963) p. 2
4. Baden Powell B.H., A short account of the Land Revenue and its Administration in British India; with a sketch of the land tenures, Oxford, 1913.
5. G.G.Hastings to ME, 13-5-1820, MSS EUR F88 Box 7 E Vol.8, Letter No.18.
6. Ibid.
7. Hastings to ME, 20-7-1819, MSS EUR F 88, Box 7E, Volume 7, Letter No.10.
8. Dutt R.C. The Economic History of India under Early British Rule, London, 1950, (new edition),p.269.
9. Quoted by Mukherjee R., The Rise and Fall of the East India Company, Bombay, 1973, p.401.
10. ME to Pottinger, Circular letter, 22-4-1818, DCF 402.
11. Ibid.
12. Elphinstone, Report, pp.20-38 passim.
13. Chaplin W. Report Exhibiting Fiscal and Judicial Administration, introduced into the Conquered Territories above the Ghauts, under the Authority of the Commissioner in the Dekhan, (Bombay,1824) et. passim.

14. Briggs J., Land Tax in India, London, 1830, pp.2-5.
15. Grant Duff to ME, 17-8-1819, quoted in the Appendix to Elphinstone, Report.
16. Chaplin, W. Loc. cit.
17. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.
18. also 'Proclamation'. PRC 13, pp.299-302
    ME to Collectors Circular, 10-7-1818, DCF 402.
19. Ibid.
20. SPD 41, L.No.160, जिंग्रजाकडील चटेकरी अेक व जासूद अेक गावगन्ना चिट्या घेऊन फिरतात मेट वगैरे सिधे खर्च पाच साहा रुपयेपर्यन्त दरगावी घेऊन गावकर यास पुसतात की गांवची लावणी व पडीक किती व गावात घरे किती व माणसे किती व गुरे व मेढरे किती हे लेहून देणे म्हणून अुपद्रव आहे.
21. ME to Collectors, Circular, 10.7.1818, DCF 402.
22. G.G. to ME, 14.7.1818, PRC 13, L.No.141
23. E.I.Papers, Vol.4, p.636.
24. JB to Pottinger, 31.5.1819, DCF 176.
25. JB to ME, 7.10.1819, DCF 177.
26. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.
27. Ibid.
28. Gazeetter of Bombay Presidency, (Bombay 1880), p.16
29. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.
30. ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. JB to ME, 1.3.1818, DCF 170.
33. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.
34. Ibid.

35. JB to ME, 1.7.1818, MSS EUR F 88 Box 6 D, Vol. I

36. JB to ME, 27.9.1818, MSS EUR F 88, Box 6 D, Vol.I

37. Ibid.

38. Maharashtra State Gazetteer, Dhulia District, (Bombay, 1974), p.29.

39. Chaplin's Report of August, 1822, quoted in Ibid.

40. JB to ME, 7 and 9 July 1819, MSS EUR F 88, Box 6 D Vol. I.

41. E.I.Papers, Vol. 4, p.686.

42. JB to ME, 9.10.1819, DCF 177.

43. Ibid.

44. E.I.Papers, Vol.4, p.686.

45. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. JB to ME, 9.10.1819. DCF 177.

49. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.

50. Briggs, quoted in E.I.Papers, Vol.4, pp.699-700.

51. Briggs, quoted by Chaplin, E.I.Papers, Vol.4, p.328.

52. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174,

53. Ibid.

54. JB to ME, 9.10.1819, DCF 177.

55. JB to Chaplin, 30.12.1822, E.I.Papers, Vol.4, pp. 714-715.

56. JB to ME, 21.10.1818, DCF 173,

57. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.

58. JB to ME, 9.10.1819. DCF 177.

59. E.I.Papers, Vol.4, p.700 ff.

60. Ibid.

61. ME to Robertson and Collectors, Circular, 14.7.1818, DCF & 402.

62. E.I.Papers, *lop.cit.*

63. JB to ME, 9.10.1818, DCF 177.

64. E.I.Papers, *lop.cit.*

65. Ibid.

66. JB to ME, 9.10.1818, DCF 177.

67. E.I.Papers, *lop.cit.*

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. JB to ME, 9.10.1818, DCF 177.

72. Ibid.

73. E.I.Papers, op.cit. p.700 ff

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.

79. JB to ME, 9.10.1818, DCF 177.

80. JB to ME, 9.10.1819, DCF 177.

81. Ibid.

82. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174,

83. E.I.Papers, Vol.4, p.636 ff.

84. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.

85. JB to ME, 9-10-1819, DCF 177.

86. Ibid.

87. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.

88. Ibid.

89. E.I.Papers, op.cit. p.636 ff

90. JB to ME, 22.6.1819, DCF 176.

91. Ibid.

92. JB to ME, 9.10.1819. DCF 177.

93. Ibid.

94. JB to ME, 22.6.1819, DCF 176.

95. Ibid.

96. Briggs cited in E.I.Papers, Vol.4, p.694

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid. p.695.

99. JB to ME, 9.10.1819, DCF 177.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

102. Briggs in E.I.Papers, Vol.4, p.695.

103. ME to Collectors, 9.7.1818, DCF 402,

104. JB to ME, 12.7.1818, MSS EUR F 88, Box 6 D. Vol.I

105. Regulations for the Conduct of Amildars in Candeish, n.d. DCF 170, (Probably March, 1818).

106. JB to ME, 23-6-1819, DCF 176.

107. Ibid.

108. JB to ME, 13.7.1818, DCF 171.

109. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.

110. JB to Hodges, 14.5.1818, DCF 171.

111. JB to ME, 13-7-1818, DCF 171.

112. Molesworth, J.T., A dictionary Marathi and English (Reprint, Poona, 1975,) p.456, The entry is under Nangarbandi also called Autbandi.

113. Called Kasbandi in Konkan, see Molesworth, op.cit.

114. JB to ME, 23.6.1819. DCF 176.

115. Ibid.

116. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.

117. Briggs in E.I.Papers, Vol4, pp.693-694.

118. JB to ME, 23.6.1819, DCF 176.

119. Ibid.

120. JB to Chaplin, 30.12.1821, DCF 187.

121. Ibid.

122. JB to ME, 23-6-1819, DCF 176.

123. JB to ME, 2.8.1818, DCF 172.

124. JB to MEm, 23-6-1819, DCF 176.

125. Briggs to all mamlatdars, Circular 3.10.1818, DCF 172.

126. Ibid.

127. JB to ME, 23.6.1819, DCF 176.

128. Ibid.

129. ME to Robertson, Circular, 14.7.1818, DCF 402.

130. JB to ME, 23.6.1819, DCF 176.

131. JB to Mamlatdars, 3.10.1818, DCF 172.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid.

134. Deed of agreement, ... for the Fassalle year 1228, 23.6.1819, DCF 176.

135. JB to ME, 9.10.1819, DCF 177.

136. Ibid.

137. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.

138. JB to ME, 23.6.1819, DCF 176.

139. Ibid.

140. Briggs translates this term as temporary Kowl. But that does not seem to be the correct description. Heen literally means of lower quality, inferior and

in matters of rent it is opposed to Sasate or full rent. See Molesworth, op.cit. also Wilson, Glossory of Revenue and Judicial Terms.

141. JB to ME, 23.6.1819, DCF 176.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid.

144. JB to Chaplin, 30.12.1821, DCF 187.

145. Briggs cited in E.I.Papers, Vol4, pp.691-693.

146. They actually were, see Briggs's Report of 18th Dec. 1822 in DCF 188.

147. 'The poverty of the people prevents their using more than one pair of Bullocks on the plough .....' JB to ME, 9.10.1819, DCF 177, and earlier he says that 'for most part a plough and one pair of Bullocks are the property of two or even three individuals .... Ibid.

148. @ ₨.50 per worker per year, see Briggs to Chaplin, 31.12.1821, DCF 188.

149. This was the rate that Briggs had approved for all loans (JB to ME, 21.10.1818, DCF 173).

150. JB to Chaplin, 18.12.1822, DCF 188.

151. Chaplin to Briggs, 3.1.1822, DCF 415.

152. JB to WC, 18.12.1822, DCF 188.

153, Chaplin to Briggs, 3.1.1822, DCF 415.

154. Ibid.

155. Selection from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XCIII, (New Series), (Bombay, 1865), S.Mansfield to Rev. Com. p.203.

156. Chaplin to Briggs, 22.1.1822, DCF 417.

157. Ibid.

158. Mansfield to Rev. Com. Loc. cit.

159. It is necessary to rememberthat Briggs was engaged in two different surveys : one was revenue survey while the other one was a topographical survey. His efforts and results in topographical survey were lauded at by the Government and the map that he prepared of Khandesh was accepted and published by the Bombay government (Bell E., op.cit. p.82). A copy of this map is available in the Pune Archieves, but is so mutilated and faint, that it is difficult to prepare a photostat copy of the same.

160. WC to JB, 3.1.1822, DCF 415.

161. JB to WC, 6.8.1822, DCF 188.

162. Source : Briggs's Jamabandi Report for fasaly 1229 (1819) in E.I.Papers, Vol.4, p.341. The figures for 1818-19 do not tally with the same forwarded by Briggs to Elphinstone in DCF 176.

163. Ibid.

164. WC to JB, 3.2.1822, DCF 417.

165. JB to WC, 20.5.1822, DCF 190.

166. JB to WC, 6.8.1822, DCF 192.

167. WC to JB, 24.6.1822, DCF 419.

168. though in 1818, Briggs had collected it both in cash and kind. (JB to ME, 23.6.1819, DCF 176).

169. Mansfield to Rev.Com.op.cit. p 203

170. Jamabandi Patrak of Kasba Galna for fasaly 1228, DCF 176, op.cit.

171. Statement of the Revenue of the Pergunna of Coombarry ... n.d. DCF 177.

172. JB to ME, 23.6.1819, DCF 176.

173. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.

174. JB to ME, 23.6.1819, DCF 176.

175. JB to ME, 9.10.1819, DCF 177.

176. JB to ME, 23.6.1819, DCF 176.

177. Gen. Inst. to Mamlatdars, 3.10.1818, DCF 172.

178. JB to ME, 9.10.1819, DCF 177.

179. Jamabandi Patrak for the kasba of Nasserabad, fasaly 1228, n.d. DCF 176.

180. Lt.Hodges to JB, 18.12.1818, DCF 174.

181. JB to ME, 23.6.1819, DCF 176.

182. Ibid.

183. Ibid.

184. ME's marginal notes on Ibid.

185. Gen.Inst. to Mamlatdars, art.s 3 and 4, 3.10.1818, DCF 172.

186. JB to ME, 6.10.1819, DCF 177.

187. JB to Chaplin, in E.I.Papers, Vol.4, p.700.

188. JB to ME, 6.10.1819, DCF 177.

189. E.I.Papers, Vol.4, p.699.

190. JB to Chaplin, 28.10.1819, DCF 178.

191. Chaplin to Briggs, 5.12.1819, DCF 406.

192. JB to Chaplin, 30.12.1822, DCF 188.

193. JB to ME, 15.6.1819, DCF 176.

194. JB to ME, 13.10.1818, DCF 172.

195. ME to Robertson, 27.4.1818, DCF 402.

196. JB to ME, 29.9.1818, DCF 172.

197. ME to JB, 7.10.1818, DCF 403.

198. JB to ME, 26.10.1818, DCF 173.

199. JB to ME, 7.3.1818, DCF 170.

200. JB to ME, 16.6.1818, DCF 171.

201. JB to ME, 10.8.1818, DCF 172.

202. JB to ME, 22.1.1819, DCF 174.

203. Gen. Inst. to Mamlatdars, 3.10.1818, art. 13, DCF 172.

204. JB to ME, 23.6.1819, DCF 176.

205. JB to ME, 22.1.1819, DCF 174.

206. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.

207. Narainrao Mamlatdar to JB, 27.12.1818, DCF 174.

208. JB to ME, 23.6.1819, DCF 176.

209. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.

210. JB to ME, 16.6.1818, DCF 171.

211. JB to ME, 20.6.1818, MSS EUR F 88 Box 6 D Vol.I

212. JB to ME, 22.8.1818, EUR F 88, Box 6 D, Vol.I.

213. ME to JB, 5.7.1819. DCF 403.

214. JB to ME, 22.7.1819, DCF 176.

215. Pandhari Patti was a tax which was levied on shops, particularly in Madras. It is identical to the Mohatarfa tax. See Wilson, Glossary.

216. JB to ME, 25.3.1819, DCF 175. L.No.452, enclosure.

217, JB to ME, 12.8.1818, MSS EUR F 88 Box 6 D,Vol.I.

218. JB to ME, 1.8.1818, DCF 172.

219. JB to ME, 22.12.1818, DCF 174.

220. JB to ME, 20.8.1818, MSS EUR F 88 Box 6 D, Vol.I.

221. JB to ME, 12.8.1818, MSS EUR F 88 Box 6 D, Vol.I.

222. Ibid.

223. Ibid.

224. JB to ME, 13.5.1818, DCF 170.

225. ME to Sir T.Hislop, 28.6.1817, PRC 13,

226. Malcolm to Adams, 31.5.1818, PRC 13, p.367.

227. Malcolm to ME, 5.6.1818, PRC 13, p.367 cited in Gadgil, H.R., Vinchurkar Gharanyacha Itihas, (Poona, 1883) p.199.

228. John Adam to ME, 14.7.1818, PRC 13, p.435.

229. JB to ME, 16.6.1818, DCF 171.

230. JB to ME, 23.6.1818, DCF 171.

231. JB to ME, 27.6.1818, DCF 171.

232. Vithal Narsinha to JB, 1.7.1818, DCF 171.

233. ME, to G.G., 18.6.1818, PRC 13, p.410.

234. Saranjam List Submitted by ME, in 1819, cited by Gadgil, op.cit. p.203.

235. JB to ME, 24.10.1818, DCF 172.

236. Ibid.

237. JB to ME, 1.7.1818, DCF 171.

238. JB to ME, 3.12.1818,DCF 173.

239. JB to ME, 6.1.1819, DCF 174.

240. JB to ME, 13.5.1818,DCF 170.

241. JB to ME, 20.4.1818,DCF 170.

242. JB to ME, 23.4.1818,DCF 170.

243. One of the conditions of the grant was that the ruler shall always be a Muslim. So, the Raja of Peinth normally had a title Dalput Row. The name of the Raja in 1818 was Abdul Momin oorf Luxdeer Dalput Row III.

244. JB to ME, 24.10.1818, DCF 172.

245. Mr. Goldsmith's Report, 1839, in Selections from the Records of Bombay Government, no. xxvi, new seriesmp.95.

246. JB to ME, 20.4.1818, DCF 170

247. JB to ME, 24.10.1818, DCF 172

248. Ibid

249. Monsfield, in Selections, no. xxvi, p.175.

250. JB to ME, 24.10.1818, DCF 172.

251. JB to ME, 17.1.1819, DCF 174

252. Ibid

253. JB to ME, 20.6.1819, DCF 176.

254. ME, to Collectors, 10.7.1818, DCF 402.

255. Report, op. cit. p.55

256. E.I.Papers, Vol. 4, p.249, underscoring mine.

257. See Gune V. T., The Judicial System of the Marathas, (Poona, 1953,) et. passim.

258. Gune V.T., op.cit., pp. 78 ff and 83 ff.

259. JB to ME, 16.1.1819, DCF 174.

260. ME to Collectors, Circular, 10.7.1818, DCF 402.

261. JB to ME, 16.1.1819, DCF 174. It is also necessary to remember that the Panchayats were judicial bodies or tribunals and not an assembly of jurors. The panchs handed out a decision and not an opinion, See Gune op. cit.

262. Ballhatchet, k., op.cit., p. 107.

263. ME to Robertson, 17.4.1818, enclosure to Briggs, 17.4.1818, DCF 402.

264. ME to JB, 11.3.1818, DCF 402.

265. Ibid

266. JB to ME, 16.1.1819, DCF 174

267. E.I.Papers, Vol. 4, p. 906 .

268. JB to ME, 15.11.1818, DCF 173

269. Ibid

270. Ibid

271. JB to ME, 16.1.1819, DCF 174.

272. JB to ME, 19.10.1818, DCF 173.

273. JB to ME, 9.11.1818, DCF 173.

274. Ibid.

275. JB to ME, 15.11.1818, DCF 173

276. JB to ME, 16.1.1819, DCF 174

277. JB to ME, 9.11.1818, DCF 173.

278. JB to ME, 16.1.1819, DCF 174.

279. Ibid.

280. Ibid.

281. JB to ME, 19-10-1818, DCF 173

282. Ibid.

283. Grant to ME, 8.9.1818, MSS EUR/F88 BOX 6 B.

284. JB to ME, 16.1.1819, DCF 174.

285. Ibid.

286. JB to Mamlatdars, 3.10.1818, DCF 183.

287. Ibid.

288. JB to Sir John Malcolm, 17.10.1819, quoted extenso in Bell, op. cit., pp. 83-86 .

289. Ibid.

290. Gune, op. cit. p. 84

291. Ibid.

292. JB to ME, 10.10.1818, DCF 173.

293. See above

294. JB to ME,19.10.1818, DCF 173.

295. Ibid

296. ME to JB, 24.10.1818, DCF 403.

297. JB to ME, 1.10.1818, DCF 172.

298. ME to JB, 6.10.1818, DCF 403.

299. JB to ME, 15.11.1818, DCF 173.

300. Ibid.

301. JB to ME, 16.1.1819, DCF 174.

302. JB to ME, 11.12.1818.

303. JB to ME, 16. 1.1819, DCF 174.

304. JB to Mackintosh, 17.6.1819, DCF 174.

305. JB to Malcolm, 17.10.1819, in Bell, op.cit.,pp.83-86

306. Ibid

307. See appendix Ibid.

308. JB to ME, 16.1.1819, DCF 174.

309. E. I. Papers, Vol.4, p. 339.

310. Strachey to ME, 15.9.1820, quoted by Ballhatchet, K. op.cit. p.220.

311. JB to ME, 8.10.1818, DCF 172.

312. JB to ME, 11.12.1818, DCF 173.

313. Ballhatchet, op.cit., p. 200.

314. For the frauds, see below.

315. JB to ME, 27.7.1819, DCF 176.

316. JB to ME, 15.5.1819, DCF 176.

317. JB to Mamlatdars, 3.10.1818, DCF 172.

318. JB to ME, 1.6.1819, DCF 176.

319. ME to Chaplin, 2.8.1823, cited by Ballhatchet, op. cit., p. 240.

320. JB to ME, 27.6.1819, MSS EUR FBB BOX 6 D, Vol. I.

321. JB to ME, 25.10.1818, DCF 173.

322. JB to ME, 7.12.1818, DCF 173.

323. Ballhatchet, op,cit., p. 93.

324. JB to ME, 4.9.1819, DCF 177.

325. Ibid, marginal notes by ME.

326. JB to ME, 13.10.1819, DCF 177.

327. JB's circular letter to all Mahals, 13.10.1819, DCF 177.

328. Ballhatchet, op.cit., p. 216.

329. Ibid, pp. 216-219.

330. Chaplin to ME, 26.6.1821, DCF 406

331. Ballhatchet, op.cit., p. 220 ff.

332. Ibid.

333. JB to ME, ND (Jan. 23 ?), MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D, Vol. II.

CHAPTER V.

BRIGGS AND PROBLEMS OF INDIA

In November1822, Grand Duff, the first British Resident at Satara relinquished his post.[1] John Briggs was appointed to that office by the Government and took charge of that post in January 1823.[2] The State of Satara was a diplomatic and political myth created by the British government during the Third Anglo-Maratha War. The State of Satara was created as an effective ' counterpoise to the remaining influence of the former Brahmin Government '.[3] Elphinstone had looked upon the creation of the state of Satara as an expedient measure. ' ...(B)y adding a portion of the revenue so sacrificed to that designed for the support of the Rajah, I expected to keep many in our employment, and more in hopes, that would otherwise have remained disaffected and ready to join in every scheme for disturbing the Government or lying waste the country.'[4] Though it was necessary for political reasons to inform the people that they were now the Raja's subjects, Elphinstone, at the same time, was at pains to inform James Grant that ' it will be proper to impress on them as well as on the Raja that it is not intended to revive even in name the Empire of Seevajee '[5] The State was to be semi-dependent for the initial period. ' With respect to the mode of his government, it must long be under the immediate control of a British agent.'[6] The power was

to be transferred to the Raja on the condition of his behaving properly and showing efficiency in the management of the administration.[7] Capt. Grand Duff, the Political Agent was to control the administration till the time when the Raja would be found capable of administering his kingdom on his own. Capt. Grant was a man of exceptional ability and deep sympathy. He not only managed the administration at Satara, but also effectively trained the young Raja in the art of administration. The Raja was told that the final settlement of his government was to 'a great measure be regulated by the disposition he evinces during this period of probation'.[8] By the beginning of 1820, Grant was convinced that the Raja was shaping well, and that a time for transfer of power to Raja was close at hand.[9] By mid 1820, Grant had virtually transferred the judicial business to the Raja. It was finally decided to transfer the power to Raja on 5th April 1822.[10] William Chaplin, the Commissioner, was present at the ceremony of transfer. A new semi-independent princely state had come into existence. Grant had great hopes for the future of the Raja and the State of Satara. ' I have very good hopes of the Raja, I think him a very good little fellow '.[11] After the transfer of power in April, Grant left Satara in Nov.1822.

It was to this office, now devoid of administrative botheration and direct control, that Capt. John Briggs succeeded in January 1823 . ' ... Captain Grand Duff ,

before quitting Satara in 1823, had made over the entire management of public affairs to the Rajah, so that I had little else to do but to make myself acquainted with all that took place , to be always ready to give information and advice to His Highness , but to abstain from interference except when I thought the interest or objects of my own Government required action, while I, of course, reported regularly everything of importance that occurred'. [12] Briggs knew exactly what was expected of him. He was expected to be masterly inactive , more of a check and control on the administration rather than its guiding genius. Captain Grant also had the same opinion. ' There is at Satara a good deal to watch, little to be done and less to be said.' [13] Briggs adopted a cautious tone towards the Raja and his entourage. Chaplin complained to Elphinstone that Briggs was ' getting rather diplomatic addressing notes " to the Durbar " and receiving written answers - ' instead of ' the confidential sort of intercourse ' which Grant had with the Raja. [14] It must, however, be realized that the easy friendship which the Raja had been able to establish with Grant, was due to a combination of opportune circumstances, not likely to repeat again. The Raja, in 1818, had been a virtual prisoner in the hands of his overmighty subject, the Peshwa, when he was freed from that bondage by the British. There is no doubt that he looked upon the British as his liberators. There is no doubt also about the fact that to him the British were

represented by the persons of people like Grant, Elphinstone or Chaplin. His relations with the British were more personality biased than system oriented.[15] The king had felt that Grant's presence in Satara as a Political Agent was a boon. His relations with Grant were easy and friendly. He looked upon Grant as his teacher and mentor. Grant, on his part, had played the role faithfully. By the end of 1821, Grant had started preparing Pratapsingh for a new Resident. He cautioned him that the Raja should be careful of his dealings with the new officer who would eventually come to replace Grant.[16] He also urged the Raja to observe the treaty faithfully so that the new officer would never catch him on the wrong foot.[17] Under such urgings it was not unnatural that Pratapsingh should view the new Resident with considerable amount of misgivings. Briggs on his part, had left Khandesh with a bitter taste in his mouth, and understandably, did not want his fingers to be burnt again. By nature he was an officious person , sometimes a little vain, and always aware of the importance of the office he was holding.[18] Under the circumstances, an easy, friendly relationship was impossible. Yet Briggs was favourably impressed by the Raja. ' The little man is, however, take him all in all a very good fellow '.[19] In 1827 he spoke highly of ' the steadiness with which ' the Raja pursued the system laid down by Grant Duff.[20] Yet, with the passage of time , the Raja had become impatient of restraints. In a

private letter quoted by Ballhatchet, Briggs tells Elphins-
-tone that the Raja ' frequently regrets rather too publicly that there is a Resident here at all, whenever his wishes are checked.' [21]

Like Grant before him Briggs also had an unfortunate occasion of checking the wishes of the Raja in financial matters. The Raja had applied to the government for a loan of two lacks of rupees to pay his establishment dues. Briggs sympathized with the Raja. The application was forwarded to Chaplin. Chaplin was fully aware of the Raja's necessity. But he observed a mystical silence. '... (N)either privately nor (in) his public letters does he hint at the risk of his (Raja's) being refused, particularly as the Raja proposed to repay the sum advanced by instalments here for the monthly pay of the troops in two months...' [22] Such an equivocation on the part of Chaplin was bound to effect Raja's relations with Briggs. Besides such instances, the loud whispers about Briggs's departure from Khandesh had already reached Satara. The apprehensive king refers to Briggs whenever his wishes were not met, as a person who, after having ruined Khandesh, has come to ruin Satara. [23] Despite this, Briggs maintained a good opinion of the Raja. Writing years later, Briggs wrote: ' ... During the time that I remained at Satara, the Rajah, who had been entrusted with full powers strictly abided by Mr. Elphinstone's rules, and would permit no deviations from them ....He was naturally shrewd, free from most of the

ordinary prejudices of his countrymen... He entertained strict notions of justice and mortality and was incapable of telling a direct falsehood ..... '[24]

On the whole, Briggs's tenure at Satara was an uneventful one. Though the climate was good, he had been working rather too hard for past eight to ten years, and that too without a break. His old complaint of headache continued to nag him persistantly. ' ... (H)ow long, I have been a martyr to severe headaches .... ' The pain was becoming ' more frequent ' and ' more obstinate every month.' At Satara the malddy became unbearable . Briggs started seriously considering the advice of his doctor and began to think of going to sea for his health. ' I should not have defended this step so long, but for the untoward conditions of my finances....'[25] Briggs had lately incurred expenses of various kinds. He had sent his family to England and had to pay heavily for the education of his children in England. His whole property consisted of Rs. 60,000/- invested at 5 % and ' the rent of a house in Cheltenham, the mortgage of which will expire for two years, when I may expect 250 £ a year from it while occupied ....' [26] Briggs, now a Major in the army, decided to relinquish his post and take a break in England. Accordingly, he left Satara in December 1826 to go back to England. Raja Pratapsing gave him a diamond ring worth Rs. 500/- and a sword with his name inlaid on the back. 'The sword has a steel handle and is quite plain.'[27]

II

From political point of view, Briggs's tenure at Satara was quite uneventful. Except routine matters, there was nothing that demanded his attention. It was, in a way, an office of leisure, and though there was no difference in the pay of a Collector and the Resident at Satara, Briggs accepted the post as it offered ' a healthier climate and somewhat more of Society to his wife and children, and more leisure to himself ... for study and literary pursuits...'[28] From the point of academic and literary work, Briggs's stay at Satara was perhaps the most eventful. At Satara he completed his famous translation of Ferishta's History of the Rise of Mohammedan Power in India. He also prepared a Persian edition o Ferishta after collating various manuscripts. While at Satara, he also translated the Siyar-ul-Mutakhirin or the Review of the Moderns, by Gulam Hussain. He had embarked upon an ambitious project of writing a history of the Land Tax in India, for which he started collecting material while at Satara. ' (G)reat progress was made in this work before Major Briggs left Satara in December 1826.'[29] More urgently, however, he completed the work for which he was commissioned by Elphinstone and published the 'Letters Addressed to Young Person In India, calculated to Afford Instruction For His Conduct In General And More Especially In His Intercourse with the Natives .'[30]

' LETTERS '

In the absence of any proper knowledge of India and and of the Indian people, there was an increasing tendency among the young arrivals from England into India, to treat the Indians with either contempt or indifference. The older generation of people like Munro, Elphinstone, Malcolm, Briggs, brought up in the romanticist humanistic tradition of the late 18th century and epitomized by Edmund Burke felt that this tendency must not only be checked, but diverted to more humane and sympathetic channels. Elphinstone , probably realizing that of all his subordinates Briggs was the only who was capable of weilding a pen and also of taking a non-personal humanistic view, asked him to write something to this effect. This was a flattering commission. '... In the whole career of my 22 years service, I have hardly ever experienced more pleasure than at the very flattering distinction you have made in my favour to write out the Journal for the young men coming to India...'[31] He was ' quite at a loss ' to speculate what shape it would take, and whether it would be possible to include within its scope ' all which is necessary and only that which is absolutely so, without making it dull and tedious. '[32] He himself thought of giving it a form of letters adressed by an elder brother to a younger one, recently arrived in India. Briggs accepted the assignment as a challenge. ' At all events, I feel it a point

of honour to attempt the thing and must rely on my Nuseeb for the success. " God is Great."

Briggs planned the book carefully. The letters supposedly covered a period of time. The first few letters covered the more obvious difficulties faced by a young cadet arriving in India. As the period of the cadets' stay in India increases , the letters ' assume a graver tone ' . ' (T)opics of a more important nature are treated of, in which legislation and policy are discussed, and opinions founded on practical experience are freely compared with theory'. [34] In the writing of the book , he repeatedly consulted Elphinstone, to whom the whole book was sent for remarks, chapter by chapter. Mr. Dunlop of the Bombay Services was also consulted, and Briggs was ' glad to find one so well informed and - observant in these matters differ so little from ' himself.[35] The book, in its final form, was published in 1828 at London by John Murry of Albemarle Street.

The entire book was ' calculated for the improvement of the minds of the youths entering the Indian service, disposing them to be kind towards the natives, and enabling them to estimate the character of the Indian population and to comprehend the nature of our rule in that interesting country.' [36] Briggs was fully conscious of the great gulf that lay between the rulers and the ruled in British India. This gulf, he believed, was not only unnecessary but wholly

dangerous. It had to be bridged. ' The veil that exists between us and the native, can only be removed by mutual and kind intercourse'. [37] The liberal humanistic spirit of Briggs's convictions breaths fire when he refers to the treatment of the Indians by the English. ' I can less easily excuse you ... for abusing the natives as a whole, whom you who designate by the absurd appellation of ' black fellows '... Is it because nature has dyed the skin of the people of tropical regions with a darker hue than those situated more remotely from the equator that it should be matter of reproach to them ?' [38] Though Briggs was anti-racist, he was pragmatic enough to realize that there were certain differences between the Indians and the English, which were rather fundamental, but certainly not unsurmountable. '..... You must bring your mind to view the inhabitants of this country merely as strangers, differing indeed from us inalmost all their habits, in their manners, in their language and in their religion, but not deficient in many excellent qualities nor in talent .... ' [39] He cautions his audience that ' the Indian community is by no means in that low state of barbarism in which you have been induced to think it .....' [40] He gives minute details of the manners and social behavarial pattern of the Indians,[41] and urges the English young men to understand and follow them. He even urges them to remove their shoes while entering an Indian house or a place of worship. He considers natives to be cleaner, more loyal

and less arrogant than the Europeans. [42] He urges the young Europeans to respect the Indian women who though uneducated and more secluded than the European ladies, were persons of different mettle altogether. ' The strength of mind and high nations of family pride which prevail among the Indian females may well excite our wonder and admiration ....' [43] Briggs undoubtedly condemns practices like sati and infanticide, but urges that force should not be used to stop these practices. In a typically non-utilitarian manner, he says: ' Our empire has been denominated one of opinion, an opinion not ill founded of our national faith and integrity, and of our disposition to govern people by their own laws ....' [44] The romantic and liberal bend of his mind, was definitely buttressed by Elphinstone's ' no innovation ' policy.

Like Sir Thomas Munro, Briggs also believed in the incorporation of natives on the administration. He points out the exploitative nature of the British rule in India. ' ... One and all lament the degradation of the better classes and deprecate that levelling system which would reduce the whole population to the condition of mere serfs of the soil; a system supposed by some to be calculated to secure our dominion if successfully and generally adopted, but one alike derogatory and impolitic. Derogatory as abandoning every principle of justice and liberality; impolitic as tending to

create universal dislike to (sic) our rule, and gradually to diminish the resources of India, by rendering the people a nation of paupers equally incapable of raising articles for exportation as of purchasing the imports of Europe. '[45] The only way by which this could be avoided, was association of Indians with the process of administration and political decision making. He hoped that '... the enlightened rulers of that vast empire will every day more and more see the justice, the policy and I may add the absolute necessity of permitting the native community to participate more largely in the administration of the government.[46]

Right since his arrival in India, Briggs had been a keen student of the Persian language. He had started the study of the language while a cadet at Madras and continued it even when he reached Hyderabad.[47] He was fully convinced that a detailed study of the history of India, particularly of the Mohammedan period which preceded the British authority in India except the Maratha territories was absolutely necessary for a better understanding of the Indians and their administrative and social systems. He believed that even for the understanding of the Maratha system, a thorough knowledge of the Mohammedan history was necessary, since the administrative system, particularly the revenue administration, of the Marathas was principally based upon the Muslim system.[48] This conviction, born quite early in his

career, led Briggs in search of reliable and complete account of the Muslim rule in India. While still at Hyderabad, he acquired a copy of an account of the Muslim rule in India by one Mohammad Hussain Astrabadi, popularly known as Ferishta. It was his wish to translate the whole work into English. However, it was not till he reached Satara, that Briggs was destined to have the necessary leisure to undertake and complete the translation.[49]

Ferishta :

Though, the translation of Ferishta was not an original work, the labour put into its translation and preparing a reliable text from amongst the various texts available, was a formidable task. The work of collating various texts of Ferishta had been undertaken by Briggs while still at Hyderabad, and when he came to Poona as Elphinstone's assistant, he brought all the documents to Poona. In 1817, Briggs was appointed as an assistant to Sir John Malcolm. ' Before proceeding to the field in 1817, I had fortunately sent part of my translation to my friend Mr. William Erskine at Bombay, and another portion to Mr. (afterwards Sir) Richard Jenkins, then Resident at Nagpore.' [50] The remaining papers which he had left with his wife in Poona, were burnt and destroyed during the raid on Sangam by the Peshwa forces on 5th November 1817. [51] Briggs later on received two

valuable manuscripts, purchased by an Indian friend from the plunder. [52]

Prior to Brigg's translation of Ferishta, parts of Ferishta's works had been translated into English by Dow and also by Col. Jonathan Scott. However, Briggs found that these translations 'were extremely inaccurate, both of them having translated from a Hindustani version.' On a careful scrutiny he realized that ' they were merely narratives founded on Ferishta. The proper names of men and places were fearfully destorted, and often rendered unintelligible..' [53] He 'took advantage of the comparative leisure ' he enjoyed at Satara, to 'return to ' his task of ' editing Ferishta and finishing the translation.' [54] He had collected several copies of the Ferishta text written in various parts of India. By a careful sifting and comparison of these various copies he was 'able to collate a more complete and correct edition of this valuable work than had ever before - existed .....' [55]

Publication of the corrected edition was not much of a problem . The book was submitted to the Bombay authorities ' who caused a large edition, in two volumes folio, to be litho graphed from the beautiful Persian text prepared under my supervision, and granted me the sum of 5000 rupees for my expenses....' [56]

Publishing the translation, however, was a different matter. In 1828, we find him lamenting the fact that ' ... from the small interest excited by oriental literature among all persons but those resident in India , I fear the translator will be unable to publish the result of his undertaking....' [57] The book was published at London in 1829. ' My share of the profits after presenting many copies to my friends and to public institutions amounted to forty pounds.' [58]

In the translator's preface to the first volume of Ferishta, Briggs says '... I resolved to examine the translation made by Dr. Jonathan Scott of the History of the Kings of Koolburga (Sic), Beejapoor, and Ahmudnuggur. This ...soon convinced me how much that accomplished Orientalist had surpassed all former translators; and I found little to alter, with the exception of a few proper names....' In the same polite vein Briggs claims that his attempt at translation of Ferishta would have been unnecessary, if Dr. Scott's translation had not been 'occasionally defective'. [59] In his autobiographical notes, which he wrote fairly late in his life and when his reputation as an oriental scholar was established beyond doubt, he is more forthright, claiming that Dr. Scott's translation was not based on an authentic version of Ferishta, but on an Indian version thereof.[60] As for the other translator of Ferishta, Col. Alexander Dow, after the polite praise typical

of the writers of the early nineteenth century, Briggs accuses him of ' instead of confining himself ... to mere translation, he has filled his work with his own observations ....' In fact, therefore, Briggs seem to have had no doubt in his mind that a new and authentic translation of Ferishta was absolutely necessary.[61] Briggs's confidence in himself was well rewarded. Dr. Elliot has called his translation as being by far the most accurate and historically acceptable.[62]

Briggs set about his work with great 'ardour'. He collected as many copies of Ferishta as he could get, corroborate the narrative with other data that he could muster. All this was done with a view to writing an original history of India. ' My researches had enabled me to fill eleven folio volumes of manuscript, partly (sic) translations and partly notes, for my general history ...'[63] Collation of various versions had become necessary since, ' it could not be expected that in the absence of the art of printing such a work should be correctly transmitted for any length of time.'[64] Contemporary to the great Prussian historian Rauke, yet without any contact with him, Briggs arrives independently to the same methodological fineness as Ranke . He would not accept any document merely because it happened to be old. He was fully aware of the scribe's propensity to commit hawlers. ' The mere copyist is a person whose principal duty is to write a fair hand; to acquire which forms the whole business of his life. The method precision

that are necessary in this occupation are for the most part obtained by sedentary habits. The transcriber despairs of becoming a scholar and his avocation prevents his being a traveller .....' [65] The collation, Briggs believed, could not be achieved only by collecting various versions of the same text. It was necessary to have corroborative evidence. Briggs sent his faithful and learned native assistant, Meer Kheirat Ally Khan, commonly called Mooshtak, ' throughout the Deccan and made copies of every Persian inscription on stone to be found in all the towns of note in that country.'[66] These findings were useful in determining the chronology of the narrative.[67]

Briggs wanted to give ' Ferishta to the public in the very words he would probably have used, had he as a native of the East, written in English.'[68] Yet he was not a mere translator. He looked upon Ferishta work, not as a literary piece, but as a historical work. He made no alterations in the text, yet gave copious explanatory notes, to determine the historicity or otherwise of the original. He prepared geneological tables and affixed them to the relevant chapters.[69] In spite of the humility with which the ' Preface ' is written one can easily see that Briggs looked upon himself as something more than a translator, somebody in the same line as Ferishta himself. ' Ferishta laments that he was unable to procure any history of the kings of Golconda or Hyderabad; but begs

if such a work should ever appear, that it may be included in his. This deficiency I have been able to supply, and it is added as an appendix in the body of the third volume. '[70]

Translating Ferishta had a purpose. In fact, to Briggs, study of history was never without a purpose. To him, the purpose of history was not only to know the truth about the physical facts, but also about the moral character of a people. In his letters to a Young Person, he alludes to this fact by urging the young officers coming to India to read and understand the history of the Indian people so as to understand them better. [71] As for Ferishta, he claims that ' the perusal of this history cannot be otherwise than instructive, if it be merely to show the certain effects of good and bad government among a people whom our ignorance disposes us to consider as devoid of moral energy and who are full prone to submit without resistance to the greasest oppression. ' [72]

' LAND-TAX IN INDIA ' :

Throughout his tenure in civil office, Briggs had been endeavouring to prepare a systematic study of the Indian administration. He had realized from his experience as a revenue officer, that the Indian revenue structure was closely connected with her social ethos . The social and cultural life of the Indians could be understood better not only by a perusal of the political history of India, but also the economic history of Indian people . He proceeded to undertake such a study which resulted in his publishing his magnum opus

' The Present Land Tax in India.' The work was mostly done in India, and published in England by Longman, Rees, et al, in the year 1830. The work is divided into three parts, the first dealing with the ' Land Tax of the Ancients ' in Greece and other parts of Europe, and with the ' Land Tax of India ' in Hindu and Mohamadan times. The second part deals with the changes introduced by English rule and administration, while the third deals with the effects of these changes on the condition of the people and the country, as a whole. ' The book is written throughout in a style studiously calm and dispassionate.....' [73]

The motivation behind the Land Tax is almost the same one as behind the Ferishta. The British rule in India must respect the traditions of the Indians if it was not to be a despotic rule. Briggs believed that the British rule in India had not done the basic needful to avoid a despotic character. Comparing the land tax in England with that in India, Briggs showed that India was far more heavily taxed. In England, the land which, by Indian revenue standards should have yielded about half a million in revenue, yielded , in practice, only seven thousand pounds. [74] He declared that ' A land tax like that which now exists in India, professing to absorb the whole of the landlord's rent, was never known under any govt in Europe or Asia. [75] Briggs was fully convinced that the British economic policies in India were ruinous to the Indians. He gave a benefit of doubt to the British

rulers by saying that '... we have erred not from intention, but out of ignorance ....' [76] The aim of his work was to remove this ignorance. He pointed out that there was no dearth of information about India. ' But nobody reads. - Information regarding India is, of all topics, the most nauseating in English Society ....' [77] And yet he wrote his massive work in the hope that people would read it.

The major target of Briggs's attack was the then prevalent utilitarian notion that ' ... all the land in the East belongs to the crown. ' [78] He believed that ' the time for maintaining such doctrines is now at an end, though there still exists a general notion that the Sovereign in India is, and always was, not only in name but in reality, the proprietor of the soil.' [79] This notion, he proves to be wrong. Quoting extensively from ancient Indian works , notably Mance, on the subject of the sale of land, Briggs pointed out the six formalities which had to be observed at the time of the sale of land. These were, (i) the assent of the townsmen, (ii) the assent of the kindered, (iii) the assent of the neighbours, (iv) the assent of heirs, (v) delivery of gold and (vi) the delivery of water. ' The assent of townsmen and kindered (was) to give the transaction publicity; the assent of neighbours for the sake of preventing future disputes about boundaries; and the assent of heirs and kinsmen, to show the right of the individual to sell ... ' Briggs asserted that this

and similar practices ' proved sufficiently ... the perfect existence of private property in land ' among the Hindus of India. [80] These rights to private property were preserved over centuries by a unique system of local government. ' Each village in India contains within itself the seeds of an entire republic or government. '..It consists of an agricultural corporation owning all the land, at the head of whom is a chief elected by the corporation. It has also at least one individual of all crafts necessary to agriculture and essential to the comforts of rural life. ' [81] These village communities were the backbone of the Indian Social and politico-economis system. According to Briggs, this system existed everywhere in India, and though ' the Mohomedan conquest and rule was subversive of the Hindoo governments and in a great measure of its institutions ' the village system continued in some form or other down to the British days. [82] After proving that the land tax under the Hindus was light, Briggs argues that with the enhancement of land tax under the Muslims, the private proprietor could no longer afford slaves and servants and had to take to ploughing himself. ' ... such is the fact that the oppressive exactions of the Mahomedans had the effect of abolishing predial slavery throughout their dominions ... ' [83] He proves that the land tax under the Hindus was light, and fixed. It ' was not regulated by the superfices cultivated, but by the quantity of the produce ... it varied not with the Metallic Value of the grain, nor was it affected by any other circumstance. The

proportion was ever the same. '[84] Drawing his information from the edicts of Vidyaranya, Briggs claims that in the Vijayanagar empire, the demand of the State did not exceed one sixth of the produce. ' .... (I)t does not appear the Hindoos ever departed from the principle that revenue was a fixed portion of produce and not a fixed rent.'[85]

Under the Muslim rule, this position changed to a considerable extent. Yet, in one notable respect, the Muslims made no changes whatever, that was the village community itself. ' The Mahomedans early saw the policy of not disturbing an institution so complete, and they availed themselves of the local influence of these officers (village servants) to reconcile their subjects to their rule .....'[86] Briggs believed that the Manjwar settlement was first introduced in India by the Muslims under the pressure of wars of conquest. '...(T)hey assessed whole districts at a certain sum, and required the Des-Adikars, whom they subsequently entitled Zamindars, to levy the amount from the respective villages or towns under their charge.'[87] He claims that the incidence of taxation on land was heavier under the Muslims. Under Allauddin Khilji, the land tax was ' equal to the value of half the produce.....'[88] But this was a rare case. Under Sher Shah Sur the assessment was fixed at one fourth of the produce.[89] 'Both Akbar and his ministers, like the economists of France, adopted the maxim that as all the wealth arises originally out of the produce

of the soil, so the land ought to yield the principal portion of public revenue .....' [90] Akbar undertook a complete survey of the land, classified the land and fixed a different tax on each. Briggs commended Akbar's reduction of all other levies which were ' unprofitable to the State and vexatious to the people .....' [91] However, Akbar soon realized the difficulties in survey and assessment, and he was reduced to the necessity of assessing whole villages and leaving it to the people themselves to distribute the portion payable by the individuals. [92] Aurangzeb tried to deviate from the practice established by Akbar. '...Aurangzeb may be considered ~~at~~ last of the Moguls who ruled in absolute indepedence, and who disregarded almost all laws which limited the power of the sovereign over his subjects; yet we find him still respecting the proprietory right of the landholder ...' [93] Further down Briggs quotes Gulam Hussain Khan, the author of Siyar-ul-Mutakhirin as saying that ' the emperor is proprietor of the revenue but he is not proprietor of the soil...'[94] Briggs claims that the Muslim revenue assessment was harsher than the Hindu one, the assessment having being raised from one sixth to one fourth or one half at times.[95] Briggs also claims that the zamindars, who were also the government, revenue collectors, were for the first time created by the Muslims. [96] The danger in this system was obvious. ' That the government always limited its demand to its due share , or that the zamindar did not exceed it in raisir the revenue from the landholders, seems very unlikely.' [97]

The government of India passed at this juncture into the hands of the British. The development of the British revenue policy forms the subject of the second part of Briggs's Land Tax. ' The English, who gradually became its (Bengal's) masters, were ignorant of the language, the history,the institutions, and the manners of the inhabitants. The new governors long remained in ignorance of the resources of the country and the privileges of their subjects .....'[98] ' ... (T)hey were puzzled to reconcile absolute right in the sovereign with specific rights in the subject...'[99] Briggs commends the efforts of Warren Hastings, the main object of which was 'fixing of deeds by which the ryots hold their lands and pay their rents, and limiting certain bounds and defences against the authority of the zamindar ....'[100] Briggs criticized the Bengal government for introducing an annual settlement in cash, instead of a fixed ratio to the produce, and calls it a ' highly expedient' measure injurious to the ryot.[101] He ridicules Mr. Grant,[102] the head Shirestedar of Bengal for holding such ignorant views, as ' with respect to the natives of Hindostan, it would be most dangerous innovation to admit, either in theory or practice, the doctrine of private individual landed property by inheritance, free or feudal tenures extending beyond the period of a single life ....' Briggs maintains that it is dangerous to accept opinions of people like Grant, however, intelligent and highly placed they might be, ' without well examining their tendency.'[103]

Briggs condemns the Permanent settlement with a vehemence born out of disgust. Briggs has no hesitation in calling Cornwallis as ' perhaps the least informed of all those whose sentiments were of importance. ' [104] He charges the Bengal Government with nepotism and favouring the interests of revenue farmers, while condemning the actual cultivator to the position of a mere serf. He also charges that the Cornwallis settlement increased the burden on the farmer claiming for the government and its agents as much as 60 %, of the produce. This heavy exactions reduced the saleable value of the land and binding the peasant more pitiably to the land. [105] In his opinion, the detastable system was chiefly due to the unbending mind of the then Governor-General who ' seems to have made up his mind that the existing system of administration (in India) was practically defective and required to be modified on that of Europe.' [106] The chaos created by such a prejudged attitude was dangerous. ' These facts only tend to show that the necessity of Indian legislators being educated in their profession, and that at all events, they should have some knowledge of the history, and manners of the people whom they govern. ' Only if Cornwallis had been better informed, he 'would have known that the integrity of private property was recognized in every village in India, and that the demand of the crown has ever had its defined limits. ' [107] Briggs believed that the Permanent Settlement was a great mistake because it proved oppressive to the real holder of the land and disturbed the social balance.[108]

Commenting on the zamindary system created by the Permanent Settlement, Briggs observes ' To escape from the trouble of enquiry and to avoid the determination of rights absolutely lost, we granted to zamindars the exclusive privilege of - what ? Not of collecting according to any fixed principle, but according to that usage which had brought the country to the brink of ruin. We confirmed to them the right of the usual extraordinary system, and compelled the cultivators by law to submit to it. ' [109] ' ... We were not warranted in raising up to a race of revenue contractors to feed on the harvest of the industrious landholder , and to render him a landlord who was only a taxman. ' [110]

Briggs analysizes the revenue system adopted and practiced in Madras, and popularly known as the Ryotwar. The ryotwar system was a settlement made annually, not with the whole village, which formerly assessed itself, but with every cultivator through a government officer. It was a ' system that on the first blush bears a semblance of such even-handed justice, by firing the amount payable by each cultivator, and which produced a great increase of revenue from what appeared to be concealed land...' [111] The assessment was calculated at 45% of the gross produce,which, according to Briggs, was very high. Besides this high rate , Briggs objects to the basic presumption in Col. Munro's settlement. Munro believed that ' all land is supposed to revert to government at the end of every year to be distributed as it may think proper. ' [112] This according to Briggs, was a wrong

presumption. He also did not like the destruction of the village community. As the assessment was fixed at the high rate of 45 % of the produce, there never was any expectation of realising the whole amount imposed. ' Remission, therefore, was necessary everywhere, but the amount to be remitted was left to the discretion of the collector and his native servants.[113] This led to an unstable and unfriendly relationship between the cultivator and the government. ' The struggle was incessant between the opposite parties: the collector to realize as large a revenue as possible, the cultivator to obtain as large a remission as possible. '[114] The advantages of the ryotwar system, as enumerated by Briggs were : (i) It professes to grant to every individual a spot of land in perpetuity, (ii) It professes to limit the demand for ever on that land, (iii) It tries to decrease the burden of assessment, (iv) It pretends to guard the cultivator from over taxation by village officers for parish rates, and (v) It defines rights. The skepticism of Briggs about the ryotwar system becomes evident through his use of such terms as ' professes ', 'tries/pretends' etc.[115] His objections to the ryotwar system can be summed up as follows: (i) In many instances it confered the property of landholders on tenants, (ii) The demand of even 30 or 40 per cent of the gross produce absorbed the whole profit, and brought ruin on the cultivator, (iii) Remissions became necessary, (iv) The annual assessment was open to great abuse, and placed the cultivator and the government officer in a state of opposition to each

other producing thereby chicane on the one hand and corruption on the other, (v) It subverted the established order of society by reducing all classes to the same level, (vi) It required an enormous civil establishment with talent, zeal and integrity; and (vii) It was a novel invasion of the ancient usages and institutions of the people.

Briggs was not in favour of both the Cornwallis system of Permanent Settlement and the Munro system of Ryotwari Settlement. However, his attack on Cornwallis is in a spirit of righteous indignation. He is therefore, more blunt and at times a little crude. By the time Briggs wrote his land tax, the Permanent Settlement had no champions. It was universally admitted to be a failure, and even the Lindenhall had forbidden its extension. With Sir Thomas Munro and his ryotwari system the case was entirely different. It was, when Briggs wrote his work, the most popular and celebrated revenue system in British India. Apart from Sir Thomas Munro it had powerful and influential advocates. It also seems to have had the backing of the utilitarians, particularly persons like Mackenzie Holt. Briggs's criticism of Sir Thomas Munro, particularly of the minute recorded by him at the end of 1824, was far more subtle and logical. ' (I)t would be leaving my task unfinished, were I restrained, from my veneration for the individual, to suffer his opinions to stand on record and unrefuted, when perhaps the welfare of many millions of people may be at stake in their

adoption.' [116] Maintaining that India was always a wealthy country whose riches and prosperity were described in glowing terms even by the European travellers, Col. Briggs asks why Indian prosperity vanished under the British government, though the British claim that they are but following the ancient practices in land revenue assessments. He believes that the British have departed from the policy and principles of their predecessors, and introduced a system that was far more exacting and rigorous than the one that existed even under the worst of the regular native governments. He contests Munro's contention that the assessment under the native princes was very heavy. With a historian's studied precision he shows that the land assessment under the native rulers was never higher than 25% of the gross produce. To Sir Thomas's rather rhetorical question that if the assessment was light under the natives, why was there an expensive machinery wanted, Briggs counters by claiming that no such machinery, most certainly not the expensive kind, ever existed under the natives. To Munro's assertion that ' it was because the assessment was not moderate that assessments in kind were introduced or continued, Briggs counters by saying ' a revenue levied according to produce ... is no proof that the tax must necessarily be heavy,' [117] and proceeds to give example from ancient Greece and Rome, contemporary China, Venice etc., where the assessment did not exceed 10% of the gross produce,and the assessment was levied in kind. [118] He very subtly connects Sir Thomas to Auranzeb who had raised

the assessment to 50% . He also takes Sir Thomas to task for unhistorical statements, when Sir Thomas, without any authority, claims that Akbar claimed far more than 1/3rd or 1/4th of the produce, though the records assert to the contrary.[119] Throughout the polemical chapter, Briggs shows a clear historical bias and a remarkable understanding of the problem. He had been a revenue officer himself, creating a system where none existed to the liking of the British. Even in those days, he was of the opinion that the British revenue system was not proceeding on right lines. ' There is evidently some radical fault in our system of finance .....' [120] This opinion, as the years went by, became a confirmed conviction with Briggs. ' I conscientiously believe that under no government whatever,either Hindoo or Mohomedan, professing to be actuated by law, was any system so subversive of the prosperity of the people at large as that which has marked our administration. ' [121]

The entire ' Land Tax ' is a heavy indictment of the British revenue policy in India. Briggs's argument can be summed up as follows. The native Indian rulers were content to levy the State demand by a simple process which had superficially what may be called a barbarous appearance, but which had adjusted itself with nicety to the social and climatic conditions of the country out of which it had grown. The British, on the other hand, grasped at too much in every sense of the word, and in all directions. ' We aimed at an impossible perfecti

of record and mastery of detail by our officials and realized our conception so imperfectly that we achieved nothing but the general ruin of the people. ' [122] (Bell, op.cit. p.130).

The introduction of British Rule in India coincided with a period of profound philosophical and ideological changes through which rugland was going. During the latter half of the eighteenth century, the British administration in India was subjected to heavy and serious criticism by the intellectuals and philosophers alike. This criticism seems to have stemmed from two principal factors : (i) the philosophical outlook and (ii) the fiscal considerations. It would, of course, be wrong to consider these two factors as mutually exclusive. In more than one respect, in fact, these two were essentially two sides of the same coin. It is necessary to bear in mind that the eighteenth century, which has been called as the age of Reason , was also a century which saw the rise of middle class in the political and economic life of England. The political ideas of the philosophers of the eighteehth century were based upon an excessive worship of reason. Human ideas were justified and human institutions accepted, only if they were based upon Reason. The major and minor premises for the Aristotalian syllogistic logic of the age of Reason were supplied by the European and Christian ethics as well as by the information about India supplied by the European officers. Any basic philosophical and political policy towards India, consequently,

was based on the late eighteenth century Englishman's ability to comprehend the needs of a totally alien society as reported to them by Europeans in India whose own powers of comprehension were inevitably defective....' [123] The critics of India, led by the romanticist humanist Edmund Burke were moved more by the monopolies of the East India Company rather than by the poverty and real misgovernment in India. The east India Company became a target of their attack because of her monopolies, not because of her misgovernment of Bengal. In their consideration of India, the English intellectuals were moved more by the philosophical considerations operating in Europe than by the practical problems of governing and administering India. The narrowing pictures of Company's misdeeds in India,as drawn by Burke [124] were meant to be a justification for the major conclusions already arrived at, namely the end of all monopolies. India figured, not as an object of serious speculation in its own right, but as an incidental issue, justifying or denying a particular point of view. ' India never occupied such a position in the mind of Europe as did China. The Indian debate in England therefore, was primarily a debate for the vindication of a viewpoint towards human government. The 'Romantic' philosophy , worshiping nature and naturalistic traditions, became not only a literary fashion, but also an intellectual cult. It affected the Indian scene as well . Warren Hastings, and to a lesser extent his predecessor, Clive, were perhaps the two good examples of early romanticist politicians. Their love for India was born

out of their respect for tradition. Humanism and naturalism, the two important ingredients of romanticism found their fullest expressions in the works of Hastings and Sir William Jones. They believed that the best way of governing India was to govern the least, or at least the presence of a foreign and alien government should be felt the least. Hastings political reforms, judicial reorganization or his refusal to make any permanent revenue settlement on Western principles were efforts to preserve the traditional frame work intact while retaining British political authority. Cornwallis and Wellesly on the other hand, were the persons who believed unashemedly in an open assertion of English moral and political superiority. They behaved, a priori , as Briggs points out in his land tax, that everything Indian was radically wrong and had to be remade on Western model.

This new trend was inevitable, however, strongly many orientalists might have condemned it. The growth of rationalism, the rise of a powerful middle class and the development of an Indian empire, developed among the British people ' an exaggarated view of the power of the legislators to shape the future of the world. [126] The utilitarian school of thought was based upon the two powerful factors of the early ninteenth century liberalism : reason and law. The practical manifestations of these factors were to be seen in the growth of a centralised administration imbibed with English ideals, and the growing impact of Christian morals. It was under these pretexts that

the battle for free trade was fought against the East India Company in 1813. The utilitarians believed that the cause of Indian poverty was simply that it had a bad government.[127] They discarded the romantic notion of letting the Indians be , and actively interfered with the local and general administrative system. ' The winning of the active cooperation of the Indian peoples was unnecessary; the task of persuading them by education and rewarding them by gradual admission to office and power was laborious , and would fail to achieve any large effect. The solution lay simply in a reconstruction of the machine of government. '[128]

To a school of Indian administrators, whose personality was made in India by Indian experience, such a doctrine amounted to wanton transgression of a moral trust. Among these were the great administrators of the early ninteenth century: Munro, Malcolm, Elphinstone and Metcalf. It would not be entirely correct to call them ' Romantics ' , as Prof. Stokes has, since they stood in the twilight of fading romanticism and the new utilitarianism. They knew that pure romanticism was dead and gone, and they must accept some of the new principles. Yet they fought, what they knew to be a losing battle. Briggs was perhaps the purest of them all. Two assumptions which he could never accept concerning India were, firstly the belief that the Indians had no indegenous system of their own, and secondly that India could not be governed without a strong European hand. His vehemence against the Cornwallis system was essentially because

of its cold, lifeless, mechanical principles, its a priori, unhistorical attitude and its imposition of western ideas on India. But in practice, Western ideas meant exploitation. ' ... (B)y rigid exactions we have increased our own revenue and reduced the people to the condition of mere labourers. This is the professed maxim of our rule, the certain and inevitable result of taking the whole surplus profit of the land. ' [129] Briggs considered the British interference in the social and ethical values of the Indians as ' more impertinence. ' ' It originates from the utter contempt with which Europeans are apt to view the natives; from that assumed superiority of our knowledge; from that unfortunate propensity to distrust them... We treat the people as if they were savages, without any frame of society ....' [130] He attacked Sir Thomas Munro, not because Sir Thomas was a new-wave man, but because he seemed to have given in to the utilitarians, in however small a measure. He decried the ryotwar system because it gave too much power in the hands of ' the uncontrolled and ignorant European Collector. ' [131] He wished that the villages would be allowed to manage their affairs with no interference from the Europeans under the pretext of protecting the people. [132] The ryotwar system ' tends to dissolve the unity of village communities , which I conceive should be our special object to keep entire.... Their natural born chiefs are humiliated under the plea of affording the inhabitants more complete protection. ' [133]

Briggs pleaded for association of the Indians with the British administration. He denied that Indians are timid and pusillanimous. ' They are bold and enterprising ... We may judge whether they will tamely submit to injuries affecting whole communities. The hold we have on them is already too loose : it should be our object to bind them more strongly to our government. ' [134] This, he believed, could be done by strengthening, and not weakning, the power and prestige of the village communities, and recognizing their complete independence.

Briggs earnestly believed that the prosperity of India and that of England were interdependent. In the fashion of classicists, he believed that the British trade with India would never improve unless and until the financial conditions of India improve. He forestalled Dadabhai Nawroji's famous drain theory, when he said, ' Were this tax even expended in India the evil would be less.... About one fifth of the gross taxation, that is to say, four millions , annually is withdrawn from it, either in produce or in specie, to be expended in England ' Briggs felt that it was too much to hope that anything would be done ' to alleviate the burthen that country now sustains from our injustice. ' [135]

The ' Land Tax ' was, thus, a massive defence of romanticist philosophy of India against the invading utilitarian doctrines. It exposed the evils of British fiscal policies in India. Yet the alternatives that Briggsand other romanticists had, had already become obsolete. Thex very coming of British

as a political power in India was so great an innovation, that despite the romanticists, India would never have remained the same. Elphinstone, Munro and Metcalf had realized this. The English moral and ethical codes, though not superior, were different. With the political power in their hands, this difference was bound to give them a sense of superiority. The British had built an empire; they could not expect to avoid its psychology.

Briggs seems to have sensed the mood of the times. If the argument in favour of justice was not to have any appreciable effect on the new ruling mentality, he was prepared with another in favour, this time, of imperialism. ' We have, however, - stronger motives even than justice to the people - if stronger there can be - a regard for our own safety. Almost all these persons who have advocated the limitation of our demand on the soil, have not failed to adduce, as a substantial argument, the policy of having a body of landed proprietors to give stability and attachment to our rule. ' Making an almost prophetic diognosis of the interrelationship between the British rule and the Indian army, he says, ' our native soldiery may be deemed the main pillars of our strength in the East : while they are steady, obedient, and faithful, we may dictate submission to our foreign and domestic enemies; but this body , of nearly, 200,000 men, with arms in their hands, is composed chiefly of landholders. In case of invasion what have their brethren at the

plough to lose by the downfall of our empire ? Can they be worse off ? [136] Briggs asserted that if a wise and virtuous prince was to rise in India and administer his government with the principles of ancient Indians, the Indian subjects of British government would like to be placed under his authority rather than the exploitative British authority. ' We have more cause to dread the proximity of good and virtuous princes than wicket ones, however powerful. ' [137]

Could this situation be retrieved ? Briggs felt that time was yet not passed for such corrective measures. He proposes certain remedial actions. (i) The claims of the government on the land should be reduced to the minimum 25 % of the gross produce should be the maximum. This would in his opinion leave enough surplus with the land holders to engage in commercial activity so vital for the British economy. ' The wants of the people of India are, like those of the human race, bound only by the means of attainment... Where there is wealth to purchase and the means to display, it is absurd to suppose that the inclination will be wanting .... ' [138]

(ii) The government should give up all claims and demands on the waste land and give it to the cultivators as a bonus. He claims from his experience that charging a low rent on waste land necessarily affects the revenue, since the cultivators on full assessment lands tend to throw up their lands for waste one. [139]

(iii) In the redistribution of the waste lands, the village communities should be given the direction of readjustment of the same. In Briggs's mind, the purpose of the whole exercise was to create a class of small estate-holders, beholden to the British government. It would, in his opinion, also have the added advantage of increasing the real value of the land, village communities, in case their own members had no capital, could borrow money to improve the waste lands, or sell it to strangers. This argument of Briggs sounds rather naive and self-contradictory. If land was so sold, the only people who would have benefit would have been the rich money-lenders from urban centres, making them landlords of waste land, and thereby introducing a foreign and wealthy element in the otherwise cohesive village community.[140]

(iv) Expenditure on establishment should be reduced by firstly handing over the revenue management to the village community through maujwar settlement, and secondly, by employing more Indians in higher positions in the establishment.

(v) The village communities should be made more independent of the government interference. This would decrease the expenses of the government. If the government insisted on managing and superintending every detail, government would end by being a bureaucracy. ' Our resources are now beginning to fail us; we endeavour to meet the contingency by reduction of expenses; but we must avoid inefficiency....' [141] This can be done by passing a large share of management to the village communities.

(vi) The income of the government should be agumented, not by increasing the land tax, but opening new avenues like customs and excise. This seems to have been an old idea with Briggs. As early as August 1818, Briggs wrote to Elphinstone declaring ' .... the more I think on the subject, the more I am convinced that ... the bulk of the revenue should be derived from trade and manufactures including duties on exports, imports, licences and stamps .....' [142]

These measures were undoubtedly managable provided the British attitude to India was one of viewing India as an equal. But that stage had long passed. The aggressive liberalism of the utilitarians like James and John Mill, and Macaulay along with the new wave of spiritual imperialism of the evangelicals like Charles Grant, had already undermined such a belief. They considered India as ripe for a change, and the change that they had in mind was a total change. The policy of ' assimilation ' that they had in mind was nothing short of anglicizing Indian culture. The middle-class theoreticians and politicians wanted India to exist for the material benefit of England, in return of which England was to bestow upon her the benefits of modern Western values and systems, however doubtful may their character seem to romanticists like Briggs. [143] In proposing the remedial measures, Briggs was late by half a century.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V.

1. Kulkarni, A.R., James Cunningham Grant Duff, (Poona, 1971), p. 15.
2. Bell, op.cit. p. 90
3. Governor-General to Elp. 15.12.1818, PRC Vol.13,p.272
4. Elp.to Governor General, 18.6.1818, PRC Vol.13, p.397
5. Elp. to Grant, 8.4.1818, Ballhatchet, op.cit. pp.19.20
6. Elp. to Governor General, 18.6.1818, PRC Vol.13, p.398.
7. Ibid.
8. Elp. to Grant, 8.4.1818, Ballhatchet, op.cit. p.20
9. Ibid, p.238.
10. Kulkarni, op.cit.p.96
11. Grant to Elp. N.D. Ballhatchet, p.239.
12. Briggs, Autographical, Bell, op.cit. p.92.
13. Grant to Elp. 16-10-1822, MSS EUR F88 BOX 6 B
14. Chaplin to Elp. 10.7.1823, Ballhatchet, p.240.
15. Pratapsing Diaries, Vol.4, p.43, entry 30.11.1820.
16. Ibid, p.283 entry 3.7.1821. '.. परंतु जा कामावर दुसरे साहेब आले म्हणजे माहाराजास अवघड पडेल सा दुसरीने राहावे.

17. Ibid. 'तहनाम्यावर हरघडी नजर ठेवून चालावे नाहीतर येथे वकील राहील तो तहनाम्याचे कलम माहाराजास लखून घरील.'

18. Infra. See his attitude towards the army in Khandesh.

19. Briggs to Elp. 19.9.1823, MSS EUR F88 BOX 6 D Vol.II.

20. Briggs to Govt. 1.1.1827, Ballhatchet, p.241

21. Ibid

22. Briggs to Elp. 17.2.1825, MSS EUR F88 BOX 6 D , Vol.III.

23. Pratapsing Diaries for the years 1823 and 1824, passim.

24. Briggs, Autobiographical Notes, Bell, p.91 .

25. Briggs to Elp. 9.9.1826, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol.III

26. Ibid

27. Briggs to Elp. 12.11.1826, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol.III

28. Bell, op.cit. p.97

29. Ibid.

30. Herein after referred to as Letters.

31. Briggs to Elp. ND (Dec.1822 ?) MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol.III

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Letters, (London 1828), p.vi.

35. Briggs to Elp. 5.8.1823, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol.III

36. Note of Dedication to Sir John Malcolm, Letters, p.iv.

37. Ibid, p. 9

38. Ibid, p.14.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid, p.18

41. Ibid, letter nos. X, XI, XII, XIII and XIV

42. Ibid, Letter No.XI, pp.79-84.

43. Ibid, p.103

44. Ibid, p.139

45. Ibid, Preface, p.viii.

46. Ibid

47. Infra, Chapter I.

48. Letters, Letter No.I, pp. 2-7

49. Bell, op.cit. p.97.

50. Briggs, Autobiographical notes, Bell, p.101.

51. Bell, op.cit. p.52

52. Ibid

53. Ibid, p.101

54. Briggs, Autobiographical Notes, Bell, p.101.

55. Ibid

56. Ibid.

57. Letters, p. 4

58. Briggs, Autobiographical Notes, Bell, p.102.

59. Briggs, John, (translator) History of the Rise of the Mohamedan Power in India, (Hereafter called Ferishta) Vol.I Reprint (Calcutta 1966), p. X)

60. Briggs, Autobiographical Notes, Bell, p.101.

61. Briggs, Ferishta, Vol.I, p. X

62. Elliot. op.cit pp 216-217

63. Briggs, Ferishta Vol. p. X

64. Ibid, p. xiii

65. Ibid

66. Ibid

67. For his labours, Briggs recommended Mooshtak for a life pension of Rs.100/- per month. Briggs to Elp. 2.1.1827, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D, Vol.III

68. Briggs, Ferishta, Vol.I, p.xiv.

69. Ibid, passion.

70. Ibid, Vol. p.xv. My underscoring.

71. Letters, letter No.II.

72. Briggs, Ferishta, Vol.I, pp.xv-xvi.

73. Bell, op.cit. p.112.

74. Briggs, Land Tax in India, (London, 1830), p.415.

75. Ibid p.416.

76. Ibid p.457.

77. Ibid p.456

78. Ibid p.1

79. Ibid p.2

80. Ibid p.30 ff.

81. Ibid, p.35

82. Ibid, p.42.

83. Ibid, p.54

84. Ibid, p.55

85. Ibid, p.65, Briggs under scoring.

86. Land Tax in India, p.118.

87. Ibid, p.119.

88. Ibid, p.120

89. Ibid, p.121

90. Ibid, p.122

91. Ibid p.123.

92. Ibid, p.126.

93. Ibid, p.127

94. Ibid, p.130.

95. Ibid, part I, chapter III, passim

96. Ibid, pp.133-135

97. Ibid, p.135

98. Ibid, 142.

99. Ibid, p.145.

100. Ibid, p.149.

101. Ibid, p.162

102. Charles Grant, the Evangelical.

103. Ibid, p.164.

104. Ibid, p. 168.

105. Ibid, p.177

106. Ibid, p.165

107. Ibid, p.180.

108. Ibid, p.218

109. Ibid, p.356

110. Ibid, p.368

111. Ibid, p.262.

112. Munro to Government, 15.8.1807, cited in Ibid,p.266

113. Ibid, p.267

114. Ibid

115. Ibid, pp.389-390.

116. Ibid, p.394.

117. Land Tax in India. p.399.

118. Ibid.

119. This minute by Sir Thomas Munro, is cited in Gleig, G.R. The Life of Maj.Gen. Sir Thomas Munro. Vol. 2.

120. Briggs to Elp. 12.9.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D, Vol.I

121. Land Tax in India, p.410.

122. Bell, op.cit. p.130

123. Marshall, P.J., Problems of Empire, (London,1968). p.51

124. Burke, E., The Works , Vol.7, p.189

125. Mukherjee S.N., Sir William Jones, (Cambridge, 1968) p. 6.

126. Ibid, p.5

127. Stokes, E. The English Utilitarians and India, (Oxford 1959), p.66

128. Ibid

129. Land Tax in India, p.414.

130. Ibid, p.447

131. Ibid, p.443.

132. Ibid, p.446

133. Ibid, p.337

134. Ibid, pp.454-455.

135. Ibid. p.459.

136. Ibid, p.424.

137. Ibid, p.429

138. Ibid, p.448 ff.

139. Ibid, p.430-

140. Ibid, p.432 ff.

141. Ibid, p.457

142. Briggs to Elp. 12.8.1818, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D, Vol.I

143. Stokes, op.cit. Chapter 1, passim.

EPILOGUE

The thirty years that Briggs spent in India, from 1801 to 1827 and 1831 to 1835, were divided into two almost equal halves. During the first half, he was a soldier, an army officer proficient in Indian languages. In 1817 he took his first political and diplomatic appointment under Mountstuart Elphinstone at the Poona Residency. He was destined never to return to army. In 1827 he left India and returned in mid 1831. His Indian career after 1831 was short lived. He returned to England in early 1835 on grounds of ill health. He never came back to India. Yet his association with India and his deep concern for the Indians continued unabated, almost till his death in 1875 at the ripe age of ninety.

Of all the members of 'Elphinstone family', Briggs was perhaps the more intelligent, more sophisticated and certainly the most independent. Extremely tenacious of his rights, Briggs was a man 'who throve on difficulties and disputations and found them wherever he went.'[1] He was a man of intelligence and of firm convictions. Once convicted, it was difficult for any one to shake him out of it. His disputes, whether with Col.MacDowell over Arabs, or with the Army over prize-money, were issues of fundamental convictions about honour or values of right and wrong. There was nothing wrong with his convictions. But he tended to get too much emotionally involved in the business of administration. He

took too much of responsibility on himself, without realizing that others also had their fair share of responsibility . After assuming the civil authority in Khandesh, he overlooked the fact that the war with Peshwa and the Pendharis was still on, and complained repeatedly to the Commissioner of the slighting of the civil authority by the army. In his private letter to Elphinstone he declared that ' unless the authority which I concern vested in me were not supported, I could not perform the duties entrusted to my charge' . It required a strong letter of chastisement to bring him back to reality. He was, however, man enough to realize and own his mistake. In the letter asking for Elphinstone's forgivance, he says : ' I trust however that what has taken place will not induce you to alter the good opinion you have been so often pleased to express of me or remove me from that confidence and indulgence which it has always been my pride to merit ...' [2]

The portrait of Briggs reproduced by his biographer, Evans Bell, in the Memoirs, shows Briggs to be a keen, disciplined and self-willed person. His supreme defect was his abondunt self-confidence. The confidence sprang from his belief that he was acting not in a mercenary opportunistic manner, but on the foundations of a set of values which were eternal. His attitude, derived in large measure from the Romantic humanist school, was firmly paternalistic. He took his duties seriously and expected every one else to do the same. like his mentor, Sir John Malcolm, and his ideal

Mount stuart Elphinstone,Briggs looked upon the office he was performing as trust held till the Indians were capable of performing the same offices for themselves. His extreme repugnance at the behaviour of the English army at Trimbak was due to the strong moralistic trend that was a part of his personality. The English superiority lay, not in arms, but in the moral values. It were these values that distinguished them from the Pendharis. ' Character is everything ' he is seen reminding his countrymen in India.[3]

It was a sincere goodwill and sympathy for the Indians that prompted him to suggest a conciliatory policy towards the Bhils. He had made a clear distinction in his mind between the Arabs and the Bhils. The Arabs, were ' a band of licentious free boosters ', to be exterminated.[4] The Bhils were an indegenous people resorting to plunder grievances. He might suggest strong, even examplary, measures against the Bhils, but its purpose always was to make them renounce plunder as a means of livelihood, not to destroy them.

Briggs was enamoured by the village community in Maharashtra. It was not only the functions of the village community that attracted him, but more fundamentally, its historic tradition as well. He believed that the village community with its balutedars was the mainspring of Indian vitality , Destroy it, and you destroyIndia. In his magnum opus, the Land Tax of India, he reverted to the same agreement and pleaded for the continued independence of this institution.

Briggs was deeply concerned about the small farmer. He sincerely wanted to help him. True, some of his measures went to the contrary. But that was not because he intended so. That was chiefly because of his eagerness to do the correct things which led him into immature action. His greatest quality was that he was free from the prejudices about India and Indians, prejudices which were commonly held by many Englishmen in India. He believed that the Indians were trustworthy. He also believed that the Indians must be treated as equals. If he was willing to cross towards with the higher authorities for Lt. Hodges, he was equally willing to do so for Appajirao, his daftardar. He had no hesitation in declaring that but for Rungopant and Meer Fazal Ali, the conquest of Khandesh would have been well nigh difficult. He advises Young Persons coming to India to treat the Indians as equals. His sociological studies had acquainted him with the Indian society far more intimately than any of his contemporaries. ' He is a clever fellow, understands the language to admiration, had had much experience of the natives, likes them, and is conciliating towards them.'[5] Coming from Elphinstone, this was perhaps the best acknowledgement of Briggs attitude towards India.

By temperament, Briggs was a scholar and a man of mediation. There also was a slightly pensive streak in him. But he was not a cynic. At times, on the contrary, there flowed

an abundance of optimistic dynamism from his pen. As Major Bell says, ' he was undoubtedly a man of a more original and rare type than most of his fellows whose merits have been told to the world by outward marks of distinction. That very political foresight which makes his acts and testimony more worthy of recollection, will account in a great measure for the extreme confidence in his own views, and impatience of being impeded, which led to an occasional want of harmony with his colleagues and official superiors.....'[6] Yet, this lack of harmony was only occasional. He was ever willing and eager to help those who were intellectually alive. He was always willing to help Grant Duff in the latter's work on the Maratha History. ' (H)e has been very kind indeed and has taken the trouble of writing a very long and a very able letter on the points I referred to him.'[7] There existed a great friendship and informality between Briggs and Grant. Grant calls him by various fond names: charitable Christian Mussulman, Pagan, a Pathan Turk. In one of his letters, Grant writes to him, ' You are a formidable adversary and I would rather avoid coming to regular action - you are Patan Toork that slaughters kind.....'[8] Grant delighted in the correspondence. ' It is perhaps only those who are engaged in an undertaking such as ours can tell the pleasure which an interchange of opinions affords on the subject of our enquiries.....'[9] There is almost a juvenile light heartedness in the letters of Grant; Briggs on the other hand is more

serious without being pompous. Condition of India and the poverty of the farmers were his psychological fixations. In a letter to Grant, he calls it his hobby horse.[10] But his preoccupation is so strong, that even while discussing history, he turns, abruptly as it were, to the condition of Indian peasantry. ' I would go back for guidance to the good old times of Menu, who required only one-sixth of the produce for the Raja, and who made land who made land ownership permanent hereditary and saleable. To draw our resources on a constantly increasing scale from the land, is very like digging away roots of a tree to get at its fruit ...' [11] The picture of India that he saw showed ' an indigent peasantry that cannot afford to purchase anything but the produce of its own district , whose wives, children and themselves go all but naked; ' a gentry ' deprived of employment, who cannot afford to cultivate because the produce will not cover the cost of culture and the assessment on the land '; A nobility - ' reduced in income and power', but not in its pride, impoverished and indebted. [12] Briggs kept a valiant fight for Indian farmer even after his departure from India. Brigg's translation of Siyar-ul-Mutakherin by Gulam Hussain did not evoke the same interest as the Ferishta. Nor did Briggs consider it of the same importance since for the period covered by the work was modern on which more reliable accounts were readily available. Briggs had presented a paper on the Banjaras to Literary Society of Bombay in 1812, which

in its modified form was published by the Society in its Transactions in 1819. It was a descriptive account of the Banjara tribe, with whom Briggs had come in contact when he was the supply Officer to the Hyderabad Expeditionary Force. Briggs' work on the Banjaras had the great merit of being the first socio-anthropological work on the tribals of Western India.

Briggs' interest in history was deep and profound. While at Satara, he collected a great deal of material for a biography of Nana Phadnis, the famous Maratha minister. His ' greatest treasure ' was ' Nana's own private dufter which contains a mine of information.' [13] His letters to Elphinstone give a clear impression that he had prepared a draft of his biography of Nana Phadnis. [14] He left documents with Balajipant Kiby. However, Briggs seems to have got the time to revise his work for publication. It was never published.

Grant's reference to Briggs as a Pathan, a Turk or a Mughal might give one a feeling that Briggs was pro-Persian. Such a feeling was, however, far from his mind. In his letters, he urges the young men coming to India to study deeply the local vernaculars. The use of Persian, not a language of the masses, in his opinion, keeps the rulers away from the people, a State of affairs, he considered not only deplorable, but also dangerous.[15]

His treatment of the Bhils was full of sympathy, consideration and justice. He desired to rehabilitate them and make them useful members of the society. He failed in his objective not because of want of effort but probably because the Bhils could not believe him. They repeatedly broke faith, but Briggs continued his policy of reconciliation . Overworked and overwrought as he was, [16] at times he acted out of exasparation. The execution of Chil Naik was an act of a man totally exasparated . Yet, it was not justifiable. This was the only instance where Briggs seems to have acted harshly.

With all his love for India, and the Indians, Briggs was no egalitarian. His principal objection to ryotwar was that it levelled all the classes to the same position. He believed that a multi-tiered, stratified society was a natural order of the things. He favoured a strong gentry and an influential yet paternal nobility. He was conviced that the nobility were the natural leaders of Indian society. They were a part of the socio-cultural ethos of India. 'The attachment of the people of India to their native dynasties is, I fear very much overlooked or very much despised. It is even more dangerous to overlook their attachment to their ancient customs of inheritance, which if rejected by us in the case of a Prince, they will believe to be altogether disregarded by us and threatened with subversion. ' [17]

With a prophetic vision born out of a deep sympathy and understanding, he warned that the loyalty of the Indian soldiers could be counted upon in ' ordinary circumstances, but if their very social and cultural basis were threatened they would desert.' [18] He felt that the reaction of the Indian masses could not be otherwise, when the over-zealous reformers tried to change the social fabric of India. Within two years of his warning, the East India Company and the British rule in India, was to get embroiled in a life and death struggle in the form of the Revolt of 1857.

Briggs can rightly be considered as a prominent protogonist of the drain theory. Briggs was conscious of the exploitation of Indians caused by the policies of the British. He gave a warning to the British against their unbridled exploitation of India. He considered the idea of colonizing India by the British as an absurdity.[19] Condition of India would not improve by exporting Englishmen to India, but only by developing Indian economic condition. He charged that England was morally wrong in not doing so. ' England refuses to receive Indian goods on equal terms, and the government taxes the land in the whole surplus produce. ' What good colonization would do to India ? He proposes a better way , a way that could be considered as an India lovers plea on her behalf. ' 'Place India on equal footing with Mother Country; treat her as a trading nation and not as a -

tributary colony; and a ninety millions of people with a thriving agricultural population; and a ready market for their produce will not fail to consume all the manufactures... England can supply...' [20] This, however, was the vision of a disoriented romanticist of the late 18th century, who had lost contact with the new reality of an illusion of ~~performance~~ permanence.

NOTES

1. Ballhatchet, op. cit. p. 26.
2. Briggs to Elp. 25.6.1818 MSS EUR/F88 BOX 6 D, Vol.I
3. Briggs to Elp. 11.6.1818,MSS EUR/F 88 BOX 6 D, Vol.I.
4. Briggs to Elp. 15.6.1818, DCF 170.
5. Elp. to Grant, 17.10.1822, MSS EUR F88 BOX 9-C
6. Bell, op.cit. p. 2
7. Grant to Elp. 12.8.1820, MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 B
8. Grant to Briggs, 31.8.1820, MSS EUR B 109
9. Grant to Briggs, 15.8.1820, MSS EUR B 109
10. Grant to Grant, 24.8.1829, MSS EUR B 109
11. Ibid
12. Ibid.
13. Briggs to Elp. N.D. MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D Vol.III
14. Briggs to Elp. 2.1.1827 MSS EUR F 88 BOX 6 D, Vol. III
' I have written Nana Funevees out.'
15. Letters pp. 49.64
16. Ballhatchet, op. cit, p. 26.
17. Bell, op.cit. p. 240.
18. Ibid. p. 241.
19. Land Tax in India, p. 459 ff.
20. Ibid.

Appendix I

Dhoolia, 8 January 1819.

Sir,

By my last Bheel report of the 19th November you were put in possession of all the information I have obtained regarding the number, the condition, the habits and the power of the Bheels of the Satpoora Hills - the conclusions be drawn from this - information appeared to me briefly this, that there are only two or three Chiefs of Bheels who have been born in the Hills, and have for many years resided in them, that these have in all about 300 persons attached to them natives of those Mountain and that the remainder of the Chief and Bheels now in those fastness were born in villages on the plain and have been driven by the State of the country into their present haunts from whence they keep up a constant intercourse with their Brethren in the plain and with whom they are not only intimately connected but frequently were quit their hills and remain in their villages for some time and then return. - The Satpoora Bhils are by no means a wild race of people their language and their language and their habits are the same as those of the towns who resemble the ordinary in habitants of the country as nearly as the state of society to which they belong admits and it need hardly be mentioned that is of the very lowest class.

In the beginning of October I made my last settlement with the Satpoora Bhils, the principle upon which all those

settlements were formed, was in the first place to provide for the chief Bhil of each Hutty seperately and to enable him to maintain about him a few members of his family: Their followers it was admitted by them were inhabitants of the villages and they were required to be sent back to their respective homes where I promised former crimes should be forgotten and they should in future be fed at the village expense. The only object that has been attained is that since our administration is Candish, excepting in the instances of those living under the protection of Sindias District, there has been no attack of large bands of Bheels carrying off the whole of cattle of the villages as heretofore for the last twenty years, the depredations have been confined to small gangs of ten or twelve men in every direction in the shape of petty gangs robbers rather than formidable Banditte - The distress occasioned by their robberies to the inhabitants is not to be imagined; some notion of it may be formed however from the fact of my having received since my settlement with the Bhil chief in October no less than 100 complaints from different Mamalatdars of highway robbers committed by them, of these only three or four have been detected the rest have evaded both pursuit and punishment . Translations of two notes lately transmitted by Satpoora Hill Bhils on the Nuseerabad District are enclosed to show the nature and style of the demands. From the moment one of their notes is received all is apprehension and alarm for fear of the treaty contained therein being carried into effect.

Another striking instance of the condition of the country regarding the Bheel robberies is exhibited in the following fact - Having called on the Mamlatdars to procure from the village on account of money which they might regarded as Tuckavi to unable them to extend their means of cultivation; one or two Purgannas declined taking any till their property could be secured from the attack of Bheels and most of them declared in common with several zamindars now here that the best way of aiding the cultivation would be by extending the arrangement already made for the Bheel population from plundering -

The object which was expected to be the result of the giving pensions to the Bheel chiefs has been obtained; the effect that was lookt for by bringing their followers back to their villages seems altogether to have failed and it is worth while to enquire into the cause -

The Bheels were formerly the village watchmen, they were the organs of intelligence of the police while the Sibandies mere its executive instruments; over each Districts or part of District was a Bheel Naiq who had the superior control over all the village Bheels, was responsible for the immediate restitution of stolen property or of tracing the thieves. It need hardly be repeated that any thing like an organised police has long since ceased in Candish, the Bheels are for the most part lookt on as robbers constitutionally rather than from

habit and the inhabitants generally have an inveterate hatred against them which time and reflection only can remove -

On our first occupation of Candish it occurred to you I believe that an irregular corps of Bheels would answer the purpose of civilising and of providing for them on the plan of Mr. Cleveland with the Hill people of Baugalpor and before we became so through acquainted with the constitution of the Bheels society; such an arrangement appeared the best adapoted to remove the evil but a more close and intimate knowledge of their habits has induced me to think that any military organization of the Bheels would be at best difficult, that it would be elevating them from thieves to soldier's for which they are in my mind wholly incapacitated from their licentious habits and their grovelling ideas, that it would be impossible to prevent crime of the most henious nature among them, and that they would on such occasions immediately fly to their fastness and their brethren would not seize them, and that the system would entirely fail of its object; a trial of this nature has been made in the District of Rawore, a few Bheels of one or two " Hutties were entertained at an expense of 700 rupees monthly, they were constantly in a state of intoxication never capable of any exertion, themselves and the rest of the Bheels who were more active constantly calling out for a similar provision had this been afforded them, the village Bheels would soon have gone to the Hills and follow the same

pursuits to be provided for in like manner, and in a year or two the expence of this establishment would have increased to an enormous amount and the Bheels instead of being useful and active members of society in that class to which they belong would become drug(?) die on the state which would have gained at an enormous expence that could reach it utmost only when every Bheel had been enlisted the negative advantage of having purchased the inaction of the present race of robbers. The attacks on the Rawere Purganna were(?) it has been formed expedient since to disband them and only employ them as watchmen or intelligences.

Had we formed among the Satpoora and other Hills bounding C bandish a race of people distinct and inconnected with the inhabitants living in seperate communities for many Generations, residing among inacassible mountains and fastness and defying the ordinary modes of a attack. If we had formed the Bheels a great nation dependent of the neighbouring contries over whom we have control, for provisions, and other formidable from their numbers their courage and their enterprise as appears to have been the case among the Hill people to the East of Bengal and which is the case also among many of the Hills continuous to our territory in other part of India it would have then become an object to have purchased the service of some few on the border to have kept in check the incursions of those from the interior. This, however, in the instance of the Bheels

of the Candeish, generally does not appear to be their condition, they are dastardly, ~~to a~~ formidable only as night robbers or highway men, incapable of making resistance against ordinary attacks, dependent wholly on the country in our profession for their subsistance and the movement this is cut off they are driven to the necessity of begging condition; they are for the most part inconnected and have no general feeling but that of not betraying each other for fear of being themselves betrayed, and the instance of the Banglepoor Hill people so much inapplicable as to precedent for our conduct towards the Bheels of Candish, All of the Hill Chiefs with whom I have had communication are personally known as the watchmen of certain villages and there is no Bheel in Candish who is not called after some town in the plain which is in past his home and to whom when he finds it convenient he returns if he obtains promise of security, these promises have been so often broken by the villagers that the Bheels now are afraid to come in notwithstanding the most solemn assurance unless they get an order from me which they invariably consider as sufficient protection.

The enemity of the inhabitants against the Bheels is carried to such lengths that they would rejoice and join heartily in any plan for their extrapation in consequence of their long sufferings and this same feeling prevails so much as to induce them to receive them into their villages unwillingly and to withhold from them that subsistance on which they principally must depend for support.

My little experience in this country is sufficient to convince me that the Bheels must be provided for, before the constant robberees will , by any means , abate, and that by reestablishing the Bheel police on a permanent footing within their own districts the object of drawing them from the Hills and of rendering them useful members of society will be obtained better than by embodying them in any shape whatever. The condition of the village Bheel at present is in many instances truly miserable and that class of society which is bound to support them, the labouring farmer, is too poor to feed men those that now remain, much less to provide for those that might be induced to quit their fastnesses, Many villages in each District have been deserted for years, some have lately becomes so, and portions of those inhabited even contain so few people as to render it impossible for them often to feed the number of watchmen that originally - belonged to the village, and the resources of those Bheels thus expelled from their homes, out casts from society, accustomed to the most servile occupation in the villages from their births and unused to the independent occupations of husbandry or manufacture are driven by femine and distress to theft while the extensive wastes of jungle in all parts of Candish are favourable to their attacks and to their escape. Admitting this reasoning to be formed on fact it becomes an object to point out some mode by which the Bheel shall be reclaimed from his future pursuits and return to that state of society to which he originally belongs and in which he is so essentially useful. The Bheels of the Chandoor and Wun districts are the instruments of interior police and

since my enhance into Candaish I there not heard of a single complaint of a highway robbery in either of those Districts; some of the Chandoor, Jaglas were guilty of making on attack on a village, south of the Godavary but I do not believe hardly one person who was in that attack has escaped without being taken up either by the police of the Collector of Ahmednager or by my own people; - The Chiefs of the Arrmudy Bheels, originally watchmen in the Districts of Patoda, Bygapoor Karrapoor Nimbayat and Chickulhut - in Candaish have in like manner sent the village watchmen back to their villages from the Hills and have either to kept in cheek all robberies but the Bheels complain of the unwillingness of the Husbandmen to feed them - notwithstanding the most positive orders to induce them to do so - The Caldurry Bheels Naiqs have not parted with their - followers yet and I have lately received some complaints of their incursions - but if ever it is found necessary to attack them they will be reduced to terms in course of a very short time by our stopping provisions passing to themfrom the plain and by entering the Hills and destroying what they have there; I was compelled to have recourse to this expedient with the arrmuddy Satmalla Bheels and I ascribe their subsequent conduct alone to their conviction of our possessing the means of destroying them whenever they provoke us. The country of which I have now been speaking in Gungturry is tolerably well peopled, no villages are entirely deserted and the Bheels of each village have therefore a home to return to where they can subsist. This

is by no means the condition of Candeish where pestilience, famine have successfully depopulated it - and the retoration of the Bheels therefore to their former occupation becomes, an object at present to be attained only by same general fund for the purpose.

At present the whole weight of supporting the village watchmen that remain falls exclusively on the husbandmen and this class of the community tho' the most industrious - is the poorest, and consequently the least able of any to bear the burthen, custom has settled a tythe on the crops for the support of the watchmen to which none but the husbandmen course contributes and his poverty at once accounts for his incapacity to feed them. There are two modes by which the Bheels in Candish may be provided for, the one is by levying a tax on the whole of the inhabitants and the other is by Government bearing the whole weight of their subsistance. The general poverty of the inhabitant is certainly adverse to any additional taxes on those who now contribute to the revenue but so large a part of the population of our Indian Government contributes so little to the general fund of taxation that by dividing the burthen amongst the whole community those who now contribute would in some measure be measure be alleviated from the demand upon them on account of the Bheels. I propose that every house in each village should pay one rupee annually and that each village should contribute on an average one Rupee monthly. That each Bheel watchman should receive monthly two Rupees, a sum which

in Candish will not support more than one person of the very lowest order with food, it is still sufficient to induce the Bheels to relinquish their predatory habits for, but if a Bheel has a family he must still be active, he must employ himself or his family in cutting grass, or wood or in some occupation by which he may earn a livelihood and this very circumstance would soon of itself alter their present inveterate habits; all the Bheels in the villages after this should be registered and the Potail be held responsible for their appearance, The Bheel Naiqs for their conduct, that a petty Naiq of a Bheels should form part of the Establishment of each Shiekhdar over eighteen or fifteen villages and that a chief Naiq should reside with the Mamlatdar of the District and be at the head of the police intelligences, that each of these persons should receive a salary equal to ½ a Rupee monthly for every village under their control, Many of the Hill Chiefs will be glad to return to their plain on such terms and the number of village Bheels which will thus be decoyed from the hills will back up the community and act as guides to the attack of those who obstinately persist in remaining - A tax of this nature would at the above rate sense to feed 4588 Bheels, a great number more than there ever were watchmen and the amount which would be realised from 2321 villages containing 1,10,182 houses would produce a sum equal to 1,38,034 Rupees annually, and which will be more than adequate to meet the object in view.

It need not be asserted that the contributions to the revenue in Candeish are capable of bearing an additional impart of 13,8000 Rupees but when it is recollected that the Bheel watchmen are now maintained solely by the industrious cultivators which only compose one fourth of the population, another fourth is composed of mechanics manufacturers, and shopkeepers and that more than half according to a mean lately taken of seven districts contribute nothing whatever to the support of Government it will in fact alleviate part of the burthen now pressing on the agricultural classes and bear equally on every member of society who is much interested in any arrangement which contributes so materially to the security of person and property; supposing for a moment that the demands on the former would not even be removed which is not the case, as all Husks or claims of Bheels will henceforward cease, there is hardly an agricultural house that does not pay 50 Rupees at l(e)ast annually to Government an additional burthen of ½ percent per annum for so great an object would if necessary be voluntarily subscribed under the present condition of private property - that I think it may be concluded that so far from suffering from the new mode of paying the village watchmen that the agricultural classes will in fact contribute less than they do at present.

If it shall still be thought that no assessment however inconsiderable should be raised on those who contribute to

the revenue, one half the population, much of which is in (every and many members in) affluent circumstances, might be called upon to aid Government in the promotion of this plan but to this there are objections. First that these people viz. persons not following any occupations, but living on their private means, Bramins and Mahomedans having been hitherto exempt might consider this small tax a grievance when not imposed generally on the whole community and secondly as one cannot ascertain exactly the member of Bheels that would come in nor exactly what would be collected the precise amount could not be calculated, and at all events, whatever may be your determination on the subject, I am of opinion till the villages become more populous that that portion allotted out of the annual subscription of 12 Rupees for the payment of the Bheel Naiqs should be paid by the Government, and their salaries for them might be fixed at a rate less than that proposed in the former part of this dispatch - with regards to the native of the Bheels of the Hills amongst whom may be reckoned Goomany Naiq of Sindwa and one or two others it is (my) intention to employ a part of their Retainers on pay for their protection of the Ghants such as the Sindwa, Dhorala, and Dholecote Barry and to do away with other claims they now have on passengers; but to induce any of them to control to accede to our proposals however liberal or reasonable it is necessary to show them how completely they are in our power, one attack of major MacBeans appears to have dissipated the host of 1200 followers of the renowned Cannaih

Bheel and are now suffering in vain to find him or his bands in order to reclaim them. This dispersion was effected in spite of the open protection and encouragement of Sindia's officers... Dasrut Náiq now remains covered by Sindia's District of Chopra and the of all the Bheel-(?) he has made several successful inroads upon our Districts with from 200 to 300 men, including Horse and some Arabs Infantry. But the moment it becomes convenient to attack him we have it in our power to dissipate his numbers effectually and to subject him to our own terms, this however unless it leads to extripation or (?) has no sensible effect on the mass of the Bheels who immediately revert to gang robberees in some numbers which evade pursuit by the nature of the country.

I should apologize perhaps for having continued to press the subject of the house tax, the payment of the Bheels, again on your notice after being aware from your private communications how averse you are to load the inhabitants of the Canduish, impoverished as they are, with an additional assessment, nor should I have done so but from a conviction in my mind that an extra contribution of this nature for the attainment of on object so desirable, would be chearfully paid by all classes and the measure hailed with general satisfaction -

I have the honour to be
Sir Your most obedient and humble
servant
John Briggs.
Political Agent in Candesh

(Source: Briggs to Elp., D&F 174, Letter no. 367)

APPENDIX (II)

List of sums paid annually to following BhillChiefs in Baglana & ofthe Satpoora & Chandore Ranges.

Hills	Names	Watchmen of What District	Dateof letter wherein allu-ded to	Totalof each chief	Grand total
1	2	3	4	5	6
Baglana	Dusrut naiq	Laitapur, Wansa	24th Septr.	102-12-0	
	Govind naiq Wuntaklycar	Laitapur		30₹- 6-0	
	Gung naiq Narcolicar			1₹3- ₹-0	
	Ookunda naiq			60- 0-0	
	Roop Sing naiq			75-3½-0	
	Mohun Naiq Bhamercar	Laitapoor, Korally Tilwun		12₹-15-0	
	Mohun naiq Salwuncar	Laitapur		25- 5-0	
	Mohun naiq Potail naiq Galwarcur	Laitapoor		76- 2½-0	
Gunjoo naiq, Nyana naiq,dhukumleycur		Laitapoor, Barry		469- 1-0	
	Cund naiq, Badul naiq, Kall naiq Owcharkur	Pimpalner, Laitapoor, Pissale, Barry		420- 4-0	
	Rajah Sreepat Garrycur	Warsal		₹7-10½-0	
	Jawjee naiq Malgaoncur	Laitapoor		14- 0-0	

1	2	3	4	5	6
Baglana	Dhondy Bedur	Zaitapoor		236-14-0	
	Dhoorjum naiq Bahoolnycur	Zeitapoor		21- 0-0	
	Chundoo Prudhan	Zeitapoor		290- 0-0	
	Ivorjan (?) naiq Kundycur	Zeitapoor		1027- 7-0	
	Kowjee naiq Dhumerecur	Tilwun		63- 0-0	
	Neem naiq Chasurcur	Chasur		52- 0-0	
	Ramchunder Naiq Kirlycur	Warsa		300- 2-0	
	Rajah Kooshul Koowar Dhurbotycur	Oomerput		218- 0-0	
	Jeewa Wussava	Bhamer, Pissale, Dhywul, Pimpalner, Chuwpullah		4280- 0-0	
	Chunder Sing Rana of Boodawul	Nandoorbar, Kuniny, Sooltanpoor		1770- 0-0	
	<u>The undermentioned Bheel Chiefs dependent on the Rana of Boodawul.</u>				
	Luchmun Parwy			200- 0-0	
	Pasha Parwy			200- 0-0	
	Raila Parwy			200- 0-0	
	Chamar Walwee	Raj Peepla, Bhamer		300- 0-0	

1	2	3	4	5	6
Chandore Range	Bapooji & Joewajee naiq Arrauddy Bheels	Patoda, Byzapoor Kundalla	27th Sept.		
	Rare naiq - " -	Dapur, Chichulwahul, Nimbayet		3000-0-0	
	Romul naiq, Mohun naiq, Jahitoo naiq, Shankar naiq Satmally Bheels	Chaslesgaum, Kunnur Bhaul, Ranjungaum		649-0-0	
	Bayajee naiq, Wahag naiq, Janee naiq, Caldurry Bhil	Bhurgaon, Barnair, Lahana, Sindoorny, Irrundole, Meyswur.		948-0-0	
	Sutwajee naiq & Soorajee naiq, Sutcoond Bheels	Kunner, Ellora		343-0-0	4740-0-0
Satpoora Range	Bhylia and Cundia	Talneir	19th Nov	100-0-0	
	Cundoo naiq			200-0-0	
	Goomany naiq	Talneir		2000-0-0	
	Ramjee naiq, Ouchit naiq, Goorekur	Sooltanpoor, Bhamere		600-0-0	
	Roopsing naiq, Cundoo naiq, Rohunmakeecur	Talneir		200-0-0	3100-0-0
					18804-10½

Sd/- J. Briggs.

N. B. - In the Satpoora range most of the Bheels are under the protection of Sindia's Districts, and have refused to enter into terms, but continue to plunder.

(Source: Briggs to Elp. 25.2.1819, DCF 175, Letter No.424, enclosure).

Appendix III

Establishment or Bheel Nemnooks of the Satpoora Hills.

Date *	Name	Village **	Land Beegha	Rupees monthly	Annually
1	2	3	4	5	6
1819,	Kanniah Turwee	-	620	50	600
April 1st	Shah Baz Khan			33.5.1	400
	50 Bheels @ 5 Rupees including Meer Khan and Bheels	-	-	250	3000
					4000
1819,	Misree Khan Janorikur	-	250	30	360
April 1st	Boovan Khan Arrawad	-		12	144
	Meer Khan	-	500	8	96
	Bizle Khan	-		8	96
1819,	Dhondo Turwee	-	50	-	-
March 18	Meer Khan	-	100	-	-
" "	Bhicka Choudry	-	50	-	-
" "	Sullabut Khan	-	100	-	-
1819, March 21.	Janniah	-	-	50	600
" "	Dusurat Dhawlizkar	-			
" "	Dadhoo	-			
" "	Gawloo	-	-	30	360
" "	Ukdoo	-	-		
" "	Kokdoo	-	-		

1	2	3	4	5	6
1819 March 21	Dhunjee Umbhakur Ragmul Samah Bhagchund Bharmal	2	-	30	360
1819, Jan.16.	Goomany naiq of Sindwa	1	-	100	1200
	10 Sibundee			85	1020
	10 Sibundee			69	828
	10 Sibundee			51	612
	10 Sibundee			60	720
	Besides his Hucks to be continued				4380
1819 June 1st	Khundoo Bheel Roop Sing Naiq	-	250	25	300
1819 June 5th	Ouchittah	-	100	25	300
	Soobhaneah	-	50	16.10.3	200
1819 Sept.29	Dewjee naiq Sultanpoorkur	1	-	62.8.0	750
		4	2100	Total Rs.	16946

* Date means the date on which the nemnook agreement was signed by the Bhil naiks and Briggs.

** Village means village in Inam or rented by the Naik.

Source: Deccan Commissioner File, No.176.
Letter no.521,(Enclosure) dated 9th June 1819.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Unpublished :

At the Pune Archieves Pune :

(i) Deccan Commissioner's Files (Inward)
Volume Numbers 170 to 192, letters from Khandesh Collectorate.

(ii) Deccan Commissioner's Files (Outward)
Volume Numbers 402 to 422, letters from Commissioner

(iii) Khandesh Jamav, (Modi)

(iv) Satara Residency Files

(v) Diaries of Raja Pratap Sinh of Satara. (Modi)

At the Department of History, University of Poona, Pune.

Elphinstone Papers from the India Office Library, London, MSS EUR, collected by Dr. A. R. Kulkarni.

Published : (For the purposes of this thesis, all the published works of John Briggs are considered as Primary Sources).

(1) Briggs, John, The Present Land Tax In India, considered As A Measure of Finance, In order to Show Its Effects On the Government And The People of That Country, And On The Commerce of Great Britain.
London, 1830.

(ii) Briggs, John. Letters Addressed To Young Person In India Calculated To Afford Instruction For His Conduct In General And More Especially In His Intercourse With The Natives.
London, 1828.

(iii) Briggs,John.(Trans.) The History of The Rise of The Mahomedan Power In India by Muhammad Kasim Ibn Hindu Shah, (called Ferishta Astarabadi) (translation from Persian), 3 Vols., First Published, London, 1829, Indian Reprint, Calcutta, 1966.

(iv) Briggs,John.(trans.) The Siyar-ul-Mutakherin: A History of The Mahomedan Power In India During The Last Century, by Mir Gholam Hussein-Khan (translation from Persian), London, 1832.

(v) Briggs,John. Two Lectures On the Aboriginal Races of India As Distinguished From The Sanskritic or Hindu Race. (Delivered before the Royal Asiatic Socie 8th May and 19th, 1852)
Harrison and Son, Westminster,N.D.

(vi) Chaplin,William, A Report On the Fiscal And Judicial System of Administration in the Deccan.
Bombay, 1824.

(vii) Choksey,R.D., Early British Administration, Pune,1964.

(viii)Choksey,R.D., Period of Transition, Pune, 1945.

(ix) Elphinstone,Mountstuart, Report On the Territories Conquered From The Peishwa,
Indian Reprint, Delhi, 1973.

(x) Forrest,Sir G.W., Selections from the Minutes and Other Official Writings of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, London 1882

(xi) Furber,H., The Private Record of an Indian Governor-Generalship.(The correspondence of Sir John Shore, Gov.Gen. with Henry Dundas).
Harrard, 1933.

(xii) Ingram, E., Two Views of British India. (The private correspondence of Mr. Dundas and Lord Wessesley)
Somerset, 1970.

(xiii) Kaye,Sir John William, Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalf, London, 1855.

(xiv) ---- Mahārāshtrāchya Itihāsāchi Sādhane,Vol.24,Dhule

(xv) Sardesai,G.S.,Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol.12 and 13, Bombay, 1953.

(xvi)Sardesai,G.S.,Selections from the Peshwa Daftar,Vol.41.Bombay.

(xvii) -- Selection of Papers From the Records At the East India House, Relating to the Revenue, Police And Civil And Criminal Justice Under The Company's Government of India, Vols.III & IV,
London (?), 1820-1826.

(xviii) -- Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No.xxvi (New Series) Bombay, 1856

SECONDARY SOURCES

Baden-Powell, B.H. Land Revenue and Tenure in British India, Oxford, 1913

Ballhatchet,K., Social Policy and Social change in Western India, Oxford, London, 1957

Bearce, G. D., British Attitude Towards India, Oxford,1961.

Bell, Evans, Memoir of General John Briggs, London, 1885

Blacker, Valentine, Memoir of the Operations of the British Army In India During the Mahratta War, 1817, 1818 and 1819, 2 Vols., London, 1821.

- - - Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. 12 (Khandesh) Bombay, 1880.

Burke, E., Collected Works of Edmund Burke, London, 1894

Burns, J.H. and Hart,H.L.A.,(ed) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, (collected works of Jeremy Bentham) London, 1970.

Burton, R.G., The Mahratta and Pindari War, Indian Reprint. Delhi, 1975.

Burtt, E. The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, New York, 1939

Chakravorty, U.N., Anglo Maratha Relations and Malcolm, New Delhi, 1979.

Choksey, R.D., Economic Life in Bombay Konkan, Bombay, 1960

Choksey, R.D., Raja Pratasinh of Satara,(1818-1839),Pune 1970.

Choksey, R.D., Mountstuart Elphinstone, Bombay 1971

Colebrooke,Sir T.E., Life of the Hon'ble Mount Stuart Elphinstone, 2 Vols., London, 1884.

Cowling, Maurice, Mill and Liberalism, Cambridge, 1963

Doshi, S.L. Bhils, Delhi, 1971

Elliot,Sir H.M., History of India, Vol.vi, Indian Reprint, Allahabad, 1972

Enthoven, R. E., The Tribes And Castes of Bombay, Vol.I Bombay, 1920.

Frazer, J. G., Letters of William Cowper, 2 Vos. London,1912.

Grand Duff, A History of the Marathas, (Revised with an introduction by S.M.Edwards), 2 Vlos, Oxford, 1921.

Gleig, G.R., The Life of Major General Sir Thomas Munro, 3 Vols., London, 1830.

Gune, V. T., The Judicial System of the Marathas, Pune 1953

Gupta, P.C., Baji Rao II and the East India Company, 1796-1818, Allied Publishers, 1964.

Gupta, S.C., Agrarian Relations and Early British Rule in India, Bombay 1963.

Kaye, Sir John William, The Administration of the East India Company, Indian Reprint, Allahabad, 1966

--- " --- The Life and Correspondence of Maj. Gen. Sir Malcolm., London, 1856.

Kincaid,D., British Social Life in India (1608-1937, London.1938

Kopf, D., British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance Calcutta, 1969.

Kulkarni,A.R., James Cunningham Grant Duff (Marathi), Pune 1971.

Philips, C.H., The East India Company (1784-1834), Manchester University, 1940.

--- Maharashtra State Gazetteer, Vol. 17 Dhulia District, (Revised edition), Bombay 1974.

Malcolm,Sir John, The Government of India, London, 1833.

Marshall,P.J., Problems of Empire: Britain and India, 1757-1813, London, 1968.

Mukherjee,N., The Ryotwari System in Madras 1742-1827,Calcutta,196

Mukherjee,R. The Rise and Fall of the East Indian Company,Bombay 1955.

Mukherjee,S.N., Sir William Jones: A Study in Eighteenth Century British Attitude to India, Cambridge, 1968.

Naik T.B., The Bhils, Delhi, 1956

Nightingle,Pamela, Trade and Empire In Western India 1784-1806 , Cambridge, 1970.

Ravinder Kumar, Western India In the 19th Century, London 1968

Roger, A., The Land Revenue of Bombay, 2 Vols., London, 1892

Sardesai, G.S., New History of the Marathas, 3 Vols. Bombay, 1945-1948.

Sen, S.N., Administrative System of the Marathas, Calcutta, 1923.

Simcox,A.H.A., A Memoir of the Khandesh Bhil Corps (1825-1891), Bombay, N.D. (Author's Preface dated 16th January 1912 P.

Spear, P., The Nabobs, London, 1963

Stark, W., Jeremy Bentham's Economic Writings, Vol. I, London, 1952.

Stokes, E., The English Utilitarians and India, Oxford, 1959.

Thakur, V.V., Holkarshāhichā Itihās, Indore, 1946.

Varma, (Kum) Sushma, Mountstuart Elphinstone in Maharashtra 1801-1827, New Delhi, 1981.